For a good explanation of postmodernism, see the link below:
http://www.colorado.edu/Englis...2012Klages/pomo.html

What I am mostly concerned about, here, is the popular manifestions. E.g., that truth is unknowable, relative, subjective, utilitarian. I am also concerned about the political implications -- e.g., the correlation between postmodern thinking and secularism. The reaction to this is also significant.

quote:

This association between the rejection of postmodernism and conservatism or fundamentalism may explain in part why the postmodern avowal of fragmentation and multiplicity tends to attract liberals and radicals. This is why, in part, feminist theorists have found postmodernism so attractive, as Sarup, Flax, and Butler all point out.

My first response concerns truth, and draws from our basic human experience. We note, here, that, postmodernism notwithstanding, everyone still recognizes that some explanations and accountings of phenomena are more intelligible and true than others. We also note the fact that lying still goes on, and that we recognize in ourselves that we do so. What is implied here is some innate aptitude of evaluation and judgment attuned to truth. This aptitude is an intelligence that senses whether we are drawing closer to truth or drifting away from it. It's what Christianity and many philosophies have called "reason" and its primary function is to sort out the true from the false, the real from the phony. In many ways, postmodernism is an assault on reason. We have noted this happening on many thread on this board.

What I'm saying, here, is that truth exists and our minds are fundamentally oriented toward alignment with it. We can approach it more and more closely and live more and more in harmony with it through the practice of honesty, critical reflection and responsible action. This leads us to a deeper and deeper experience of truth, perhaps ultimately moving one into the realms of religion and spirituality.

If truth does not really exist, then neither does lying, and information becomes merely something to use to obtain certain ends. These can be justified however one wishes, for in some postmodern schools, goodness is a purely relative matter as well. But what I wrote about truth applies to goodness aas well -- we really do know when we see it and approach it, and we know when we drift away from it. Fidelity to one's values is the way forward, here, but such values must be in alignment with truth.

This little opener has many implications, which I am hoping we can explore. What I am saying is that objective truth and goodness really do exist, although in a transcendent realm, for we can never fully grasp them, only approach them more and more closely.

In many ways, postmodernism is an assault on reason. We have noted this happening on many thread on this board.

Yes. Succinctly said.

What I'm saying, here, is that truth exists and our minds are fundamentally oriented toward alignment with it. We can approach it more and more closely and live more and more in harmony with it through the practice of honesty, critical reflection and responsible action.

Although it does seem, dear Phil, that some minds are fundamentally oriented toward non-truth, or at least confusion (and we surely all have our good days and our bad days). But perhaps it would be more exact to say that some people are emotionally oriented toward non-truth and do not our emotions come significantly into play when getting that �feel� for what is true?

So that is to say that when we get out of whack with the truth, when our reasoning tends to send us astray, it may or may not be time to take some evening university classes, but it may be time to sit down with a shrink. (But if one were to sit down with a lefty, postmodern shrink then one would tend to get worse so be careful!)

This leads us to a deeper and deeper experience of truth, perhaps ultimately moving one into the realms of religion and spirituality.

I wonder why some of us are drawn there and others are not. Your �perhaps� is well placed.

But what I wrote about truth applies to goodness aas well -- we really do know when we see it and approach it, and we know when we drift away from it.

I think we do but it can require us to become good listeners and brave evaluators (usually of ourselves).

This little opener has many implications, which I am hoping we can explore. What I am saying is that objective truth and goodness really do exist, although in a transcendent realm, for we can never fully grasp them, only approach them more and more closely.

Surely objective truth exists just as surely as a pernicious type of nuance exists that attempts to disingenuously undermine truth by playing off the inherent inexactness of whatever truth we hold at the moment. One might say that our truth is never perfectly precise and this may indeed be due to the nature of truth emanating from a transcendent realm or because our instruments and techniques of detection are in constant need of improvement. I think we should always keep in mind, however, particularly in this day and age of postmodernism, if one is doing fine tuning of the truth (even if by overturning accepted truths) or one is simply attempting do destroy the notion of truth itself with subtle techniques of slander.

That was an excellent opening post, Phil.

Thanks, Brad, and good comments.

- - -

Where I am coming from in all this is not an attempt to extol modernity over postmodernity, for the latter has made some valuable contributions, as the link I posted above appreciates. It is to take on the way that postmodernism has undermined belief in objective truth and goodness, reducing these to a mere matter of opinion and, therefore, spawning a spirit of skepticism (even cynicism) concerning the claims of religions and conservatives. Indeed, any attempts to point to principles inhering in the "nature of things" (natural law) is scoffed at by postmodernists. Not so fast, however . . .

The strongest antidote I've found is not the fundamentalistic insistence on the authority of the Bible and other such instances of dogmatism, but the philosophy of Bernard Lonergan (especially as articulated by Daniel Helminiak). Longergan's contribution here is to point to the dynamism of the human mind/spirit itself and what this implies about truth and goodness. This dynamism can be summarized as follows:
A. Be attentive. What is the situation? What's going on? What is the data? What happens to be the case? "The facts, ma'am, only the facts." This is the level of empirical observation.
B. Be intelligent. What meanings / orderings do the facts suggest? What hunches and intuitions come to mind? What patterns? What hypotheses? The beginnings of theoretical thinking and philosophy.
C. Be reasonable. How can I know that my hypotheses and meanings are correct? This is the step of critical reflection? Testing one's premises. Epistomology and metaphysics.
D. Be responsible. What action should I take based on my understanding? Ethics.

