This post is a tad oblique, from the philosophyforums, but I'm putting it here for continuity.

Theological Realism & the Linguistic (re)Turn
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Medieval Theological Realism: Its Neoplatonic Anticipation of the Linguistic Turn
by johnboy


The proper (apophatic) predication of terms in our God-concept in cosmological arguments can 1) bolster our modal ontological arguments, 2) rebutt semantical anti-realism and 3) buttress theological realism. Medieval thomistic arguments as traditionally influenced by the neoplatonic linguistic tradition remain robust and are effective in answering modern idealist critiques.


In theology, the process of kataphasis (or the kataphatic approach) involves the attempt to gain descriptive accuracy by positively describing God metaphorically, so to speak, using analogies. For this reason, some call it the via positiva.


The process of apophasis (or the apophatic approach) involves the attempt to gain descriptive accuracy by negatively describing God using disanalogies, anagogically employing the via negativa, reemphasizing the metaphorical nature of all God-talk.


Taken together, unitively and anagogically, these processes of kataphasis and apophasis, and these languages of metaphor and analogy, yield a mystagogy that sets forth divine attributes that render God intelligible even while, at the same time, leaving God utterly incomprehensible. Certain observable effects that derive from causes not locatable in either the conventional space-time-mass-energy plenum or any putative realm that adds additional primitives (�givens� or �fundamental properties� or dimensions), however material or immaterial, physical or nonphysical, whether in actuality or in principle, direct our attention to this transcendent wholly other. This veiled but utterly efficacious cause, such cause known only by such effects proper to no other, this transcendent wholly other, this utter incomprehensibility, sharing no physical, quasi-physical or metaphysical nature or essence, similarly shares with other natures no infinite causal regress, invoking neither the paradox of existence nor the paradox of infinity. The epitome of apophatic theology thus yields the paragon of all God-concepts pointing toward the wholly, wholly, wholly other with no confusing moon mistaken for one�s finger.


Theology thus distinguishes its object from those causes of physics and metaphysics, both veiled and unveiled, that inescapably evoke irresolute paradox, whether derived from the riddles of existence or of infinity. With such a cosmological God-concept thus predicated in essentially apophatic terms, modal ontological arguments thereby gain new impetus. They certainly avoid the self-contradictions alleged in the concepts derived from kataphatic and analogical attributes, for instance the putative omnipotence and omnibenevolence that create theodicy issues because of their too very narrowly conceived anthropomorphic understandings. They positively avoid any so-called unwarranted predication of being by existence, bounded or unbounded, because Ipsum Esse Subsistens absolutely individuates this God-concept from all other being. Once thus establishing the reasonableness of this concept, we can then speculate further, theologically. It creates an opening for interideological and interreligious dialogue, too.


Thus the neoplatonic analysis of the classical aristotelian conceptualizations, discriminating between our apophatic, kataphatic, metaphorical, analogical, anagogical and mystagogical linguistic processes, anticipates the linguistic turn, general semantics and analytic philosophy, and many centuries before Wittgenstein or E-prime. Don�t we ordinarily distinguish fairly well between the verb forms of �to be� based on identity vs predicates vs existence vs auxiliary usages and tenses? Do we really need to issue caveats not to treat terms applied in analogies univocally? Don�t we already know this? Does this linguistic awareness, by itself, really suggest compatability between an analytical thomism and a semantic antirealism ?


Stephen Boulter writes that �the form of x cannot come to be in a human intellect (barring Divine illumination) unless that intellect has direct sensory experience of x, or some of x�s adequate effects.� He notes how Haldane commits thomism to the principle that out of sight means out of mind by quoting that ancient slogan, �There is nothing on the lips that was not first (or simultaneously, and ipso facto) in the intellect, and nothing in the latter that was not first in the senses.� He properly concludes, consistent with my apophatic disquisition regarding God-concepts, above: �But this overlooks the fact that [Aquinas] recognizes two ways of acquiring knowledge of the natural world: one can come to know something directly by being literally informed of the object in question in the manner Haldane has discussed; or one can form some idea of the existence and nature of something indirectly by noting its effects.� [1]


Some question the propriety of such a strategy to defend theological realism by analogy with a defense of realism in the philosophy of science. However, do we not use a seamless epistemological garment in our philosophy of nature, our philosophy of science, our metaphysics and theology, in each discipline deriving some intelligibility of veiled causes from their effects by drawing analogies with similar effects from otherwise comprehensible unveiled causes? Those who question this strategy sometimes offer a Christocentric realism (and with some merit but, in my opinion, requiring, very much, a less fideistic development), however unnecessarily considering it over against the God of philosophy or natural theology. [2] At any rate, I rather like both approaches, properly pursued.


Have we not already sewn the fabric of the rebuttal of skepticism, in arguing for realism in both science and theology, using the very same threads of reductio ad abusurdum analyses of the self-contradictory anti-realist epistemologies as intertwined with our first principles and prephilosophical presuppositions (the intrinsic representational character of thought and the intrinsic intelligibility of the world, much less the existence of other minds)? Failing to reject deeply flawed, fundamental humean premises, Kant fashioned a philosophical garment that covers no one�s metaphysical derriere. Why wear that silly epistemological hospital gown? Why repeat that mistake and compound Kant and Hume�s anti-realist errors by unraveling the very reductio ad absurdum threads that sewed our aristotelian robes of science together in the first place?


