The Broad Street Bullies.

And the winner is: Lisa, from the Blog for a Broad website uncovered by Brad.

Just some random thoughts in response to the Goodenough article.

And now a central claim. We would argue, as have many others, that our sense of self, human self-awareness, made possible by symbolic language. That is, when we say that we are aware of our thoughts and ideas and plans and memories, we do this using symbolic constructions. It may be possible to have a thought without linguistic representation, but we know that we have had one only when it is self-represented in symbolic form.

That may be true in the sense that one needs to be able to think abstractly (symbolically), but does one necessarily need a symbolic language to be self aware? Perhaps it's not the quality of thoughts but the quantity of them that leads to self-awareness. Self-awareness might even be an illusion, if one looks at it from the Buddhist perspective. And what about the supposed idea of non-dual thinking where one moves beyond the symbols and language themselves? And don't gorillas and chimpanzees recognize themselves in mirrors? The claim also is that humans are the only species that have a symbolic language, but is that true? Is not a howl that means, for example, "danger from the ground" and a different kind of howl that means "danger from the sky" symbolic? And what about the songs of whales?

I think the real emergent difference that has a profound effect in differentiating humans from other species isn't so much symbolic language as it is being able to extend whatever capabilities we have for symbolic thinking from the confines of language and culture to the environment and to radically do so. It's one thing to have a thought. It's quite another for that thought to have consequence in the physical world � for ourselves and others. Certainly the opposable thumb helps in this regard. Termites change their environment radically, but are they deep symbolic thinkers? Chimpanzees and gorillas (with their ability to learn sign language) are certainly deep symbolic thinkers, but can they so readily use their ideas to change the environment? To a certain extent they do � through culture. They learn a great many things such as how to make a bed in the branches of a tree. But how is this type of information passed on? It seems to be by the tried and true method of "monkey see, monkey do." There's a big pay-off for learned behavior but it takes time and energy. Such behavior is merely a sideline, if you will, of such a species. It can't become steeped in such behavior because their language is not very complex and their means of converting their symbols, their information, into concrete effects is also limited. Thus for a chimp or gorilla their mental faculties become a "sideline" rather than a defining characteristic of a species.

I don't think we're all that different in content from a great number of other animals. We just may differ by degree. But what might emerge if the ability to change the environment and to think and communicate symbolically were encoded in less impermanent and inexact ways? You might get something like we have now; an explosion of thinking and an explosion in our ability to shape the environment (technology). Although a complex language is a requirement for that which comes next, what does come next is of hugely "emergent" importance: the written language. It allows us to encode our symbolic thinking, culture and language in more permanent ways and thus emerges an information explosion.

I mean, when it comes down to it, we're different as humans because of the explosive amount of information we can create and access because of a written language, and this is so because a written language allows us to symbolize the symbols. It's one further level of abstraction. This also leads to novel languages such as mathematics which opens whole other doors. What emerges is a species that is steeped in thought, language and culture, but not a species where these attributes themselves are unique. It's more a matter of degree, and what "emerges" from this ability to create and share information is our dependence on it and our fixation and identification with it. And I do mean "fixation" because look at how hard we work, for example, to "get back to nature." We're constantly trying to get in touch with a more primitive state and escape our complex thought-based worlds, although our stated aim is usually to escape stress or to simply develop an appreciation for nature. We're like a species obsessed with thinking and caught in a feedback look by our ability to create more things to think about.

Thus inspired by all of those broads, it does seem that a more broadly conceived epistemology than that embraced by the scientistic materialist monists is called for because:

1) We all use both faith and reason. [The foundations of logic, Godel laboriously proved, are ultimately based on our faith in them, their emotional impact, and suspension of disbelief as much as anything else. from "The Scientific History of Paradox" by wuliheron ]

2) We all acknowledge paradox at some level, whether the paradox of existence or the paradox of infinity or causal chain/joint paradox. [see "The Paradox of Existence" by wuliheron ]

3) We all encounter ontological discontinuity, whether at the deepest structures of matter in our quantum interpretations, or as we approach the earliest moments following the Big Bang in general relativity, or in any of our ruminations about pre-BigBang conditions, or as we cross the threshold from syntactical, indexical, computational consciousness to semantical, nonalgorithmic consciousness, or, iow, as we engage in speculative scientific cosmology or speculative cognitive science. [see jb's amplification ]

4) We all employ our analogical imaginations and kataphasis (an attempt to gain descriptive accuracy by stating what something is like or actually is). [see jb's explication and this ].

