30 January 2004, 12:01 AM
johnboyFrom Biology to Consciousness to Morality
This post is a tad oblique, from the philosophyforums, but I'm putting it here for continuity.
Theological Realism & the Linguistic (re)Turn
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Medieval Theological Realism: Its Neoplatonic Anticipation of the Linguistic Turn
by johnboy
The proper (apophatic) predication of terms in our God-concept in cosmological arguments can 1) bolster our modal ontological arguments, 2) rebutt semantical anti-realism and 3) buttress theological realism. Medieval thomistic arguments as traditionally influenced by the neoplatonic linguistic tradition remain robust and are effective in answering modern idealist critiques.
In theology, the process of kataphasis (or the kataphatic approach) involves the attempt to gain descriptive accuracy by positively describing God metaphorically, so to speak, using analogies. For this reason, some call it the via positiva.
The process of apophasis (or the apophatic approach) involves the attempt to gain descriptive accuracy by negatively describing God using disanalogies, anagogically employing the via negativa, reemphasizing the metaphorical nature of all God-talk.
Taken together, unitively and anagogically, these processes of kataphasis and apophasis, and these languages of metaphor and analogy, yield a mystagogy that sets forth divine attributes that render God intelligible even while, at the same time, leaving God utterly incomprehensible. Certain observable effects that derive from causes not locatable in either the conventional space-time-mass-energy plenum or any putative realm that adds additional primitives (�givens� or �fundamental properties� or dimensions), however material or immaterial, physical or nonphysical, whether in actuality or in principle, direct our attention to this transcendent wholly other. This veiled but utterly efficacious cause, such cause known only by such effects proper to no other, this transcendent wholly other, this utter incomprehensibility, sharing no physical, quasi-physical or metaphysical nature or essence, similarly shares with other natures no infinite causal regress, invoking neither the paradox of existence nor the paradox of infinity. The epitome of apophatic theology thus yields the paragon of all God-concepts pointing toward the wholly, wholly, wholly other with no confusing moon mistaken for one�s finger.
Theology thus distinguishes its object from those causes of physics and metaphysics, both veiled and unveiled, that inescapably evoke irresolute paradox, whether derived from the riddles of existence or of infinity. With such a cosmological God-concept thus predicated in essentially apophatic terms, modal ontological arguments thereby gain new impetus. They certainly avoid the self-contradictions alleged in the concepts derived from kataphatic and analogical attributes, for instance the putative omnipotence and omnibenevolence that create theodicy issues because of their too very narrowly conceived anthropomorphic understandings. They positively avoid any so-called unwarranted predication of being by existence, bounded or unbounded, because Ipsum Esse Subsistens absolutely individuates this God-concept from all other being. Once thus establishing the reasonableness of this concept, we can then speculate further, theologically. It creates an opening for interideological and interreligious dialogue, too.
Thus the neoplatonic analysis of the classical aristotelian conceptualizations, discriminating between our apophatic, kataphatic, metaphorical, analogical, anagogical and mystagogical linguistic processes, anticipates the linguistic turn, general semantics and analytic philosophy, and many centuries before Wittgenstein or E-prime. Don�t we ordinarily distinguish fairly well between the verb forms of �to be� based on identity vs predicates vs existence vs auxiliary usages and tenses? Do we really need to issue caveats not to treat terms applied in analogies univocally? Don�t we already know this? Does this linguistic awareness, by itself, really suggest compatability between an analytical thomism and a semantic antirealism ?
Stephen Boulter writes that �the form of x cannot come to be in a human intellect (barring Divine illumination) unless that intellect has direct sensory experience of x, or some of x�s adequate effects.� He notes how Haldane commits thomism to the principle that out of sight means out of mind by quoting that ancient slogan, �There is nothing on the lips that was not first (or simultaneously, and ipso facto) in the intellect, and nothing in the latter that was not first in the senses.� He properly concludes, consistent with my apophatic disquisition regarding God-concepts, above: �But this overlooks the fact that [Aquinas] recognizes two ways of acquiring knowledge of the natural world: one can come to know something directly by being literally informed of the object in question in the manner Haldane has discussed; or one can form some idea of the existence and nature of something indirectly by noting its effects.� [1]
Some question the propriety of such a strategy to defend theological realism by analogy with a defense of realism in the philosophy of science. However, do we not use a seamless epistemological garment in our philosophy of nature, our philosophy of science, our metaphysics and theology, in each discipline deriving some intelligibility of veiled causes from their effects by drawing analogies with similar effects from otherwise comprehensible unveiled causes? Those who question this strategy sometimes offer a Christocentric realism (and with some merit but, in my opinion, requiring, very much, a less fideistic development), however unnecessarily considering it over against the God of philosophy or natural theology. [2] At any rate, I rather like both approaches, properly pursued.