Boulter makes the case that epistemological and ontological realism without semantical realism pays a high price forcing one to say that �that section of the reality manifest to the senses is not wholly intelligible to human beings, or one must produce some theory of the world that makes no use of all mature scientific theory,� much less modern scientific cosmology, quantum interpretations and speculative cognitive science.


1) Boulter, Stephen J., Could Aquinas Accept Semantic Anti-Realism? , The Philosophical Quarterly Vol. 48, No. 193, (Oct 1998), 504-513.


2) Moore, Andrew, Theological Realism and the Observability of God, International Journal of Systematic TheologyVolume 2, Issue 1 (March 2000) Page 79.

pax,
jb

JB, a couple days ago I read through a few more of those posts at the Philosophy forums. I ran into a particularly post that I was impressed with, written by a certain someone we all know in response to an analogy that your line of reasoning was akin to the ancient superstitious maps that wrote "dragon" in the margins as a placeholder for "unknown lands."

quote:

If you still have a map whose margins read: "Here there be dragons", then you need a new map, the margins of which read: "Here there be quarks, muons, gluons, superstrings, supersymmetry, supervenience, superluminality, nonlocality, eigenstates, spatialized time, multiverses, parallel universes, temporalized space, negative entropy, Penrose's microtubulur quantum properties, Chalmers' phenomenal consciousness as a primitive fundamental property, consciousness as emergent, consciousness as supervenient."

Thus the neoplatonic analysis of the classical aristotelian conceptualizations, discriminating between our apophatic, kataphatic, metaphorical, analogical, anagogical and mystagogical linguistic processes, anticipates the linguistic turn, general semantics and analytic philosophy, and many centuries before Wittgenstein or E-prime. Don�t we ordinarily distinguish fairly well between the verb forms of �to be� based on identity vs predicates vs existence vs auxiliary usages and tenses? Do we really need to issue caveats not to treat terms applied in analogies univocally? Don�t we already know this? Does this linguistic awareness, by itself, really suggest compatability between an analytical thomism and a semantic antirealism ?

I can't say that I follow all this, JB, but I was wondering if that thread was going to rope you in. To me, that initial post, and the examples given, were just a bit silly. Ooops. I mean, to me those examples evoked a mental state of bewilderment.

JB said (elsewhere): Have we not already sewn the fabric of the rebuttal of skepticism, in arguing for realism in both science and theology, using the very same threads of reductio ad abusurdum analyses of the self-contradictory anti-realist epistemologies as intertwined with our first principles and prephilosophical presuppositions (the intrinsic representational character of thought and the intrinsic intelligibility of the world, much less the existence of other minds)? Failing to reject deeply flawed, fundamental humean premises, Kant fashioned a philosophical garment that covers no one�s metaphysical derriere. Why wear that silly epistemological hospital gown? Why repeat that mistake and compound Kant and Hume�s anti-realist errors by unraveling the very reductio ad absurdum threads that sewed our aristotelian robes of science together in the first place?

I'm in stitches.

quote:

Originally posted by Brad Nelson:
[qb] JB, a couple days ago I read through a few more of those posts at the Philosophy forums. I ran into a particularly post that I was impressed with, written by a certain someone we all know in response to an analogy that your line of reasoning was akin to the ancient superstitious maps that wrote "dragon" in the margins as a placeholder for "unknown lands."

quote:

If you still have a map whose margins read: "Here there be dragons", then you need a new map, the margins of which read: "Here there be quarks, muons, gluons, superstrings, supersymmetry, supervenience, superluminality, nonlocality, eigenstates, spatialized time, multiverses, parallel universes, temporalized space, negative entropy, Penrose's microtubulur quantum properties, Chalmers' phenomenal consciousness as a primitive fundamental property, consciousness as emergent, consciousness as supervenient."

[/qb]

If you read further, you will see where I was mercilessly ad hominem-uh-nimmed and just gave up. That's why I started the new thread in the spirituality forum ... with less than oblique references to E-prime, with which I wrote that initial post, btw, except for others' quotes

D. David Bourland, student of Alfred Korzybski , pioneered the use of E-Prime , a semantic hygiene that dispenses with any form of the verb �to be� and, supposedly, thus eliminates or reduces the paradox and confusion that come about from the fact that �to be� and is can be used interchangeably for auxiliaries, predicates, identities or existence. This neo-linguistic approach is a non-aristotelian linguistic system, which supposedly attempts to abolish the is of aristotelian essence. It is thus hailed not only as a triumph of general semantics but as an inoculation against metaphysics and theology. It is supposed to eliminate false dichotomies, bivalence, two-valued logic and either-or thinking, adhering to a principle of non-identity; hence Korzybski is credited with �The map is not the territory.�

E-prime is thus claimed to free us from a medieval aristotelian framework, ridding us of the proposition of �isness� and all of the ambiguity and paradox it generates. Some have used it to parody Catholicism based on its aristotelian metaphysical traditions.