5) We all employ our dialectical imaginations and apophasis (an attempt to gain descriptive accuracy by stating what something is not like or actually is not).

6) We all use Zeno's "Backdoor Philosophy" of the reductio ad absurdum . [Arguments such as Zeno presented revolve around what philosophers call reductio ad absurdum or what I shall refer to here as the �backdoor� argument. Rather than directly proving something, you sneak in the backdoor and show the alternatives are patently ridiculous. For example, if I wish to prove its possible for me to argue in general, I could take the backdoor approach and demonstrate how ridiculous it is for me to argue I can�t argue. Cf. wuliheron above]

7) We all are systematically constrained from knowing some things, in principle, but don't equate that situation with our somehow being methodologically flawed . [and I think I have really hit upon something here re: certain epistemological attitudes, along the lines of if the only tool one has is an epistemologically scientistic hammer then every problem looks suspiciously like an ontologically monistic nail . ]

8) We all begin with faith in human reason without rationally demonstrating why.

9) We all reject solipsism without rationally demonstrating why.

10) We all have faith in the existence of other minds witout being able to rationally demonstrate why.

11) We all thus know what we know transempirically .

12) We all rely on intelligibility even when comprehensibility evades us, thus moving past radical skepticism, nihilism and solipsism.

13) Rather than being thwarted by Godel's findings that we must take certain axioms on faith, we can be emboldened by its corollary that we can see the truth in certain of our axioms even if we cannot prove them. In a sense this heals the Cartesian split by drawing an important distinction between knowing and proving. Gosh almighty, not even Bertrand Russell and Alfred North Whitehead can prove the axioms that are used in demonstrating 1 + 1 = 2 using the same mathematical system that proves that 1 + 1 = 2, but who would seriously question that sum? Now, this does not mean that we can combine our faith and reason and any old axioms and necessarily move toward absolute truth, but it does mean that a rigorously applied philosophy of nature and other degrees of abstraction can help us to confidently select those faith-based axioms (of physics and metaphysics and meta-metaphysics/theology) that are logically consistent, externally congruent, internally coherent, interdisciplinarily consilient, hypothetically consonant and a host of other criteria for epistemological rigor, without restricting one's methods to what can be known solely through sense experience and empiricism. This is a good thing because the frontiers of scientific cosmology, quantum interpretations and cognitive science all hint at a putative ontological discontinuity that simply requires both extrasensory and transempirical approaches.

The Way, the Tao, is both broader that the scientistic cohort imagines and narrower than the fideistic cohort imagines, eschewing both excessive hubris and humility in epistemology and embracing, rather, an epistemological holism.

Faith, then, is the confident assurance in our axioms, the conviction of proofs unseen, but not the conviction of Truth unseen. And it operates in physics, math, philosophy, metaphysics and theology, but not without rigor. While we cannot, in principle, rationally demonstrate many of the axioms that undergird different species of faith, we can, through a reductio ad absurdum, point to the manifest absurdities that would ensue from the rejection of faith-based propositions, both in general, and also in particular situations. Because we all acknowledge at least some paradox as inescapable, we must be careful in our reductio ad absurdum analyses or we will toss out everything that is counterintuitive, just for instance, general relativity and quantum theory and the calculus, itself.