Have we not already sewn the fabric of the rebuttal of skepticism, in arguing for realism in both science and theology, using the very same threads of reductio ad abusurdum analyses of the self-contradictory anti-realist epistemologies as intertwined with our first principles and prephilosophical presuppositions (the intrinsic representational character of thought and the intrinsic intelligibility of the world, much less the existence of other minds)? Failing to reject deeply flawed, fundamental humean premises, Kant fashioned a philosophical garment that covers no one�s metaphysical derriere. Why wear that silly epistemological hospital gown? Why repeat that mistake and compound Kant and Hume�s anti-realist errors by unraveling the very reductio ad absurdum threads that sewed our aristotelian robes of science together in the first place?
Boulter makes the case that epistemological and ontological realism without semantical realism pays a high price forcing one to say that �that section of the reality manifest to the senses is not wholly intelligible to human beings, or one must produce some theory of the world that makes no use of all mature scientific theory,� much less modern scientific cosmology, quantum interpretations and speculative cognitive science.
1) Boulter, Stephen J., Could Aquinas Accept Semantic Anti-Realism? , The Philosophical Quarterly Vol. 48, No. 193, (Oct 1998), 504-513.
2) Moore, Andrew, Theological Realism and the Observability of God, International Journal of Systematic TheologyVolume 2, Issue 1 (March 2000) Page 79.
pax,
jb
31 January 2004, 07:47 AM
johnboyD. David Bourland, student of Alfred Korzybski , pioneered the use of
E-Prime , a semantic hygiene that dispenses with any form of the verb �to be� and, supposedly, thus eliminates or reduces the paradox and confusion that come about from the fact that �to be� and is can be used interchangeably for auxiliaries, predicates, identities or existence. This neo-linguistic approach is a non-aristotelian linguistic system, which supposedly attempts to abolish the is of aristotelian essence. It is thus hailed not only as a triumph of general semantics but as an inoculation against metaphysics and theology. It is supposed to eliminate false dichotomies, bivalence, two-valued logic and either-or thinking, adhering to a principle of non-identity; hence Korzybski is credited with �The map is not the territory.�
E-prime is thus claimed to free us from a medieval aristotelian framework, ridding us of the proposition of �isness� and all of the ambiguity and paradox it generates. Some have used it to parody Catholicism based on its aristotelian metaphysical traditions.
So, I have done a little searching for any commentary on E-Prime by Catholic authors or philosophers. Failing there I have looked into analytical thomism, thinking some linguistic and semantical discussions there might inform my perspective. Not much specific insight to glean there either. I have, however, enjoyed toying around with E-Prime and my metaphysical leanings as a koan of sorts and it has been a useful heuristic for bringing certain metaphysical concepts into sharper relief. These koan-like exercises did seem useful where theoretical ontological entities are concerned and I found that, ironically, a certain clarity might be gained regarding metaphysics and theology and not rather their abolition as some advocates of E-Prime contend. After all, as we know from neoplatonic influences on thomism, linguistic analysis didn�t begin with modern general semantics and Wittgenstein.
These E-Prime koans brought to mind what we already know about the need to disentangle our concepts involving, for instance, a) the God of philosophy and the God of Revelation; b) the apophatic and kataphatic approaches; c) physics, metaphysics and meta-metaphysics; d) being and Being; e) esse and Ipsum Esse Subsistens; f) analogous commonalities and absoulte differentition; g) forma in aristotelian thomism�s hylomorphism; actus essendi or esse in existential thomism ; intellectual dynamism in transcendental thomism; symbolic logic in analytical thomism; phenomenological approach in personalist thomism; h) apophatic versus kataphatic predications of modal ontological arguments; i) direct knowledge and indirect knowledge by effects; etc
Here is my inventory of E-Prime Insights anticipated by Thomistic Metaphysics
1) E-prime can help break the materialist-dualist deadlock, not unlike the Bohm interpretation treatment of wave-particle unity. These distinctions are anticipated in aristotelian thomism�s hylomorphism and can be further elucidated by analytical thomism.
2) E-prime refocuses our intention from the ontological to the existential and the operational. These distinctions are anticipated by existential thomism in its treatment of being not merely as an ontological isness (forma) but more fundamentally as an operational act (actus essendi).
3) E-prime refocuses our intention from the ontological to the phenomenological. This distinction is anticipated in the phenomenological approach of personalist thomism. It perhaps also clarifies the distinction between human being and human becoming.