So, I have done a little searching for any commentary on E-Prime by Catholic authors or philosophers. Failing there I have looked into analytical thomism, thinking some linguistic and semantical discussions there might inform my perspective. Not much specific insight to glean there either. I have, however, enjoyed toying around with E-Prime and my metaphysical leanings as a koan of sorts and it has been a useful heuristic for bringing certain metaphysical concepts into sharper relief. These koan-like exercises did seem useful where theoretical ontological entities are concerned and I found that, ironically, a certain clarity might be gained regarding metaphysics and theology and not rather their abolition as some advocates of E-Prime contend. After all, as we know from neoplatonic influences on thomism, linguistic analysis didn�t begin with modern general semantics and Wittgenstein.

These E-Prime koans brought to mind what we already know about the need to disentangle our concepts involving, for instance, a) the God of philosophy and the God of Revelation; b) the apophatic and kataphatic approaches; c) physics, metaphysics and meta-metaphysics; d) being and Being; e) esse and Ipsum Esse Subsistens; f) analogous commonalities and absoulte differentition; g) forma in aristotelian thomism�s hylomorphism; actus essendi or esse in existential thomism ; intellectual dynamism in transcendental thomism; symbolic logic in analytical thomism; phenomenological approach in personalist thomism; h) apophatic versus kataphatic predications of modal ontological arguments; i) direct knowledge and indirect knowledge by effects; etc

Here is my inventory of E-Prime Insights anticipated by Thomistic Metaphysics

1) E-prime can help break the materialist-dualist deadlock, not unlike the Bohm interpretation treatment of wave-particle unity. These distinctions are anticipated in aristotelian thomism�s hylomorphism and can be further elucidated by analytical thomism.

2) E-prime refocuses our intention from the ontological to the existential and the operational. These distinctions are anticipated by existential thomism in its treatment of being not merely as an ontological isness (forma) but more fundamentally as an operational act (actus essendi).

3) E-prime refocuses our intention from the ontological to the phenomenological. This distinction is anticipated in the phenomenological approach of personalist thomism. It perhaps also clarifies the distinction between human being and human becoming.

4) E-prime opens us to a plurality of views in giving an account of reality and is informed by Kant�s view of how it is we construct reality and is not inconsistent in this regard with the intellectual dynamism of transcendental thomism.

5) E-prime helps us to discover metaphors and analogies, disguised metaphors and disguised analogies, in our thoughts and in our language, and in this regard was anticipated by the neoplatonic linguistic tradition that influenced thomism, drawing proper distinctions in God-concepts between analogous kataphatic commonalities and transcategorical apophatic differentiations. This is a pivotal distinction required in the proper predication of such concepts for modal ontological arguments to the extent one might want to avoid both self-contradictory terms (that generate theodicy issues) and so-called tautological predications of being by existence (not a problem insofar as Ipsum Esse Subsistens absolutely individuates and differentiates God).

6) To the extent E-Prime conflates physics and metaphysics, this is anticipated by the hylomorphism of an aristotelian thomism, avoiding dualism and materialism, partly analogous perhaps to a neutral monism and some naturalistic dualisms though not causally closed physically.

7) E-Prime, in restricting metaphysical language, as above, is anticipated by apophatic theology, which has only negations to offer and no direct knowledge about God to assert or to make statements of isness about due to utter incomprehensibility and thus is indeed good semantic hygiene even in theology.

8) When kataphatic theological affirmations are formulated, E-prime precision reveals the metaphorical and analogical nature of the God-concepts for this veiled but utterly efficacious cause, such cause known only by such effects proper to no other, such a cause the motives and nature of which remain inscrutable even when its effects are not.

9) All of these applications of E-Prime are to the God of philosophy and of natural theology. They didn�t rid us of metaphysics but were leveraged on behalf of metaphysics to lend clarity, erase ambiguity and eliminate unnecessary paradox and thereby point us toward the insights garnered from the dialogue between the aristotelian, existential, transcendental, personalist and analytical schools of thomism, totally consistent with the neoplatonic linguistic tradition�s influence on thomism.

Now, mind you, I didn�t write this in E-prime because, after my koan work was done, I realized it had added neither jot nor tittle by way of a critique of thomism that hadn�t already found its way in to the schools, traditions and influences discussed above, not to say that Meister Eckhart and Pseudo-Dionysius might not have found it useful, not to suggest that all of the folks who misinterpret and misconstruct thomism could not benefit from a few koans themselves. I�m certainly not going to subject revealed theology to this process but will leave the exegetes to their form, literary, historical and redaction criticisms. It may, however, be something the Jesus Seminar will want to take up with its already one-dimensional, impoverished Christology.

If you read further, you will see where I was mercilessly ad hominem-uh-nimmed and just gave up.

I seriously doubt you'll ever give up. Being whacked on the head doesn't mean you're necessarily right, but it does mean you're having an impact.