This is the way the mind naturally proceeds from observation to action, sometimes in a matter os seconds, sometimes plodding along with each setp for long periods of time, depending on the situation. If one is truly faithful to this movement, the consequence is authentic understanding and action. We all have direct experience of this as it is our uniquely human way of knowing and proceeding. Ideological bias subverts this process, as do a number of other factors like addictive involvements.

It seems to me that postmodern skepticism is directed primarily at #3, Be reasonable, questioning whether we can really know whether one theory or hypothesis is really more true than another. IOW, how can I know that what I think about something is more true than not, more correct than not? There are ethical implications here since what one does depends in large part on how one understands things.

Lonergan's reply is that rational knowledge is understanding that is coherently verified and illuminated in the data. Because some explanations and hypotheses are more coherent and verifiable than others, then it follows that some are more true than others. This doesn't mean that we won't eventually find an explanation that is "more true" than the one we have now, of course, or that we cannot come to deeper understandings. Most importantly, what is implied is that the mind is innately disposed to make such evaluations and judgments, even regarding ideas.

Lonergan's method doesn't tell us what the truth is, only how we can come to know it. It also expresses optimisim in our being able to do so by pointing out that the mind wouldn't really be disposed toward truth unless it was there to be comprehended in the first place. This postulates the existence of levels of truth beyond mere opinion--an hypothesis that is confirmed when numerous people come to the same understanding or can share understanding after having followed this procedure. Without denying the role that subjective perceptions and biases can play, Lonergan confidently points to the existence of truth and goodness as realities toward which the mind is naturally oriented to know and express.

(This is becoming the discussion of Helminiak's work that I hinted might take place at some point.)

Just bouncing a few things from the postmodern link before I�m engaged for most of the rest of the day:

quote:

From a literary perspective, the main characteristics of modernism include:

1. an emphasis on impressionism and subjectivity in writing (and in visual arts as well); an emphasis on HOW seeing (or reading or perception itself) takes place, rather than on WHAT is perceived. An example of this would be stream-of-consciousness writing.

2. a movement away from the apparent objectivity provided by omniscient third-person narrators, fixed narrative points of view, and clear-cut moral positions. Faulkner's multiply-narrated stories are an example of this aspect of modernism.

If I note any underlying theme to modernism and postmodernism it is one of willful and wanton destruction. Creativity certainly implies or requires a certain amount of destruction as new ideas are given the light of day and inevitable, to some extent, at the expense of old ones. But I think we need to ask ourselves when are we constructively destroying, when are we recklessly destroying, and how do we tell the difference? This is the question that is becoming central to my pursuit of the truth. We might also note the need and power of novelty, of change for change�s sake and acknowledge it has its place and that a perfectly ordered, predictable and indestructible society is neither desirable nor likely. But I think it is when we touch those deeper meanings and sources of truth and goodness that our actions are shaped then to be positive (even if quite destructive in result or appearche�say, destroying the UN and replacing it with something better).

quote:

The distinguishing characteristic of postmodernist theorizing is its rejection of traditional philosophy and metaphysics. The Western philosophical tradition itself is, of course, a record of debate rather than consensus. The postmodernists, however, claim to have rejected not one thesis or another but rather the entire philosophical tradition from Plato through George Santayana. Deconstructionists, pragmatists and New Historicists certainly make assertions and criticize opposing views, just as traditional thinkers did. Unlike traditional philosophers, however, postmodernists make no attempt to tell the truth about reality. They realize, what in their view their predecessors failed to grasp, that human reason is an inadequate instrument for achieving truth. They have therefore renounced metaphysics and philosophy in favor of what Carl Rapp calls "post-rational criticism."

Rapp wastes no time considering whether such a change in intellectual history is desirable or not; instead, he asks the reader to consider whether the alleged transformation has indeed occurred. Rapp�s answer, at which he arrives through a series of close examinations of key postmodernist texts, is that no such grandiose intellectual revolution has taken place. The postmodernists, he finds, cannot help philosophizing despite themselves and, even worse (from their point of view), engaging in metaphysics. Their theorizing, therefore, continues rather than terminates the career of Western philosophy.

http://www.nhinet.org/seatonr.htm (bold emphasis mine)

Hee hee. See?

The innate dynamism of the human mind cannot be denied if one is really searching for the truth. What postmodernists are doing is trying to assert truth even while denying any basis for believing in the objectivity of its existence.

Nevertheless, this doesn't change the fact that many have latched onto this stuff and used it as the basis for rejecting traditional (hence, authoritative ) understandings about which widespread consensus had, in fact, been reached. Lacking crticial thinking skills, many today (especially youth) latch onto this stuff and find in it a justification for a brand of secularism that cannot distinguish between truth and falsehood, right and wrong. These are the leftists who despise traditional values and who often promote anarchy. If there were a small fringe group, I wouldn't be concerned, but they're not!

Phil said: The innate dynamism of the human mind cannot be denied if one is really searching for the truth. What postmodernists are doing is trying to assert truth even while denying any basis for believing in the objectivity of its existence.