Again: Faith, then, is the confident assurance in our axioms, the conviction of proofs unseen, but not the conviction of Truth unseen. We thus proceed with Godel along with the imperatives of the Psalmist and Ignatius to taste and SEE the goodness of the Lord and, I would add His other attribute , Truth, and Her other attribute, Beauty, and their other attributes like Personhood and Intelligence, even if they are only analogical


pax,
jb

I mean, when it comes down to it, we're different as humans because of the explosive amount of information we can create and access because of a written language, and this is so because a written language allows us to symbolize the symbols. It's one further level of abstraction. This also leads to novel languages such as mathematics which opens whole other doors. What emerges is a species that is steeped in thought, language and culture, but not a species where these attributes themselves are unique.

First, let's zoom in on that word attributes and recall that, here again, we are speaking analogically . In the same way that the Divine Attributes are analogical to human traits but in no way share human nature (essence), some interspecific attributes shared by humans and other animals are analogical but in no way share human nature, especially if genetically distinct. Goodenough and Deacon properly go further to emphasize that, despite our primate heritage (of which they emphasize we must remain ever mindful and where certain attributes or traits may indeed be held in common, genetically and otherwise), human biosemiotic capacities are radically novel, downright astonishing.

Next, you allude to something very important --- degrees of abstraction and it is here that you focus in on something Deacon and Goodenough sometimes give very short shrift to: metaphysics.

I had written previously that, in reading this essay by Teed Rockwell of Berekeley, CA, at
http://forums.philosophyforums...howthread.php?p=6893 , especially the
following excerpt, I could not help but to think of the irony in the
similarities between the approaches of these ID proponents and that of
Rorty. The same is true for all who reject metaphysics and you have thus properly gathered my objection to this part of their approach. Rockwell writes of this Rortyism:

"If we accept (as I think Rorty does) that the exact divisions between all
scientific specialties are decided by social convention rather than by where
nature has placed carvable joints, why is there any problem with the fact
that the specialized borders of philosophy are drawn vertically (by levels
of abstraction) rather than horizontally (by subject matter)? This is
basically the point that Haack makes when she says that "giving up the idea
that philosophy is distinguished by its a priori character encourages a
picture of philosophy as continuous with science. . .but this does not
oblige one to deny that there is a difference in degree between science and
philosophy" (Haack 1993 p. 188){2}[Haack, S. (1993) Evidence and Inquiry
Basil Blackwell Oxford.]

Indeed, that is what this whole thread is about.

pax,
jb

That may be true in the sense that one needs to be able to think abstractly (symbolically), but does one necessarily need a symbolic language to be self aware? Perhaps it's not the quality of thoughts but the quantity of them that leads to self-awareness. Self-awareness might even be an illusion, if one looks at it from the Buddhist perspective. And what about the supposed idea of non-dual thinking where one moves beyond the symbols and language themselves? And don't gorillas and chimpanzees recognize themselves in mirrors? The claim also is that humans are the only species that have a symbolic language, but is that true? Is not a howl that means, for example, "danger from the ground" and a different kind of howl that means "danger from the sky" symbolic? And what about the songs of whales?

Well, I'm way behind on reading, too, but I was able to skim right through the pictures, and I'll pick up on this point, knowing as I do so that there are many others I haven't properly considered yet. But this one about the relationship between thought and self-awareness is one I've been interested in a long time. Some of the comtemplative states I've experienced have also helped me to understand a few things about this.

I agree that in non-dual states of awareness, where there is no or little thought happening, there is nonetheless a kind of non-conceptual self-awareness. It is a direct experience of oneself as see-er, as the subject of awareness, and this subjectivity is not mediated or grasped by thought. I think it's possible that all animals have this kind of awareness, but maybe not in the same way as human beings. That would take too long to clarify, however, so I'll pass for now.

I view thought as primarily in the service of language; obviously, we think in our own language, so that ought to tell us something. Thinking is, then, a kind of "talking to ourselves," at times. When we do so, we become present to ourselves via the medium of our thoughts. As noted in another thread on the word, thoughts convey presence; our own thoughts convey to the inner witness of our selves some sense of presence. Other, less intentional forms of thought seem to be disparite energies manifesting via the symbol-creating properties of the human mind. The reason such energies are presented symbolically is so that we can understand what they are, and establish some kind of relationship with them. Wholeness and homeostasis seem to be the driving force behind their manifestation; learning to listen to them and work with them is an important work.