This neo-linguistic approach is a non-aristotelian linguistic system, which supposedly attempts to abolish the is of aristotelian essence. It is thus hailed not only as a triumph of general semantics but as an inoculation against metaphysics and theology.

Be wary when a change of language is needed to make some belief system make sense. I'm suspicious of anything that needs to be so carefully isolated and removed from reality in order to function properly. No doubt, as you say, E-Prime can be useful and I can't even begin to understand some of the uses you've put it to. But my little intuitive grey cells (a cluster of which form a "spider sense" area in the brain which is tingling even now) tell me to be on guard against techniques that turns us into little machines in the service of geeky scientists instead of emphasizing science in the service of humans and knowledge. Our normal mode of speaking is filled with emotion, intuitions and other irrational things, but they are not necessarily just so much excess baggage. They ARE our finally tuned instruments of investigation.

To be or not to be? That is the inflection.

To be or not to be? That is the inflection.

What Brad meant in E-Prime was: The famous interrogatory soliloquy "To exist or not to exist?" came to mind in this particular context.

An Online E-Prime Checker or Download your own - in freeware

Which reminds me�since Panther head coach John Fox is apparently fond of clich�d phrases, one of his favorites being "It is what its is", who's your pick in the SuperBowl, JB?

Or does that Doris Day signature song come more into play? Or maybe it's time to fix your own signature. It's practically a whole hive of bees.

--------------------

I be cool with that.

I am pulling for the Cajun QB

Don't some opinions have both more modeling power re: reality and hypothetical fecundity re: science than others?

Taking Wittgenstein's counsel, should we be confusing the separate issues of how things are with that things are?

Ever notice the inherently obfuscatory nature of aristotelian God-concepts? Those concepts that are traditionally used in so-called proofs of God? Such obfuscations arise from the ambiguities that result from the many possible uses of the verb to be, such as 1) to establish identity 2) to indicate existence 3) to predicate a concept or 4) to use as an auxiliary of another verb form, as well as from 5) confusion regarding tenses.

Because of those ambiguities, much confusion results when God-concepts get plugged into informal discussions as well as into formal logical systems, including modal ontological arguments. The God-speak of aristotelian thomism mostly involves metaphorical language. This language of metaphor necessarily results from natural theology's search for analogical commonalities between physical and/or metaphysical aspects of a hypothetical creation and putative divine attributes of a hypothetical Creator. This is because the hypothetical Creator-concept, in order to be non-self-contradictory and logically consistent, must employ only such properties that are logically guaranteed to be conceptually compatible with each other because of their negativity. As such they could entail no conceptually incompatible attributes.

The implications are that, for theo-speak, all positive statements about God are necessarily analogical and cannot be used willy-nilly in formal logic without committing category errors. Only negatively framed conceptualizations can suitably predicate a God-concept, absolutely individuating and differentiating the meta-metaphysical Creator-concept from all creature-concepts, which might be physical, quasi-physical or metaphysical.

The implications are that how things are, then, whether physically, quasi-physically or metaphysically in a putative created realm, are not dispositive of the questions surrounding that things are, which are framed meta-metaphysically of a putative Creator, which by definition remains utterly incomprehensible, though somewhat intelligible through analogical speculations.

The upshot of this is that, when shorn of any philosophical excess, except for the prephilosophical and prescientific existential warrants we all employ, it is of no substantive theological import whether Sagan's infinite cosmos and Hawkings' spatialization of time hypotheses are correct or whether William Lane Craig's kalam cosmological argument is correct, whether Dennett's consciousness "explanation" is correct or Dembski's spiritual machine is correct, whether Dawkins red in tooth and claw evolution is correct or whether Behe's irreducible complexity is correct. So, to the extent that cosmology and consciousness might seem to be the final frontiers for physics and/or metaphysics re: how things are, they are not, in principle, dispositive of the meta-metaphysical hypothesis re: that things are.

However, I am not saying that the ultimate resolution or irresolution of such intractable questions might not evoke interesting analogues re: a putative Creator-concept. In that vein, all Darwin did was to dispossess some folks of a misinterpreted analogue. To that extent, all Sagan, Craig, Dennett, Dembski, Dawkins, Behe et al could ever provide us, of theological import, are some additional analogues to speculate on re: Creator-concepts. Things could still get much more interesting physically, quasi-physically and metaphysically, and i think it is much too early to rule out any possibilities in those putative realms a priori. I will say this: Evolution has too much modeling power for me to abandon that paradigm, even if some hold out that it is mere opinion. My worldview wouldn't come crashing down, however, if irreducible complexity were ever proved.

As for Time, Proof of God? contains catgeory errors. I think the question has metaphysical import, however, should we ever discover that actual infinities are instantiated in physical/metaphysical reality. If Max Tegmark is correct about Parallel Universes, then John Haldane is also correct: "Reality is not stranger than we imagine but stranger than we can imagine!" Haldane may be on to something but we shouldn't forget Chesterton in that we don't know enough about the unknown to say that it is unknowable.

pax,
jb

I am pulling for the Cajun QB

He wound up acquitting himself well. I almost fell asleep during the first half but the Superbowl finally acquitted itself too in the second.