Okay, I think I getcha. You mean they�re trying to have their cake and eat it to. As Dr. Phil might say (the junior Dr. Phil, the one on TV), "How�s that workin� for ya?"

Phil also said: Nevertheless, this doesn't change the fact that many have latched onto this stuff and used it as the basis for rejecting traditional (hence, authoritative [Eek!] ) understandings about which widespread consensus had, in fact, been reached.

The book on conservatism that I�m reading now points out that one of the tenets of conservatism is that authority and government is absolutely essential to securing liberty. We trade a bit of the latter to empower the former so that the lion�s share of our liberty is protected. But there are some (many, really) who go off half-cocked and see all establishment of authority as a threat to their liberty. This is basically an anarchical position at best. One might nuance this a bit and say that there are many (very many) who detest the establishment of any authority from a source that is not kosher to them (and many have such severe definitions of "kosher" that there is little room left for democratic nuance and compromise, aka "tolerance"). Larger ideas such as the rule of law, diversity (in the true sense), tolerance (in the true sense), and the preservation of all those small habits and customs that can never be encoded into law, but are absolutely essential, are tossed aside in the heat of passionate (he says generously) battle.

Lacking crticial thinking skills, many today (especially youth) latch onto this stuff and find in it a justification for a brand of secularism that cannot distinguish between truth and falsehood, right and wrong.

One might also say that we have trained our youth to value emotion at the expense of reason when, really, the two should work in harmony. One gets the feeling that the presumption is that cold reason predominated at one time and that now a new, fairer, more enlightened (and more emotional) form of reason must make amends. Another way is to say that we�ve taught people that a sure sign that one has honed in on reason is if their rawest, most surface level emotions have been activated.

These are the leftists who despise traditional values and who often promote anarchy. If there were a small fringe group, I wouldn't be concerned, but they're not!

"Lashing out" has become a lazy habit in this culture and it shows.

I realize I am lapping in and out with random ideas when you might prefer a more linear progression, but I want to insert the following as Exhibit C for the purpose of adding another dimension to this discussion. But first, let me summarize your points in your own words in no particular order:

In many ways, postmodernism is an assault on reason.

What I am saying is that objective truth and goodness really do exist�

What I'm saying, here, is that truth exists and our minds are fundamentally oriented toward alignment with it.

What postmodernists are doing is trying to assert truth even while denying any basis for believing in the objectivity of its existence.

Lacking crticial thinking skills, many today (especially youth) latch onto this stuff and find in it a justification for a brand of secularism that cannot distinguish between truth and falsehood, right and wrong. These are the leftists who despise traditional values and who often promote anarchy.

It is to take on the way that postmodernism has undermined belief in objective truth and goodness, reducing these to a mere matter of opinion and, therefore, spawning a spirit of skepticism (even cynicism) concerning the claims of religions and conservatives. Indeed, any attempts to point to principles inhering in the "nature of things" (natural law) is scoffed at by postmodernists.

IOW, how can I know that what I think about something is more true than not, more correct than not? There are ethical implications here since what one does depends in large part on how one understands things.

This is the way the mind naturally proceeds from observation to action, sometimes in a matter os seconds, sometimes plodding along with each setp for long periods of time, depending on the situation. If one is truly faithful to this movement, the consequence is authentic understanding and action.

That's a lot of thick (in the good sense), meaty propositions, any one of which elicit a long discussion. So let me add some for fertilizer with this quote from Edmund Burke:

quote:

�A man who considers his nature rightly will be diffident of any reasonings that carry him out of the ordinary roads of Life; Custom is to be regarded with great deference especially if it be an universal Custom; even popular notions are not always to be laughed at. There is some general principle operating to produce Customs, that is a more sure guide than our Theories. They are followed indeed often on odd motives, but that does not make them less reasonable or useful."

I think in many ways the problems inherent in postmodernism can be attributed to intellectual hubris. Surely the assault on truth is itself, as I think Phil intimated, indicative of a search for more truth, perhaps a deeper truth, but only on the terms of these new truth-tellers (who, in their zeal, often have quite unexacting and illogical habits). I think both the zealousness and carelessness of this search is driven by the perception that previous generations and their systems have failed us and that therefore these customs and conventions, if one really wants to get to the truth, can and should be freely dispensed with (thus we see the contempt and mocking). The search for truth itself is a motivating factor, for sure, but driving this process as well is a healthy (rather, unhealthy) dash of vengeance, anger, spitefulness and arrogance.

We are all standing on the shoulders of giants. We aren't lightyears away from paradise because our ancestors did so little. We are, many of us, living right now in a peaceful, prosperous world because they did so much. As Jerry Muller states in his book, Conservatism, "From the beginning of his public career to its end, Edmund Burke warned of the potentially disastrous social and political results of intellect which overstretched its proper reach. In his first book, from which the selection below is drawn [the one above that I quoted], Burke focused on the hazards of a frame of mind that demanded a rational justification of each institution, rejected every institution which did not meet the standards set by speculative theories of justice, and demanded that human society be reconstructed to conform to speculative criteria.