4) E-prime opens us to a plurality of views in giving an account of reality and is informed by Kant�s view of how it is we construct reality and is not inconsistent in this regard with the intellectual dynamism of transcendental thomism.
5) E-prime helps us to discover metaphors and analogies, disguised metaphors and disguised analogies, in our thoughts and in our language, and in this regard was anticipated by the neoplatonic linguistic tradition that influenced thomism, drawing proper distinctions in God-concepts between analogous kataphatic commonalities and transcategorical apophatic differentiations. This is a pivotal distinction required in the proper predication of such concepts for modal ontological arguments to the extent one might want to avoid both self-contradictory terms (that generate theodicy issues) and so-called tautological predications of being by existence (not a problem insofar as Ipsum Esse Subsistens absolutely individuates and differentiates God).
6) To the extent E-Prime conflates physics and metaphysics, this is anticipated by the hylomorphism of an aristotelian thomism, avoiding dualism and materialism, partly analogous perhaps to a neutral monism and some naturalistic dualisms though not causally closed physically.
7) E-Prime, in restricting metaphysical language, as above, is anticipated by apophatic theology, which has only negations to offer and no direct knowledge about God to assert or to make statements of isness about due to utter incomprehensibility and thus is indeed good semantic hygiene even in theology.
8) When kataphatic theological affirmations are formulated, E-prime precision reveals the metaphorical and analogical nature of the God-concepts for this veiled but utterly efficacious cause, such cause known only by such effects proper to no other, such a cause the motives and nature of which remain inscrutable even when its effects are not.
9) All of these applications of E-Prime are to the God of philosophy and of natural theology. They didn�t rid us of metaphysics but were leveraged on behalf of metaphysics to lend clarity, erase ambiguity and eliminate unnecessary paradox and thereby point us toward the insights garnered from the dialogue between the aristotelian, existential, transcendental, personalist and analytical schools of thomism, totally consistent with the neoplatonic linguistic tradition�s influence on thomism.
Now, mind you, I didn�t write this in E-prime because, after my koan work was done, I realized it had added neither jot nor tittle by way of a critique of thomism that hadn�t already found its way in to the schools, traditions and influences discussed above, not to say that Meister Eckhart and Pseudo-Dionysius might not have found it useful, not to suggest that all of the folks who misinterpret and misconstruct thomism could not benefit from a few koans themselves. I�m certainly not going to subject revealed theology to this process but will leave the exegetes to their form, literary, historical and redaction criticisms. It may, however, be something the Jesus Seminar will want to take up with its already one-dimensional, impoverished Christology.
02 February 2004, 11:20 PM
johnboyI just posted this at philosophyforums.com -
Wonder how they'll like it?
Contra-Dennett: the Skinnerian Neuromythology of Consciousness Explained quote:
� if the brain were simple enough for us to understand it, we would be so simple that we
couldn't �
G. E. Pugh What One Will NOT Find in Consciousness Explained:
1) any theses or arguments intended to state the literal truth [1]
2) discrimination between conscious and nonconscious events [2]
3) a satisfactory answer to how physical processes in the brain cause consciousness [8]
4) an empirical theory of consciousness -- as Dennett himself somewhat rashly claims [14]
5) an explanation of what it is to adopt the Intentional Stance [35]
6) consciousness explained away [38]
7) attention to the role of emotions
8) an account of consciousness that considers the autonomic and peripheral nervous
systems, the neuroendocrine system and axis, the endocrine and immune systems
9) an explanation for how the 'Joycean machine' ( as stream-of-consciousness virtual
machine) works
10) analysis of noumenon [46]
What One Will Find in Consciousness Explained:
1) a family of metaphors [1]
2) metaphors, which, as a set of tools, have serious design faults [2]
3) Joycean Machine metaphor ( that does not add up to a theory of consciousnes [2]
4) Probing and narrative-precipitation ( that fail to mark off conscious from nonconscious
events) [2]
5) Consciousness ignored [3]
6) An undercutting of the database for the empirical study of CSC by restricting analysis to
inputs and to output "texts" (i.e., stimulus and response). Such practices as nearly killed
off CSC research earlier in this century. [4]
7) An erroneous assertion that the difference between misremembering(Orwellian) and
misrepresentation (Stalinesque) models of consciousness cannot be differentiated [5]
8) Philosophical misuse of an important neuropsychological phenomenon, known as
blindsight [6]
9) A hampering of scientific and philosophical understanding of the phenomenon and of
consciousness through a misrepresentation of blindsight [6]
10) A mistaken account of visual filling-in (described as results of the brain's "ignoring an
absence" or "jumping to a conclusion") insofar as it actually comprises a multitude of
different perceptual completion phenomena involving spatially propagating neural activity
(neural filling-in). [7]