I just posted this at philosophyforums.com -

Wonder how they'll like it?

Contra-Dennett: the Skinnerian Neuromythology of Consciousness Explained

quote:

� if the brain were simple enough for us to understand it, we would be so simple that we
couldn't �

G. E. Pugh

What One Will NOT Find in Consciousness Explained:

1) any theses or arguments intended to state the literal truth [1]
2) discrimination between conscious and nonconscious events [2]
3) a satisfactory answer to how physical processes in the brain cause consciousness [8]
4) an empirical theory of consciousness -- as Dennett himself somewhat rashly claims [14]
5) an explanation of what it is to adopt the Intentional Stance [35]
6) consciousness explained away [38]
7) attention to the role of emotions
8) an account of consciousness that considers the autonomic and peripheral nervous
systems, the neuroendocrine system and axis, the endocrine and immune systems
9) an explanation for how the 'Joycean machine' ( as stream-of-consciousness virtual
machine) works
10) analysis of noumenon [46]


What One Will Find in Consciousness Explained:

1) a family of metaphors [1]
2) metaphors, which, as a set of tools, have serious design faults [2]
3) Joycean Machine metaphor ( that does not add up to a theory of consciousnes [2]
4) Probing and narrative-precipitation ( that fail to mark off conscious from nonconscious
events) [2]
5) Consciousness ignored [3]
6) An undercutting of the database for the empirical study of CSC by restricting analysis to
inputs and to output "texts" (i.e., stimulus and response). Such practices as nearly killed
off CSC research earlier in this century. [4]
7) An erroneous assertion that the difference between misremembering(Orwellian) and
misrepresentation (Stalinesque) models of consciousness cannot be differentiated [5]
8) Philosophical misuse of an important neuropsychological phenomenon, known as
blindsight [6]
9) A hampering of scientific and philosophical understanding of the phenomenon and of
consciousness through a misrepresentation of blindsight [6]
10) A mistaken account of visual filling-in (described as results of the brain's "ignoring an
absence" or "jumping to a conclusion") insofar as it actually comprises a multitude of
different perceptual completion phenomena involving spatially propagating neural activity
(neural filling-in). [7]
11) Ignorance of the importance of a consideration of qualia to imagery and cognition [9]
12) A failed argument (however true its conclusion) against the Cartesian Screen [10]
13) A use of the concept of phenomenology in almost complete disregard of the work of
Husserl and his successors in German and French philosophy [11]
14) A textual relativism that undermines materialism [12]
15) A mistaken belief that qualia, and therefore their causes, can be temporally point- like,
but qualia theorists are committed to no such view; and without this commitment, the
argument from Orwellian/ Stalinesque indeterminacy does not succeed against qualia
[13]
16) a fully naturalized account of consciousness that manages to leave out the very
consciousness he purports to explain [15]
17) an argument that Dennet does not need to play the philosopher's game of saying
whether he is a behaviorist, a functionalist, an eliminativist [16]
18) Dennett as a behaviorist, a functionalist, and eliminativist [16]
19) verificationist attacks on qualia that are too radical to carry conviction [17]
20) accounts of pains, dreams, and images that in no case earn the eliminative conclusions of
his arguments [20]
21) an equation of reportability with consciousness, which completely leaves out the
qualitative content of conscious states [21]
22) an erroneous account of the blindspot and scotomas [22]
23) a Cartesian first-person operationalism [24]
24) fundamental eliminativism about phenomenology [29]
25) arguments that rely on a question-begging third-person absolutism [30]
26) question begging verificationism [31]
27) a failure of representationalism [37]
28) a pervasive neuromythology that is misleading about the scope and limits of science and,
hence, a 'scientism' that could give science a bad name [40]
29) fundamentalism on the scientific side of the fence [41]
30) a series of strawmen arguments [42]
31) cheap rhetorical shots, shellgames [43]
32) promising title, nowhere fulfilled [44]
33) determination by fiat, which phenomena are to be called conscious "scientifically"
followed by failed attempts to explain even them [44]
34) an analysis of phenomena [46]
35) a spiffy, up-to-date methodology of-- get this -- Skinnerian behaviorism [47]
36) a confounding of two distinct projects through a close interweaving of empirical
speculations into how intentional systems are built with a philosophical inquiry into what
intentional systems and intentional states are. [49]
37) a Skinnerian polemic which, by a series of slightly questionable steps, the reader is lead
to embrace an outrageous conclusion [50]
38) a jumbled mixture of neurophysiology, higher cognitive functions, current experience and
brute, all eminently suited to 'decomposing' a composite reification of those processes
into what the the "thinking thing" is.[51]
39) strawman arguments that undermine Cartesian materialism while carrying no weight
against a Phenomenal Realism [52]
40) denial of aspect to experience,the existence of which is both entirely compatible with
both functionalism and physicalism; hence, an account of consciousness that, in its
attempt to deny same, runs the risk of being seen to eliminate what it purports to
explain. [53]


1) McGinn, Colin. Consciousness Evaded: Comments on Dennett, Philosophical Perspectives,
Vol. 9, AI, Connectionism and Philosophical Psychology. (1995), pp. 241-249.