I find it ironic that in this Age of Science that we see all around us those who seem to have rejected this age. We are told that reason must triumph over all other concerns and yet "reason" is often just a code word for someone else's political, social and metaphysical agenda. But what we surely see, and it might be the major lesson we gain from all this, is that darkness is always on the horizon. Reason (attentiveness, intelligence, reasonableness, responsibleness), through constant exertion of intellectual and moral muscles, must continually turn the generators of light or else darkness and confusion quickly falls. And because we must be humble enough to know that we could be wrong we must strive to keep intact the system that allows for the free exchange of ideas and the triumph (in the marketplace) of true and good ones. Thus one sees how postmodernism, with its assault on reason and objective truth, is oriented to undermine this magnanimous (and rigorous) system.

quote:

Many modernist works try to uphold the idea that works of art can provide the unity, coherence, and meaning which has been lost in most of modern life; art will do what other human institutions fail to do. Postmodernism, in contrast, doesn't lament the idea of fragmentation, provisionality, or incoherence, but rather celebrates that. The world is meaningless? Let's not pretend that art can make meaning then, let's just play with nonsense.

Anyone with a set of eyes will see both fragmentation and coherence in the world. Sometimes one. Sometimes the other. Maybe both together or singly. Good artists rightly at times try to break through constraints (painful though their self-conscious self-indulgence can sometimes be to watch). At other times they follow the rules. But to choose to see only one or the other, or to give preference and legitimacy to one or the other, isn't daring or breaking new ground, or revealing new truths. It's just repeating mistakes from the past and then trying to pass this lazy method off as some type of inventive and daring way of looking at things. Believe me, objectivity is hard work (said with a Bush accent). It really is. To break from group-think, to break from the safety of one's peers or clique, and to try to do something original and authentic is incredibly hard. Our affectations, prejudices and conceits weigh us down and are tough to escape from � but then, that's the very job of certain professions including journalism, writing, art, etc. To actually institutionalize ignorance, as it appears postmodernism does, is astounding.

I realize I am lapping in and out with random ideas when you might prefer a more linear progression. . .

You carry on with the rangers behind the lines and I'll bring up the tanks in a frontal assault. (Good posts.)

- - -

Continuing . . .

What the post-modern "post-rational critique" really turns out to be, then, is another instance of Step 2, "Be Intelligent." It is an hypothesis attempting to give an accounting of reality, only it's a-priori discounting Step 3, "Be Reasonable" as a valid means of confirming its propositions. We saw some of this in the Hawkins discussions and in others about enlightenment, where reason is portrayed as bein a disreputable guide to understanding truth because it does terrible things like affirming ontological dualism, making judgments, endorsing hierarchies and lending itself to patriarchical systems of injustice. In fact, some of these critiques almost seem to equate reason itself as inherently patriarchical!

The fallacy here is equating the products of rational inquiry with reason itself. Reason has no problem whatsoever with a critique of traditional formulations; if a better explanation can be furthered, so let it be done. Reason isn't inherently dogmatic; but it is conservative in the sense that it is not inclined to dismiss a rationally persuasive traditional understanding simply because it's traditional. Again, let a better understanding be put forward and reason will be its evangelical agent.

The post-modern critique will have none of this, however.

Nevertheless, human nature being what it is, no post-modernist can escape the dynamism of their own human spirit and its movement from Step 2 to Step 3. The post-modernist cannot help but wonder, "Am I correct? Is my explanation valid? How can I be sure that this is the best way to make sense of the data?" Like it or not, the post-modern hypothesis must eventually hold itself up for rational validation, only its inherent rejection of reason creates a sense of frustration in the post-modernist. The post-rational critique must be affirmed over-and-against the dynamism of the human spirit, creating a sense of inner conflict and contradiction. This, too, is blamed on reason, and so the cycle continues, the consequence being a kind of anti-rational dogmatism that leaves people conflicted, confused, and unable to discern right from wrong, good from evil, and the way out of their conundrum. In their misery, they lash out against anyone, anything and any structure supporting rational inquiry, as though their emotional passion were sufficient proof for the veracity of their position and the wrongness of reason.

Yet still they must wonder . . . "Am I correct? Does it follow that the other being wrong means that I am right?" Attentiveness to these questions and honesty in puruing their leadings will point the way out. If only they will listen . . .

And one more potent salvo, this time from Daniel Helminiak in Religion and the Human Sciences. (emphasis mine)

quote:

In the scientific and postscientific era, arationality is found in an overt form and in a latent form. The overt form is deliberate and self-conscious. It represents the outright and argued rejection of rationality. It is examplified in philosophical skepticism, nihilism, or relativism. It is also the position underlying contemporary postmodernism . . . Disillusioned by the recently discovered complexity of the universe, both physical and social, people have argued for the abandonment of the attempt to understand. Supposedly, there is no objective truth or objective good, so it makes no sense to puruse them. All things are relative, nothing is absolute. Of course, this position is blantantly self-contradictory. It stands on an absolute claim that there are no absolutes; it expects respect and feigns validity while it grants only qualified validity, only social validation, to any position. But for this position, logical choherence and self-contradiction do not matter, for at the core of this position is the denial of any reality apart from a social construction, so there is nothing that constrains the human mind and requires the principle of contradiction. To this extent overt arationality represents a deliberate return to a prescientific worldview, to a world of magic, superstition, whim, power politics, and personal preference, all supposedly beyond the possibility of any adjudication.