11) Ignorance of the importance of a consideration of qualia to imagery and cognition [9]
12) A failed argument (however true its conclusion) against the Cartesian Screen [10]
13) A use of the concept of phenomenology in almost complete disregard of the work of
Husserl and his successors in German and French philosophy [11]
14) A textual relativism that undermines materialism [12]
15) A mistaken belief that qualia, and therefore their causes, can be temporally point- like,
but qualia theorists are committed to no such view; and without this commitment, the
argument from Orwellian/ Stalinesque indeterminacy does not succeed against qualia
[13]
16) a fully naturalized account of consciousness that manages to leave out the very
consciousness he purports to explain [15]
17) an argument that Dennet does not need to play the philosopher's game of saying
whether he is a behaviorist, a functionalist, an eliminativist [16]
18) Dennett as a behaviorist, a functionalist, and eliminativist [16]
19) verificationist attacks on qualia that are too radical to carry conviction [17]
20) accounts of pains, dreams, and images that in no case earn the eliminative conclusions of
his arguments [20]
21) an equation of reportability with consciousness, which completely leaves out the
qualitative content of conscious states [21]
22) an erroneous account of the blindspot and scotomas [22]
23) a Cartesian first-person operationalism [24]
24) fundamental eliminativism about phenomenology [29]
25) arguments that rely on a question-begging third-person absolutism [30]
26) question begging verificationism [31]
27) a failure of representationalism [37]
28) a pervasive neuromythology that is misleading about the scope and limits of science and,
hence, a 'scientism' that could give science a bad name [40]
29) fundamentalism on the scientific side of the fence [41]
30) a series of strawmen arguments [42]
31) cheap rhetorical shots, shellgames [43]
32) promising title, nowhere fulfilled [44]
33) determination by fiat, which phenomena are to be called conscious "scientifically"
followed by failed attempts to explain even them [44]
34) an analysis of phenomena [46]
35) a spiffy, up-to-date methodology of-- get this -- Skinnerian behaviorism [47]
36) a confounding of two distinct projects through a close interweaving of empirical
speculations into how intentional systems are built with a philosophical inquiry into what
intentional systems and intentional states are. [49]
37) a Skinnerian polemic which, by a series of slightly questionable steps, the reader is lead
to embrace an outrageous conclusion [50]
38) a jumbled mixture of neurophysiology, higher cognitive functions, current experience and
brute, all eminently suited to 'decomposing' a composite reification of those processes
into what the the "thinking thing" is.[51]
39) strawman arguments that undermine Cartesian materialism while carrying no weight
against a Phenomenal Realism [52]
40) denial of aspect to experience,the existence of which is both entirely compatible with
both functionalism and physicalism; hence, an account of consciousness that, in its
attempt to deny same, runs the risk of being seen to eliminate what it purports to
explain. [53]
1) McGinn, Colin. Consciousness Evaded: Comments on Dennett, Philosophical Perspectives,
Vol. 9, AI, Connectionism and Philosophical Psychology. (1995), pp. 241-249.
2) `The Best Set of Tools'? Dennett's Metaphors and the Mind-Body Problem
(in Discussions) Kirk, Robert, The Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 43, No. 172. (Jul., 1993), pp.
335-343.
3) Block, Ned. The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 90, No. 4. (Apr., 1993), pp. 181-193.
4) Dennett, consciousness, and the sorrows of functionalism. Mangan, Bruce, U California, Inst
of Cognitive Studies, Berkeley, US
5) Christie J; Barresi J, Department of Psychology, Dalhousie University, Halifax, Nova
Scotia, Canada, Consciousness and cognition, 2002 Jun, 11(2):347-65
6) Blindsight in hindsight, Consciousness and cognition, 1997 Mar, 6(1):67-74
7) Finding out about filling-in: a guide to perceptual completion for visual science and the
philosophy of perception.Pessoa L; Thompson E; Noe A; The Behavioral and brain sciences,
1998 Dec, 21(6):723-48; discussion 748-802
8) What is consciousness? Solms M, Academic Department of Neurosurgery, Royal London
Hospital, Whitechapel, England. Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, 1997,
45(3):681-703; discussion 704-78
9) The importance of a consideration of qualia to imagery and
cognition.Hubbard TL, Department of Psychology, Texas Christian University, Fort Worth,
Conscious Cogn. 1996 Sep;5(3):359-67
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Philosophical-Studies. O 98; 6(3): 331-344, International-Journal-of-Philosophical-Studies
12) Dennett's Fictional Selves, Cooney,-Brian, Southwest-Philosophy-Review. Ja 94; 10(1):
117-124
13) Orwell, Stalin, and Determinate Qualia, Robinson,-William-S, Pacific-Philosophical-
Quarterly. Je 94; 75(2): 151-164
14) Dennett's Conceptual Reform, Ross,-Don, Behavior-and-Philosophy. Spr-Sum 94; 22(1):
41-52
15) Minds, Memes, and Rhetoric, Clark,-Stephen-R-L, Inquiry-. Mr 93; 36(1-2): 3-16,
Inquiry:-An-Interdisciplinary-Journal-of-Philosophy
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Research. D 93; 53(4): 899-903
17) The Elimination of Experience, Seager,-William, Philosophy-and-Phenomenological-
Research. Je 93; 53(2): 345-365
18) Rorty, Richard. "Blunder Around for a While." London Review of
Books (November 21, 1991), 13(22):3, 5-6.