2) `The Best Set of Tools'? Dennett's Metaphors and the Mind-Body Problem
(in Discussions) Kirk, Robert, The Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 43, No. 172. (Jul., 1993), pp.
335-343.

3) Block, Ned. The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 90, No. 4. (Apr., 1993), pp. 181-193.

4) Dennett, consciousness, and the sorrows of functionalism. Mangan, Bruce, U California, Inst
of Cognitive Studies, Berkeley, US

5) Christie J; Barresi J, Department of Psychology, Dalhousie University, Halifax, Nova
Scotia, Canada, Consciousness and cognition, 2002 Jun, 11(2):347-65

6) Blindsight in hindsight, Consciousness and cognition, 1997 Mar, 6(1):67-74

7) Finding out about filling-in: a guide to perceptual completion for visual science and the
philosophy of perception.Pessoa L; Thompson E; Noe A; The Behavioral and brain sciences,
1998 Dec, 21(6):723-48; discussion 748-802

8) What is consciousness? Solms M, Academic Department of Neurosurgery, Royal London
Hospital, Whitechapel, England. Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, 1997,
45(3):681-703; discussion 704-78

9) The importance of a consideration of qualia to imagery and
cognition.Hubbard TL, Department of Psychology, Texas Christian University, Fort Worth,
Conscious Cogn. 1996 Sep;5(3):359-67

10) Dennett's Misrememberings,Bloomfield,-Paul, Philosophia-. Mr 98; 26(1-2): 207-218

11) Phenomenology and Fiction in Dennett, Carr,-David, International-Journal-of-
Philosophical-Studies. O 98; 6(3): 331-344, International-Journal-of-Philosophical-Studies

12) Dennett's Fictional Selves, Cooney,-Brian, Southwest-Philosophy-Review. Ja 94; 10(1):
117-124

13) Orwell, Stalin, and Determinate Qualia, Robinson,-William-S, Pacific-Philosophical-
Quarterly. Je 94; 75(2): 151-164

14) Dennett's Conceptual Reform, Ross,-Don, Behavior-and-Philosophy. Spr-Sum 94; 22(1):
41-52

15) Minds, Memes, and Rhetoric, Clark,-Stephen-R-L, Inquiry-. Mr 93; 36(1-2): 3-16,
Inquiry:-An-Interdisciplinary-Journal-of-Philosophy

16) Appendix A (For Philosophers), Jackson,-Frank, Philosophy-and-Phenomenological-
Research. D 93; 53(4): 899-903

17) The Elimination of Experience, Seager,-William, Philosophy-and-Phenomenological-
Research. Je 93; 53(2): 345-365

18) Rorty, Richard. "Blunder Around for a While." London Review of
Books (November 21, 1991), 13(22):3, 5-6.

19) Block, N. 1995. What is Dennett's theory a theory of? Philosophical
Topics 22:23-40.

20) Bricke, J. 1984. Dennett's eliminative arguments. Philosophical Studies
45:413-29.

21) Bricke, J. 1985. Consciousness and Dennett's intentionalist net.
Philosophical Studies 48:249-56.

22) Churchland, P. S. & Ramachandran, V. S. 1993. Filling in: Why Dennett
is wrong. In (B. Dahlbom, ed) Dennett and His Critics. Blackwell.

23) Clark, S. R. L. 1993. Minds, memes, and rhetoric. Inquiry 36:3-16.

24) Dretske, F. 1995. Differences that make no difference. Philosophical
Topics 22:41-57.

25) Fellows, R. & O'Hear, A. 1993. Consciousness avoided. Inquiry 36:
73-91.

26) Marbach, E. 1994. Troubles with heterophenomenology. In (R. Casati, B.
Smith, & S. White, eds) Philosophy and the Cognitive Sciences.
Holder-Pichler-Tempsky.

27) McCauley, R. N. 1993. Why the blind can't lead the blind: Dennett on
The blind spot, blindsight, and sensory qualia. Consciousness and Cognition
2:155-64.

28) McGinn, C. 1995. Consciousness evaded: Comments on Dennett.
Philosophical Perspectives 9:241-49.

29) Seager, W. E. 1993. Verification, skepticism, and consciousness.
Inquiry.

30) Siewert, C. 1993. What Dennett can't imagine and why. Inquiry.

31) Tye, M. 1993. Reflections on Dennett and consciousness. Philosophy and
Phenomenological Research 53:891-6.

32) Fodor, Jerry. "Deconstructing Dennett's Darwin." Mind &
Language (September 1996), 11(3):246-262.

33) McGinn, Colin. "Consciousness Evaded: Comments on Dennett."
In James E. Tomberlin, ed., AI, Connectionism and Philosophical
Psychology. Philosophical Perspectives, 9. Ridgeview: Atascadero, 1995.