I'm not sure if animals think; they certainly do communicate, so perhaps some kind of communication happens in their consciousness. But there again, I strongly suspect that it's very different from humans, who not only think, but who are conscious of the act of thinking and can consciously direct thought and word this way or that, exercising what freedom we have to do so.

JB, those are twelve great points, all well written, and easily intelligible. Now don't think too much about what I'm going to say. It just popped out.

JB said: 4) We all employ our analogical imaginations and kataphasis (an attempt to gain descriptive accuracy by stating what something is like or actually is). [see jb's explication and this ].

Your thoughts have prompted some other thoughts about language in general.

JB, I admire your broad (nyuck) vocabulary, but in some ways my rather limited one has its advantages. I think that fine-grained words allow one to get to fine-grained meanings. It can, of course, be laborious and more time consuming using small words. It's like building a house brick by brick instead of bolting together large pre-fabricated parts. But do we really need to build piece by piece from scratch an already well understood structure such as a wall? But if we don't, despite our ability to quickly construct entire buildings or city blocks, might we pave over or obscure subtler meanings?

You be the industrial giant. I be the small stone mason. I think Phil is an architect who designs both big and small buildings (while taking kickbacks from the Teamsters). W.C. is the building inspector always forcing us to rewire our arguments.

JB said: Goodenough and Deacon properly go further to emphasize that, despite our primate heritage (of which they emphasize we must remain ever mindful and where certain attributes or traits may indeed be held in common, genetically and otherwise), human biosemiotic capacities are radically novel, downright astonishing.

Yes, I understand the point, I think, which is that humans are not just "more" of some attribute, but that something new and novel emerges from some unique arrangement of existing attributes which then becomes more than the sum of the parts. But I'm not convinced that human pride doesn't find a bit more emergence in who we are then is called for.

If we accept (as I think Rorty does) that the exact divisions between all
scientific specialties are decided by social convention rather than by where
nature has placed carvable joints, why is there any problem with the fact
that the specialized borders of philosophy are drawn vertically (by levels
of abstraction) rather than horizontally (by subject matter)?

That's a most interesting idea.

I agree that in non-dual states of awareness, where there is no or little thought happening, there is nonetheless a kind of non-conceptual self-awareness.

Yes, Phil, I didn't write it but I was certainly thinking about meditation at the time. It's interesting that many experience heightened levels of awareness even while specifically trying to escape language � and presumably conventional symbolic thought.

I view thought as primarily in the service of language; obviously, we think in our own language, so that ought to tell us something.

That's very interesting, because I was thinking (gads, the paradoxes!) that language is primarily in service of thought. I will tell you that I am a real head case when it comes to hearing words in my head as I'm thinking. But I also have to acknowledge that, as best I can tell, real unique and novel thoughts are not (maybe never) the result of playing with words and language. There's a process that seems above and beyond mere words.

I'm not sure if animals think; they certainly do communicate, so perhaps some kind of communication happens in their consciousness. But there again, I strongly suspect that it's very different from humans, who not only think, but who are conscious of the act of thinking and can consciously direct thought and word this way or that, exercising what freedom we have to do so.

This is big, Phil. We indeed transcend our godelian constraints in that we are able to look at, question and change our own axioms. This is not only big for cognitive science in demonstrating that artificial intelligence will never supervene on computers, it is big for formative spirituality and psychological therapies that point to our need for reprogramming . What is astonishing about the human brain is its ability to rewrite its own programs, n'est pas?

pax,
jb

So I won't get confused with the 12 Step Program, here's #13 from my edit of that post above:

13) Rather than being thwarted by Godel's findings that we must take certain axioms on faith, we can be emboldened by its corollary that we can see the truth in certain of our axioms even if we cannot prove them. In a sense this heals the Cartesian split by drawing an important distinction between knowing and proving. Gosh almighty, not even Bertrand Russell and Alfred North Whitehead can prove the axioms that are used in demonstrating 1 + 1 = 2 using the same mathematical system that proves that 1 + 1 = 2, but who would seriously question that sum? Now, this does not mean that we can combine our faith and reason and any old axioms and necessarily move toward absolute truth, but it does mean that a rigorously applied philosophy of nature and other degrees of abstraction can help us to confidently select those faith-based axioms (of physics and metaphysics and meta-metaphysics/theology) that are logically consistent, externally congruent, internally coherent, interdisciplinarily consilient, hypothetically consonant and a host of other criteria for epistemological rigor, without restricting one's methods to what can be known solely through sense experience and empiricism. This is a good thing because the frontiers of scientific cosmology, quantum interpretations and cognitive science all hint at a putative ontological discontinuity that simply requires both extrasensory and transempirical approaches.

The Way, the Tao, is both broader that the scientistic cohort imagines and narrower than the fideistic cohort imagines, eschewing both excessive hubris and humility in epistemology and embracing, rather, an epistemological holism.

Faith, then, is the confident assurance in our axioms, the conviction of proofs unseen, but not the conviction of Truth unseen. And it operates in physics, math, philosophy, metaphysics and theology, but not without rigor. While we cannot, in principle, rationally demonstrate many of the axioms that undergird different species of faith, we can, through a reductio ad absurdum, point to the manifest absurdities that would ensue from the rejection of faith-based propositions, both in general, and also in particular situations. Because we all acknowledge at least some paradox as inescapable, we must be careful in our reductio ad absurdum analyses or we will toss out everything that is counterintuitive, just for instance, general relativity and quantum theory and the calculus, itself.

Again: Faith, then, is the confident assurance in our axioms, the conviction of proofs unseen, but not the conviction of Truth unseen. We thus proceed with Godel along with the imperatives of the Psalmist and Ignatius to taste and SEE the goodness of the Lord and, I would add His other attribute , Truth, and Her other attribute, Beauty, and their other attributes like Personhood and Intelligence, even if they are only analogical

I think that fine-grained words allow one to get to fine-grained meanings. It can, of course, be laborious and more time consuming using small words. It's like building a house brick by brick instead of bolting together large pre-fabricated parts. But do we really need to build piece by piece from scratch an already well understood structure such as a wall? But if we don't, despite our ability to quickly construct entire buildings or city blocks, might we pave over or obscure subtler meanings?

This is very, very true. We CAN and DO do a disservice to common sense when we take either what is patently obvious or patently absurd and then OBSTRUCT their view. VERY FEW people rely on natural theology and metaphysics in their lives of faith and the reformed epistemology advocates like Platinga give some good reasons for same, imo. There is even some truth in the approach of the Calvinists and Barth et al who eschew natural theology. But the truth in the approaches of the reformed epistemologists and even the fideists needn't be set over against the truth of natural theology and metaphysics.

Still, the truth gained from natural theology and metaphysics is of little use, I believe, for most people of faith because all that such truth entails is really just common sense, what everyone knows and tastes and sees already, intuitively and connaturally. Hence, natural theology and its metaphysics are primarily the tools of apologetics for connecting with others who already accept the God of the Philosophers or who already at least accept Philosophy leaning toward an acceptance of metaphysics but otherwise without an explicit faith.

The reason the arguments and proofs get so confounding and so convoluted is because some of the infidels in their extreme sophistry have raised so many sophisticated (and not unreasonable) arguments against religious faith (for whatever reason or attitude), brick by philosophical brick, that one cannot tear down their walls of resistance to faith except one metaphysical brick at a time. This is because, as per Godel's theorems, there CAN be alternate explanations for reality built on unprovable axioms that are nevertheless ALSO externally congruent, internally coherent, logically conistent, hypothetically consonant, interdisciplinarily consilient, etc and it is the apologist's task to LOOK closely at WALLS and replace the LEAKS, however small, in their metaphysical Dikes. As Gibran cautions, though: No one ever crashed the walls of stubborn tradition and escaped the falling stones.