19) Block, N. 1995. What is Dennett's theory a theory of? Philosophical
Topics 22:23-40.
20) Bricke, J. 1984. Dennett's eliminative arguments. Philosophical Studies
45:413-29.
21) Bricke, J. 1985. Consciousness and Dennett's intentionalist net.
Philosophical Studies 48:249-56.
22) Churchland, P. S. & Ramachandran, V. S. 1993. Filling in: Why Dennett
is wrong. In (B. Dahlbom, ed) Dennett and His Critics. Blackwell.
23) Clark, S. R. L. 1993. Minds, memes, and rhetoric. Inquiry 36:3-16.
24) Dretske, F. 1995. Differences that make no difference. Philosophical
Topics 22:41-57.
25) Fellows, R. & O'Hear, A. 1993. Consciousness avoided. Inquiry 36:
73-91.
26) Marbach, E. 1994. Troubles with heterophenomenology. In (R. Casati, B.
Smith, & S. White, eds) Philosophy and the Cognitive Sciences.
Holder-Pichler-Tempsky.
27) McCauley, R. N. 1993. Why the blind can't lead the blind: Dennett on
The blind spot, blindsight, and sensory qualia. Consciousness and Cognition
2:155-64.
28) McGinn, C. 1995. Consciousness evaded: Comments on Dennett.
Philosophical Perspectives 9:241-49.
29) Seager, W. E. 1993. Verification, skepticism, and consciousness.
Inquiry.
30) Siewert, C. 1993. What Dennett can't imagine and why. Inquiry.
31) Tye, M. 1993. Reflections on Dennett and consciousness. Philosophy and
Phenomenological Research 53:891-6.
32) Fodor, Jerry. "Deconstructing Dennett's Darwin." Mind &
Language (September 1996), 11(3):246-262.
33) McGinn, Colin. "Consciousness Evaded: Comments on Dennett."
In James E. Tomberlin, ed., AI, Connectionism and Philosophical
Psychology. Philosophical Perspectives, 9. Ridgeview: Atascadero, 1995.
34) Nagel, Thomas. Other Minds: Critical Essays 1969-1994. New
York & Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995. Includes "7. Dennett: Content and
Consciousness"; "8. Dennett: Consciousness Dissolved."
35) Slors, Marc. "Why Dennett Cannot Explain What It is to Adopt the Intentional Stance."
Philosophical Quarterly (January 1996), 46(182):93-98.
36) Tye, Michael. "Reflections on Dennett and Consciousness."Philosophy and
Phenomenological Research (December 1993), 53(4):893-898.
37) Ward, Andrew. "The Failure of Dennett's Representationalism: A Wittgensteinian
Resolution." Journal of Philosophical Research (1993), 18:285-307.
38) Wuketits, Franz. "Consciousness Explained--or Explained Away?"
Acta Analytica (1994): 55-64.
39) Yu, Paul and Gary Fuller. "A Critique of Dennett." Synthese (March
1986), 66(3):453-476.
40) Brains and minds: a brief history of neuromythology, R C Tallis, Fitzpatrick Lecture, given
at the Royal College of Physicians on 21 July 1999, J R Coll Physicians Lond 2000;34:563-7
41) Bernard Haisch, Freeing the Scientific Imagination, IONS Review #57, Sept. - Nov. 2001
42 �52) Excerpts from informal Reviews at Amazon.com
53) Shoemaker, Sydney, Lovely and Suspect Ideas ,Philosophy and Phenomenological
Research, Vol. 53, No. 4. (Dec., 1993), pp. 905-910.