34) Nagel, Thomas. Other Minds: Critical Essays 1969-1994. New
York & Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995. Includes "7. Dennett: Content and
Consciousness"; "8. Dennett: Consciousness Dissolved."

35) Slors, Marc. "Why Dennett Cannot Explain What It is to Adopt the Intentional Stance."
Philosophical Quarterly (January 1996), 46(182):93-98.

36) Tye, Michael. "Reflections on Dennett and Consciousness."Philosophy and
Phenomenological Research (December 1993), 53(4):893-898.

37) Ward, Andrew. "The Failure of Dennett's Representationalism: A Wittgensteinian
Resolution." Journal of Philosophical Research (1993), 18:285-307.

38) Wuketits, Franz. "Consciousness Explained--or Explained Away?"
Acta Analytica (1994): 55-64.

39) Yu, Paul and Gary Fuller. "A Critique of Dennett." Synthese (March
1986), 66(3):453-476.

40) Brains and minds: a brief history of neuromythology, R C Tallis, Fitzpatrick Lecture, given
at the Royal College of Physicians on 21 July 1999, J R Coll Physicians Lond 2000;34:563-7

41) Bernard Haisch, Freeing the Scientific Imagination, IONS Review #57, Sept. - Nov. 2001


42 �52) Excerpts from informal Reviews at Amazon.com


53) Shoemaker, Sydney, Lovely and Suspect Ideas ,Philosophy and Phenomenological
Research, Vol. 53, No. 4. (Dec., 1993), pp. 905-910.

It's think it's more likely that an understanding of consciousness will change our ideas of matter and energy rather than consciousness being neatly folded into our current ways of viewing the physical.

What's most likely, that we'll discover some new force or component that is currently hidden or that we'll simply clear up some of our misconceptions about what matter and energy really are?

My gut instinct is that consciousness has the ability to dramatically change most of our notions of the laws of energy and matter just as Einstein did to Newtonian physics and Planck, Bohr and Rutherford later did to everyone's physics.

The lack of an explanation for consciousness (which seems a possibility) would be even more dramatic - particularly if it can be proved that it's just impossible to know what it is and how it works.

So that's why arguing about property dualism isn't really going to go anywhere- it simply shuts down scientific investigation by claiming that we have a magic unexplainable presentation theater for our "experiences".

In that Dennett thread was the above quote. That really says it all. How dare feelings and thoughts exist! Why, things like that, if left unexplained, could leave room for � gasp! �things such as religion. Or worse. We might find out that science has its limitations; that there indeed are things beyond the material. Mustn't have that. That nasty ol' thing called consciousness must be reeled in. As The Borg said: "You will be assimilated. Resistance is futile." Better to make reality fit into science than science fit into reality. It seems that's been quite incumbent on religion for quite some time. Sauce for the goose�

JB: That's a particularly good link you provided in one of the philosophy forum threads: Freeing the Scientific Imagination:

quote:

It is acceptable, in fact even fashionable, to publish scientific papers today on theories of entire universes, invisible to us, that may be adjacent to our universe in higher dimensions. Such ideas go by the name of superstring theory and M-theory, and are considered among the most exciting and prestigious forefront areas of modern physics. Even universes right on top of our own, penetrating the space right under our noses, are considered plausible, provided you express this with impressive mathematics in terms of opposite chirality particles and interactions, for example. I myself have postdocs working for me who are experts in these areas.

If a religious person, however, talks about transcendent spiritual realities, that is scoffed at. For some reason the 11- or 26-dimensional string worlds�take your pick�of the physicist are fine, but the supernatural realms of the mystic are judged to be mere superstition. The word "supernatural" has been tarred and tainted by the materialist-reductionist guardians of the "natural" (meaning the particles and fields of modern physics). The interesting thing is that the string and brane universes remain theoretical concepts, whereas mystics throughout the ages report coherent and consistent observations of transcendent, that is, supernatural, realities. As an astrophysicist, I am partial to observations.

Additional from the above-mentioned link:

quote:

There seem to me to be three minimum foundations for a spiritual worldview:

- A creator who ultimately seeks benevolence�in spite of evidence that seems to contradict that notion�from our limited historical earthly perspective.

- Human beings as immortal spiritual forms evolving through temporary bodies.

- The existence of realms of reality beyond the presently known particles and forces of modern physics.

Without at least these three pillars, one may have a system of morals and ethics or a philosophy of life, but not a spiritual worldview. With each of these pillars, what starts as a system of morals and ethics moves progressively toward a substantively new vision of spirituality in nature, marrying the values of objective scientific discovery with the subjective experience of a far larger reality than that yet grasped by science.

These three pillars are at odds with the tenets of fundamentalist scientism, but none of them is genuinely at odds with either the corpus of scientific knowledge or the scientific method as it is practiced today by the mainstream, because mainstream science limits its investigations to the physical world. Arguments against these three fundamental spiritual tenets are based on the dogmatic assumptions of fundamentalist scientism, not on any objective scientific evidence.