Here we have freedom disconnected from truth and responsibility, free to follow desire and instinct without the inconvenience of having to be accountable to any particular moral principles or traditional beliefs about truth and falsehood. Given the fallen nature of humanity, this is a recipe for disaster, both individual and social. Small wonder, then, the connections between postmodernism, secularism and anarchism. Small wonder, too, that they find themselves at serious odds with anyone who professes to believe there is good and evil, truth and falsehood, etc.

In Spiral Dynamics lenses, this is an ideal context for the unleashing of the Red system under the pretense of Green concerns. Here, postmodernists are a lot like Islamofacists, only the latter are more principled in their connection to the Blue level of Islam.

And just in case one needs to be hit over the head with a sledge hammer to see the connections between postmodernism and leftist stances, consider this definition of postmodernism from one of its leading critics:

quote:

Charles Murray, a strong critic of postmodernism, defines the term:

"By contemporary intellectual fashion, I am referring to the constellation of views that come to mind when one hears the words multicultural, gender, deconstruct, politically correct, and Dead White Males. In a broader sense, contemporary intellectual fashion encompasses as well the widespread disdain in certain circles for technology and the scientific method. Embedded in this mind-set is hostility to the idea that discriminating judgments are appropriate in assessing art and literature, to the idea that hierarchies of value exist, hostility to the idea that an objective truth exists. Postmodernism is the overarching label that is attached to this perspective."

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/P...nism_and_its_critics

It's really difficult to say how prevalent this attitude is, but the statement above points to a number of landmarks that can be readily observed.

Finally, here's a good article on Postmodernity in Europe-- its characteristics, prevalence, and how one might hope to advance the Gospel in such a culture. The article reinforces a lot of what we've gone over above, and proposes apologetics as a good way to interact with postmodernists. I'm not so optimistic about that, except to the extent that it moves the postmodernist to an appreciation of Step #3, "Be Reasonable." That's the real value of apologetics, I think.

- - -

I'm pretty much done. I think we've laid it all out, demonstrated where the problems lie, and how the postmodern attitude is at the root of a lot of other issues that come up on this discussion board. We've addressed the issues directly, and have pointed the way out without resorting to fundamentalistic, authoritative, and dogmatic responses. Postmodernists need to learn to "Be reasonable" without having to eschew the valid critiques of modern society, capitalism, religion and other issues they cherish. Such critical thinking informed by reason will not lead to a restoration of modernity, so there is no need to fear a regression will take place, here. Rational inquiry in a spirit of honesty and humility will lead to novel understandings that are nonetheless true to the inner dynamism of the human spirit. As a Christian, I am not fearful about such inquiry leading one away from the Christian mysteries. My sense is that a greater appreciation for the Christian tradition of wisdom will be the consequence, animated anew by the postmodern spirit of playfulness and attunement to mystery.

Rational inquiry in a spirit of honesty and humility will lead to novel understandings that are nonetheless true to the inner dynamism of the human spirit. As a Christian, I am not fearful about such inquiry leading one away from the Christian mysteries. My sense is that a greater appreciation for the Christian tradition of wisdom will be the consequence, animated anew by the postmodern spirit of playfulness and attunement to mystery.

I think you've definitely made a dent in this issue, and you may be done with it for now (certainly it might not be the most riveting subject over the Christmas Holiday) but I can't help thinking that you've kicked up enough dust to leave a trail of chattering currents and sub-currents in your wake. So be it!

Previously on "As the Postmodernism Turns", Phil said: What I'm saying, here, is that truth exists and our minds are fundamentally oriented toward alignment with it. We can approach it more and more closely and live more and more in harmony with it through the practice of honesty, critical reflection and responsible action. This leads us to a deeper and deeper experience of truth, perhaps ultimately moving one into the realms of religion and spirituality.

If we are fundamentally oriented towards truth then we must also admit that we are prone to getting our truth detectors out of whack. This may be partially due to the fact that the search for truth requires the active engagement of our imaginations. Imagination is useful, probably absolutely vital, for solving problems. Not always do we approach problems linearly, reasoning them out bit by bit. Often the problems at hand do not lend themselves to this type of approach nor do our innate talents allow for it. I, for one, have a hard time with the linear "bit by bit" approach but, if I absorb enough information and give it time to gestate, I might often "intuitively" spit out an answer that seems reasonable. But our imaginations have limitations. They are fallible and they still need to reckon with the far less glamorous, but vital, aspects of reasoning which Phil outlined as a number of steps. Our imaginations can make giant intuitive strides but without confirmation from the more "nuts and bolts" aspects of our intellect we are in danger of stepping too far or stepping off the path altogether. Believe me, intuition can be like a drug and can quickly lead to arrogance. Since it's harder and takes longer to do the proofs of problems, to verify our intuitions with those "nuts and bolts" reasoning methods, I think we often just take the easy path and trust our imaginations and intuitions and leave it at that. I think we're tempted to do so because there is no better confirmation of ourselves and our existence than our feelings, so we tend, especially if one is feeling existentially weak, to give them much too much weight in the reasoning process.

This is the way the mind naturally proceeds from observation to action, sometimes in a matter os seconds, sometimes plodding along with each setp for long periods of time, depending on the situation.