So, the infidels made me do it, to paraphrase Flip Wilson. Most "fidels" don't even need it, for the most part.

pax,
jb

Phil: I agree that in non-dual states of awareness, where there is no or little thought happening, there is nonetheless a kind of non-conceptual self-awareness.

Brad: Yes, Phil, I didn't write it but I was certainly thinking about meditation at the time. It's interesting that many experience heightened levels of awareness even while specifically trying to escape language � and presumably conventional symbolic thought.

Jack Haught: explanatory pluralism

Jacques Maritain: connaturality and degrees of knowledge

JPII fr Crossing the Threshold of Hope : the extrasensory and transempirical

jb i : epistemological holism

Great minds DO think alike

Still, the truth gained from natural theology and metaphysics is of little use, I believe, for most people of faith because all that such truth entails is really just common sense, what everyone knows and tastes and sees already, intuitively and connaturally.

I realize that you were speaking only in regards to faith, JB, but I think what you said goes to the core of why it's even worth having a conversation. We all experience reality and don't need an explanation of it as we go along in order to do so. But I wonder if we really can rely on simply experience and common sense alone to really see and experience that which we are seeing and experiencing? Either no explanation is needed or a never-ending chain of explanations is needed. Or maybe we're simply changing our reality by having this discussion as our sense of common sense changes, as does our awareness of truth.

quote:

13) Rather than being thwarted by Godel's findings that we must take certain axioms on faith, we can be emboldened by its corollary that we can see the truth in certain of our axioms even if we cannot prove them. In a sense this heals the Cartesian split by drawing an important distinction between knowing and proving. Gosh almighty, not even Bertrand Russell and Alfred North Whitehead can prove the axioms that are used in demonstrating 1 + 1 = 2 using the same mathematical system that proves that 1 + 1 = 2, but who would seriously question that sum? Now, this does not mean that we can combine our faith and reason and any old axioms and necessarily move toward absolute truth, but it does mean that a rigorously applied philosophy of nature and other degrees of abstraction can help us to confidently select those faith-based axioms (of physics and metaphysics and meta-metaphysics/theology) that are logically consistent, externally congruent, internally coherent, interdisciplinarily consilient, hypothetically consonant and a host of other criteria for epistemological rigor, without restricting one's methods to what can be known solely through sense experience and empiricism. This is a good thing because the frontiers of scientific cosmology, quantum interpretations and cognitive science all hint at a putative ontological discontinuity that simply requires both extrasensory and transempirical approaches.

I'm glad you took the time to single that one out, JB, because I missed it the first time. That's very well thought out and written. That would go on my refrigerator if there was room.

I'm multi-tasking on this thread. One can take a peak at the Philosophy Forums (by clicking here) for how things are going there, where I am not at all immersed in pusillanimous and obsequious sycophantic flattery.

I suppose my opening response should address how I view the implicit (or explicit) charge that I have introduced diversity recklessly. That does invite some introspection since that vice would not be beyond me, in addition to being too long-winded in forums, at times.

It is true that I don't endorse any of those ideas per se, likely especially Penrose's quantum tubules. However, they don't elicit immediate negative visceral reactions for me as they may for many. The hard problem of consciousness is intractable and, when it comes to nonalgorithmic consciousness, not only is there no evidence whatsoever from physics or metaphysics that has made a useful contribution to understanding the mind, there is no evidence from cognitive science either. In that regard, I concede epistemological parity to Chalmers, Searle, Rand, Penrose, Dembski, Dennett, Deacon & Goodenough, though not without a requirement for a modicum of philosophical rigor. I'm certain that some of you, better than me, could take up the various ad hominem and reductio ad absurdum analyses that might winnow out the wheat from the chaff re: philosophical rigor. My main point is that the invocation of metaphysics in consciousness studies is not without warrant and not a facile maneuver to close some causal gap or grease some causal joint and that it is indeed reckless and without existential warrant or rational justification to a priori foreclose on metaphysical speculations re: the hard problem.