Hi there Brad, and others:

Don't really understand much of what you're saying, but if you're interested in being "conscious".. LOL... read "The Power of Now", by Eckhart Tolle. Maybe you already have.. then never mind.

:-)

Katy

my philosophyforums.com swansong -

re: desparate to maintain Mystery

Truly, some try to locate Mystery where it has no place.

Others try to banish Mystery from where it will eternally perdure.

Many are confounded by just where Mystery's boundaries truly lie.

Wittgenstein offers counsel that it is not how things are but that things are which is the mystical . This is not to suggest that some information regarding how things are might not lie beyond our reach, in principle, whether due to methodological constraints or ontological discontinuities, but such occulting regarding how things are would not, in my view, be mystical or theological occulting. Rather, it could even be quite compatible with different versions of naturalism, materialism and physicalism. I think it is true, though, that many do appear desperate in retaining mystery in this metaphysical regard. And that is, indeed, a pity. It is, in fact, as pitiable as some's apparent desperation to banish any prospect of ontological discontinuity, whether in speculative cognitive science or speculative scientific cosmology.

One needn't be desperate, whatsoever, about maintaining the truly mystical; Mystery can take care of itself, all by itself.

my philosophyforums.com swansong

I've enjoyed reading some of that stuff. For what it's worth, we miss you here. If you get homesick for a little abuse I can supply that readily enough.

Katy said: Don't really understand much of what you're saying,....

Me too!

...but if you're interested in being "conscious".. LOL... read "The Power of Now", by Eckhart Tolle.

Maybe you can provide us with a book review or a few relevant quotes.

Wittgenstein offers counsel that it is not how things are but that things are which is the mystical.

I like that!

That's a very graceful swan song, JB. You should have seen mine at Macfixit forums. I think there was probably a great round of applause from their Lounge regulars when I left.

Maybe you just need to fill up your tank again for awhile? That philosophy forum seemed to engage you in a way that helped you test and clarify your thinking.

Now how about a nice movie review or something on this forum while you rest up? Or a comment about HSPs? Or what do you think about John Kerry, who's looking like the man to beat for the Democratic nomination? We have good threads going on all these topics, as you know.

Phil says: "Now how about a nice movie review or something on this forum while you rest up? Or a comment about HSPs? Or what do you think about John Kerry, who's looking like the man to beat for the Democratic nomination? We have good threads going on all these topics, as you know."

Thanks for making me laugh.. I need a little levity in my life. Maybe it wasn't meant to be funny, but anyhow, it's a sign that I'm feeling better when I get my sense of humor back.

:-)

Katy

"All may be well. All can be well. All will be well. All manner of things shall be well. And you will know that all manner of things will be well." - Julian of Norwich


JohnBoy,

How about "All IS well"? I used to read the daily devotional book "God Calling" all the time, and the phrase, "All is well", is used a lot in the book.

:-)

Katy

Interestingly, Julia Boton Holloway writes re: 'All shall be well and all shall be well and all manner of thing shall be well'.

quote:

Again Julian is translating from the Hebrew into English, rather than from Jerome's Latin. For 2 Kings 4 in the King James, which is translated from Hebrew, so translates 'shalom' , which has the meaning of 'all', 'wholeness', 'all being well', where Jerome and Wyclif merely had it be 'Recte' and 'right'.

Ring out, bells of Norwich, and let the winter come and go,
And all will be well again, I know.
All will be well, I�m telling you, let the winter come and go
And all will be well again, I know.

Below is from: J. T. White, 1844

quote:

What's this that steals upon my frame?
Is it death, is it death?
That soon will quench this mortal flame,
Is it death, is it death?
If this be death, I soon shall be
From ev'ry pain and sorrow free.
I shall the King of glory see,
All is well, all is well.

Weep not, my friends, weep not for me,
All is well, all is well!
My sins forgiv'n and I am free,
All is well, all is well!
There's not a cloud that doth arise,
To hide my Jesus from my eyes.
I soon shall mount the upper skies,
All is well, all is well.

Tune, tune your harps ye saints on high,
All is well, all is well!
I too will strike my harp with equal joy,
All is well, all is well!
Bright angels are from glory come,
They're 'round my bed, they're in my room,
They wait to waft my spirit home,
All is well, all is well.

Hark! Hark! my Lord and Master's voice,
Calls away, calls away!
I soon shall see -- enjoy my happy choice,
Why delay, why delay?
Farewell my friends, adieu, adieu,
I can no longer stay with you,
My glittering crown appears in view,
All is well, all is well!

Must be like - thy Kingdom come
distinguished from
The kingdom of God is within you ... ...

The distinction, then, is between an eschatological certainty, on one hand, and our response to the Gospel imperative to hasten the reign of God, otoh, starting, of course, with the wo/man in the mirror, who can indeed glimpse the glory, who can indeed receive a foretaste, but for whom the unitive life likely seldom perdures on this side of death.

'Til every soul is saved, then, "They act as if my people's wounds were only scratches. 'All is well,' they say, when all is not well." Jeremiah 6:14

Lord, Jesus, come quickly, the monks chant at Advent.