That got me thinking about what techniques one might use to sharpen one's reasoning powers and lower one's gullibility factor. Being a radical skeptic or cynic is the path some people take and I think they do so, not because they don't trust other people, but because they don't trust their own judgment. "Out in the field", if you will, in our busy daily lives where things are often coming at us in machine-gun-fashion, we're not likely going to be able to slow down and reason things out according to some set formula. We're going to react with our instincts, like it or not, and very often once these instincts decide an issue then that is that. There must be some exercises we can do or books we can read to train us for better judgment. Certainly having an open chat like this on a forum is one way to do this and is perhaps a major reason why we do this.

quote:

For the Rationalist, all that matters is that he has at last separated the ore of the ideal from the dress of the habit of behaviour; and, for us, the deplorable consequences of his success. Moral ideals are a sediment; they have significance only so long as they are suspended in a religious or social tradition, so long as they belong to a religious or a social life. [41] The predicament of our time is that the Rationalists have been at work so long on their project of drawing off the liquid in which our moral ideals were suspended (and pouring it away as worthless) that we are left only with the dry and gritty residue which chokes us as we try to take it down. First, we do our best to destroy parental authority [because of its alleged abuse], then we sentimentally deplore the scarcity of 'good homes', and we end by creating substitutes which complete the work of destruction.

And it is for this reason that, among much else that is corrupt and unhealthy, we have the spectacle of a set of sanctimonious, rationalist politicians, preaching an ideology of unselfishness and social service to a population in which they and their predecessors have done their best to destroy the only living root of moral behaviour; and opposed by another set of politicians dabbling with the project of converting us from Rationalism under the inspiration of a fresh rationalization of our political tradition.

It would seem that Michael Oakeshott's notions of Rationalism have some bearing on this topic. And he presents an interesting challenge for conservatives.

I think the "trick" is to see how the dynamism of the human spirit is such that its innate movement is to know more and more truth and to love more and more what can be loved. This moves in a contrary direction than reductionism and materialism, leading, inevitably, to an embrace of philosophy, methaphysics and theology.

Why theology?

Because only "God" satisfies the breadth of knowledge and love toward which the human spirit is naturally oriented.

A theological or philosophical foundation provides the necessary context for Step 4, "Be Responsible." Without this context, people can indeed sound like they're saying all the right things, but they are merely spouting moralisms, often with an intent to try to motivate good-hearted people to endorse a dubious cause in the name of high virtue. Politicians have been known to play this game . . . as have many other groups.

Friends, there are some big words and arcane phrases below --- but they are juxtaposed, in each case, to some more familiar ideas and experiences, that you might grasp it all in context. This is a dense condensation of many ideas drawn from many sources.

The different approaches to reality are the:

1) positivistic employing deductive-probabilistic rationality in descriptive accounts, primarily experienced as the noetical, with existential orientations to the imperatives to be attentive (descriptive) and to be intelligent (probabilistic), calling us to ongoing intellectual conversion ;

2) pragmatic employing ecological rationality in evaluative accounts; primarily experienced as the aesthetical , with an existential orientation to the imperative to be in love , calling us to ongoing affective and socio-political conversions ;

3) philosophic employing normative rationality in prescriptive accounts, primarily experienced as the ethical , with an existential orientation to the imperative to be responsible , calling us to moral conversion ;

all of these rationalities, accounts and experiences being attempts to model reality in distinct parts, and

4) meta-physical and meta-normative and meta-evaluative employing meta-rationality in attempts to model reality as a whole, primarily experienced as the holy , with an existential orientation to the imperative to be reasonable , calling us to religious conversion , bringing the noetical, aesthetical and ethical and their polynomial natures together in holiness, re-ligating them, so to speak, tying them all together with the belief that they do point to One Reality notwithstanding our otherwise disparate experiences of their polynomial natures and apparent inconsistencies and contradictions, which might tempt us to affirm any latent arationality or irrationality .

The different approaches to reality are the:

Examples of each type would be helpful. I've taken, say, a positivistic approach to environmental concerns by looking at it this way, or a pragmatic approach by looking at it that way, etc. And this seems somewhat self-evident, but do you feel we need to develop all these approaches to some extent to gain wisdom and balance (even if we may do so unconsciously competently and not by rooting through dictionaries for terms)?

And more to the topic, which method do you think postmodernists might be using too exclusively and thus helping them to get out of whack with reality?

By the way, you forgot number five:

5) Johnboysian Metaphysics



What a great pleasure to hear from you this morning. I know everyone else 'round here misses you as well.

quote:

Originally posted by Brad Nelson:
[qb]re: The different approaches to reality are the: Examples of each type would be helpful.[/qb]

These groups are something of a takeoff on Daniel Helminiak's categories.

Brad takes the positivistic approach when he is being a scientist , using deductive rationality, when he is being Holmes, and probabilisitic rationality, when he is being Watson (inductively).

The pragmatic approach, for me, would correspond to Helminiak's theotic realm, which BN engages in when doing spirituality and practicing Buddhist asceticisms. This would correspond to Gelpi's orthopraxis authenticates orthodoxy, wherein what is true is considered useful and not to be confused with what is useful is considered true (not bivalent) .