Bill Dembski wrote:
Quote:
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------


Over a hundred years ago William James saw clearly that science would never resolve the mind�body problem. In his Principles of Psychology he argued that neither empirical evidence nor scientific reasoning would settle this question. Instead, he foresaw an interminable debate between competing philosophies, with no side gaining a clear advantage. The following passage captures the state of cognitive science today:


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Quote:
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
We are thrown back therefore upon the crude evidences of introspection on the one hand, with all its liabilities to deception, and, on the other hand, upon a priori postulates and probabilities. He who loves to balance nice doubts need be in no hurry to decide the point. Like Mephistopheles to Faust, he can say to himself, "dazu hast du noch eine lange Frist" [for that you�ve got a long wait], for from generation to generation the reasons adduced on both sides will grow more voluminous, and the discussion more refined.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

from: Are We Spiritual Machines? 1999 First Things 96 (October 1999): 25-31.

As for whether or not metaphysics can be fecund in any aspect of science, put me down as agreeing with Valentin F. Turchin in his The Meaning of Metaphysics at the Principia Cybernetica Web.


Finally, I am in search of consistency in those who deride Chalmers, Searle, Penrose et al when it comes to the epiphenomenalists, eliminativists and emergentists in cognitive science who have no evidence and when it comes to the theoretical physicists in cosmology who have no evidence (and can have no direct evidence, in principle). Are these other cognitive scientists and cosmologists to be similarly derided? I say encourage them all, again, not sans philosophical rigor (and certainly our postures will diverge on what that might entail).

I issue my caveat because putative ontological discontinuity has already been suggested by modern physics and these quasi-physical propositions, should they invite in the serious possibility of a radical discontinuity ontologically re: the origins of existence, would serve to make ontological discontinuity a more viable possibility universally, which is to say even re: consciousness. This is not to invoke QM for consciousness per se but to suggest analogically that there may be other nonenergetic explanations for same.

Well enough. Even I am interested in the AFC Championship.

pax,
jb

But I wonder if we really can rely on simply experience and common sense alone to really see and experience that which we are seeing and experiencing? Either no explanation is needed or a never-ending chain of explanations is needed. Or maybe we're simply changing our reality by having this discussion as our sense of common sense changes, as does our awareness of truth.

What a multifaceted, either/or, both/and approach! IOW, very catholic.

I suppose my opening response should address how I view the implicit (or explicit) charge that I have introduced diversity recklessly.

Hmmm, generally the error in regards to diversity (in my chosen field, heh heh) is not one of recklessness but disingenuousness. It's not usually the case of diversity being championed, but someone's specific scheme of all the ideas and concepts that have a right to belong on the discussion table while excluding the ones that, by their very nature, injure somebody's concept of diversity. It can get as downright silly as someone calling you a squelcher of diversity because you put up a vigorous defense of your viewpoint while ripping the other guy's to shreds. You just killed diversity; that is, you dared to not stay in their self-constructed cramped little box and in doing so you burst their little bubble of sheltered beliefs and exposed them as just so much bullying.

I think in this case someone is attempting to paint your arguments with the brush of frivolousness; as if your real motive is to make everyone feel warm and fuzzy by not excluding any theories or beliefs instead of being on a rugged search for the truth which, of course, knows no narrow bounds nor cares a whit one way or the other for diversity.

re: That would go on my refrigerator if there was room.

Why not compromise?

He who loves to balance nice doubts need be in no hurry to decide the point.

That's a great line. It seems the mind/body problem (or whatever yuze guys are arguing about) is like a race to climb a tall mountain. Whichever method or philosophy can plant its flag there first wins. I would imagine that there then would be a round of high-fives among the winners and a chorus of throat-slashing gestures aimed toward the defeated opponents.

quote:

Finally, I am in search of consistency in those who deride Chalmers, Searle, Penrose et al when it comes to the epiphenomenalists, eliminativists and emergentists in cognitive science who have no evidence and when it comes to the theoretical physicists in cosmology who have no evidence (and can have no direct evidence, in principle). Are these other cognitive scientists and cosmologists to be similarly derided? I say encourage them all, again, not sans philosophical rigor (and certainly our postures will diverge on what that might entail).