The philosophic is Brad doing philosophy. The meta-rational approaches, for me, equate to Helminiak's theological realm, which I just genericized to facilitate dialogue with ideologues

quote:

Originally posted by Brad Nelson:
[qb]And this seems somewhat self-evident, but do you feel we need to develop all these approaches to some extent to gain wisdom and balance... [/qb]

Interestingly, it seems that human core competencies lie in our ecological rationality, which you can read more about at the Max Planck Institute.

I expand on this elsewhere, near the bottom of this page on epistemology, for any who may come along and be interested, not likely fodder for a genral forum :

quote:

In my larger epistemic schema, now having drawn distinctions between deductive, probabilistic, ecological, normative and meta- rationalities, as I narrow my focus onto ecological rationality, what I think I am seeing, is ecological/evolutionary rationality as an epistemic niche (double entendre intended), which might well be inhabited by what has been called 1) abduction by Peirce 2) the tacit dimension by Polanyi 3) connaturality by Maritain 4) non-intuitive immediate awareness by Fries 5) the illative sense by Newman and 6) the various epistemic desiderata by Platinga. One thing these capacities have in common is that they are usually employed by humans unaware, likely due to the fact that they, themselves, constitute our innate noetic structure.

At any rate, directly to your point, it seems that humans are not well equipped to engage in deductive and probabilistic rationality without considerable training, much less normative rationality and meta-rationality, and this includes our struggles to articulate what's going on, when we do employ them in an otherwise unconsciously competent manner. Here is some disquieting evidence on how humans reason.

We need, then, to experience ongoing conversion in all of these areas, as you say, to gain wisdom and balance...

quote:

Originally posted by Brad Nelson:
[qb]And more to the topic, which method do you think postmodernists might be using too exclusively and thus helping them to get out of whack with reality?[/qb]

Going back to Phil's thread opener:

quote:

What I am mostly concerned about, here, is the popular manifestions. E.g., that truth is unknowable, relative, subjective, utilitarian.

Some aspects of our approach to truth are indeed unprovable, relative, subjective, utilitarian BUT other aspects do appear provable, absolute, objective and governed by our very nature (to affirm a deontological/natural law aspect in addition to any teleological/consequentialist/utilitarian aspect). The postmodernists are too humble when it comes to human knowledge. OTOH, the fundamentalists are too proud.

Anyone who gets out of whack is overemphasizing one aspect of rationality: 1) arationality 2) irrationality 3) deductive rationality 4) probabilistic rationality 5) ecological rationality 6) normative rationality or 7) meta-rationality.

The postmodernists --- confronted with these multiple rationalities, all of which approach the same reality from different angles and seemingly obey different laws (polynomial), independent of one another --- apparently take the apparent conflicts, inconsistencies and contradictions, and ascribe those to reality, itself, rather than to the fallible observer. Yes, our grasp of reality is very problematical, but, unquestionably, our grasp is an ever-tightening one.

The rationalists overinvest in deductive rationality with a type of a priorism . The empiricists overinvest in probabilistic rationality. Scientism overinvests in a view of human nature that emphasizes ecological rationality, sometimes called evolutionary rationality, and those guilty of scientism are both too rationalistic and too empiricistic. Fideists and fundamentalists rely too much on ecological rationality to the exclusion of the others, giving the skeptics all of the ammo they need to take a dismal view of human nature.

It is also possible to get entirely wrapped up in normative rationality and meta-rationality, seeing the road to truth, beauty, goodness and love, without ever walking the road, or without walking as far down the road as one could.

Alas, there are perils for us all!

pax,
jb

quote:

The postmodernists --- confronted with these multiple rationalities, all of which approach the same reality from different angles and seemingly obey different laws (polynomial), independent of one another --- apparently take the apparent conflicts, inconsistencies and contradictions, and ascribe those to reality, itself, rather than to the fallible observer.

Interesting. I'm still absorbing what you said, but let's suppose for the moment (and this doesn't seem like too great a leap) that you've successfully described what people do, JB (in terms of their different modes of thinking). Now, to understand this thinking process, and to therefore perhaps propose effective remedies for our shortcomings, do you suppose we need to progress our investigation from what people are doing to why they are doing so? Why might one default to a postmodernist view? Is this type of thinking the result of the influence from our educational, cultural, and/or media institutions? Once the cause is diagnosed, is it just a matter of putting back in a component that is missing? If I were an ideologue (he he), or some type of fundamentalist, what exercises would you give me to do? If I were too literal with not enough spiritual, is there a John Fonda workout video I should rent?

quote:

It is also possible to get entirely wrapped up in normative rationality and meta-rationality, seeing the road to truth, beauty, goodness and love, without ever walking the road, or without walking as far down the road as one could.

Errr�guilty as charged. So, what's the remedy for this? Do I need to get out more often? Find new friends? (Any friends, that is.) I do sometimes regret that I just can't walk down the street to JBville and receive wisdom in the form of experiential instruction (aka walking down along the bijou) as well as a Buddhist stick across my back (aka a Buddhist stick across my back). I guess I could go bowling, smoke a few butts, chug a few beers, get in a bar fight and find the meaning of life. Or I could move to Seattle where perhaps the only other intellectuals reside but (and I'm really trying to be non-judgment) Seattle intellectuals are SOOO annoyingly leftist. I have no peers. It's not because I�m so great it's because I�m so weird. Yes, that's my cross, I know. (It even sorta rhymes.)