I'm more interest in social and political dynamics than science at the moment, although science always holds an interest for me. But how convenient and wonderful that the more I learn about science and its methods the more I realize how these two subjects are not too dissimilar. In short, I'm just astonished, particularly in this supposedly enlightened day and age, just how much social, political and other biases blind otherwise brilliant people. It's as if Einstein one day woke up and decided, for one reason or another, that he just wasn't going to use the value pi in any of his equations.

It's interesting to me that the thread title over there is "How does consciousness happen?" instead of "What is consciousness?"

I think I've always been interested in the impossible questions. I remember being bored in school learning that certain equations worked to solve certain problems. I wanted to know why they worked. The explanation, if there was one, would inevitably lead to another dead-end "why" question.

Now, I know that there is a practical reason to ask the "how" questions. For example, once we understood the "how" of the atom we could harness its power. Hell, Quantum physics taunts us (at least according to its interpreters) by saying that certain questions are not only unanswerable but that it doesn't even make sense to ask them. You can bet that sticks in my craw.

So when they ask "How does consciousness happen?" I figure they're being a hell of a lot more practical then me. If they can figure out the "how" then they might be able to make use of it. But I'd rather learn what consciousness is. One could figure out how it works without really figuring out what it is. Heck, isn't the why science works because it doesn't get bogged down in questions that, for practical purposes, don't matter?

On a purely speculative basis (which is the most fun), I wonder if the top-down paradigm of emergence, when melded with a concept of god, doesn't provide a tidy answer for consciousness. One can imagine that complex systems (once they acquire the necessary state of complexity) somehow plug into energy or essences that are already there. It's not a matter of something new or unexpected being created. It's a matter of plugging in and turning on something that already exists. The inevitable outcome of this line of reasoning, at least for me, is that there has to be a "pure state" of something from which to draw these energies and properties. That would be the "what". The "why" of consciousness then becomes a question of God's motive. Technically it is now, if you ask me. Change it to "how does consciousness work" and you get the same thing. So what question is it really that science asks? It just seems to me, at the core, they're not really asking any deep questions no matter how the question is phrased. At its heart I don't think they're describing reality. They're simply predicting what will happen next by looking closely at what happened before. Given that, I find it interesting that scientists become so immersed in questions outside their purview. But then religion is an ancient yearning.

From Brad to JB:You be the industrial giant. I be the small stone mason. I think Phil is an architect who designs both big and small buildings (while taking kickbacks from the Teamsters). W.C. is the building inspector always forcing us to rewire our arguments.

LOL!

But your point (elsewhere in that post) about how meta-concepts are shortcuts to enable another level of reflection is a good one, and a good example of how language and conceptualization by humans is different from the animals. I think here we see language in the service of spirit, rather than survival or other more basic motives.

From JB: This is big, Phil. We indeed transcend our godelian constraints in that we are able to look at, question and change our own axioms. This is not only big for cognitive science in demonstrating that artificial intelligence will never supervene on computers, it is big for formative spirituality and psychological therapies that point to our need for [i]reprogramming . What is astonishing about the human brain is its ability to rewrite its own programs, n'est pas?[/i]

Oui, c'est vrai. Only, maybe the brain isn't doing it. I think of the brain as a kind of "hard drive" with a few instinctual routines hard-wired into its structure. So what's rewriting the programs is the soul, which is inseparable from the brain and is even formed by the lawfulness of the brain and our sensory system. IOW, it's the soul that's the agent of freedom and intelligence, not the brain. The brain just makes the manifestation of soul in space and time possible like a TV makes television waves manifest. That's my very simplified view of this metaphysical situation.

(Admittedly behind in reading some of the posts on this thread, but trying to catch up.)