JB, good to see you here again.

You write: . . .The different approaches to reality are . . . and proceed describing levels that seem to take into account both ontological concerns and the dynamism of the spirit described by Lonergan/Helminiak. I'll have to think that over some more, as Helminiak would surely emphasize being reasonable as constituitive of every stage above the positivist/empirical while you seem to connect it with your metaphysical level.

You also write: The pragmatic approach, for me, would correspond to Helminiak's theotic realm, which BN engages in when doing spirituality and practicing Buddhist asceticisms.

As Buddhism is not even a theism, it's hard to see how it could be considered theotic, except in the usual inclusivist sense. But as a tradition very authentically established in the art of being attentive, intelligent, reasonable and responsible, Buddhism does so mostly at the philosophic level, developing the human spirit (perhaps) as much as is possible without drawing from theistic and theotic considerations (revelation, grace). Theism takes things a step further by inquiring into the ultimate Source of contingent existence, and theoticism moves further, exploring how one interacts with and becomes transformed by God. Maybe we have different understandings of these words, but that's how I understand Helminiak to be using them.

The postmodernists are too humble when it comes to human knowledge. OTOH, the fundamentalists are too proud.

I think you are much too kind in your assessment of postmodernism, here. I would use the word "cynical" where you use "humble," although you might mean this in a philosophical sense, I think.


The rationalists overinvest in deductive rationality with a type of a priorism.

Say some more about this when you have the time. Perhaps relating to your point, Helminiak writes:

quote:

The presupposition, spoken or unspoken, of any theoretically coherent account is the validity of the theorizing instrument, the human mind. . . if one were to deny the particular presupposition in question here -- namely, that the human mind is capable of objectively valid knowledge -- the denial would invalidate the very mind of the denier. So the contrary argument is inevitably self-contradictory.

Nevertheless, I don't hear the Lonergarians saying that we can have absolute certainty about what we hold to be ture (as in fundamentalisms), but only that the mind strives toward such and really does know what it knows. This includes experiential knowledge, which the human spirit acts upon following the four exigencies just as surely as with any other kind of investigations:

quote:

Originally posted by Phil:
[qb] ... as Helminiak would surely emphasize being reasonable as constituitive of every stage above the positivist/empirical while you seem to connect it with your metaphysical level. [/qb]

Good point. My outline is really just a heuristic device (mostly placeholders or conceptual hatracks) and I do precisely see all of the lonerganian imperatives as constitutive of every approach to reality. Not only that, I see all of the approaches as fully integrated and not so easily distinguishable as my facile categorizations might lead one to imagine. IOW, I see these rationalities kind of like fractals --- all containing one another even as some tend to refract the light of rationality more so in one color versus another. After all, rationality, by definition, implies reasonableness. Ergo, all of these approaches (I don't view them as levels) are ways of being reasonable.

quote:

Originally posted by Phil:
[qb]As Buddhism is not even a theism, it's hard to see how it could be considered theotic, except in the usual inclusivist sense. [/qb]

Exactly. As I said, I genericized the theotic to the pragmatic and the theological to the metaphysical-meta-normative.

quote:

Originally posted by Phil:
[qb]Theism takes things a step further by inquiring into the ultimate Source of contingent existence, and theoticism moves further, exploring how one interacts with and becomes transformed by God. Maybe we have different understandings of these words, but that's how I understand Helminiak to be using them. [/qb]

Same understanding. I simply use the theotic as a species of the genus pragmatic and theology as a species of the genus metaphysical, although this would be restricted to natural theology, where metaphysics culminates.

There is a whole other consideration of how far human growth processes can proceed --- noetically, aesthetically and ethically --- without the benefit of divine revelation and explicit faith. That's been well addressed on your other threads, where Helminiak was invoked.

quote:

Originally posted by Phil:
[qb]re:The rationalists overinvest in deductive rationality with a type of a priorism.

Say some more about this when you have the time.

Perhaps relating to your point, Helminiak writes:

quote:

The presupposition, spoken or unspoken, of any theoretically coherent account is the validity of the theorizing instrument, the human mind. . . if one were to deny the particular presupposition in question here -- namely, that the human mind is capable of objectively valid knowledge -- the denial would invalidate the very mind of the denier. So the contrary argument is inevitably self-contradictory.

Nevertheless, I don't hear the Lonergarians saying that we can have absolute certainty about what we hold to be ture (as in fundamentalisms), but only that the mind strives toward such and really does know what it knows. This includes experiential knowledge, which the human spirit acts upon following the four exigencies just as surely as with any other kind of investigations. [/qb]

Say more? Hmmm ...

Gelpi criticizes, properly in my view, the transcendental thomists, like Rahner and Lonergan, for their foundationalism and a priorism .

Amos Yong can say this better than me:

quote:

In order to briefly outline the task of foundational pneumatology and its inherent difficulties, two comments about Gelpi�s book and work are in order. The first is his commitment to a non-foundationalistic epistemology . This derives in part from his overall project of developing an inculturated theology in dialogue with the North American philosophic tradition stretching from Edwards and Emerson through Brownson, Abbott, and Santayana, to Peirce, Royce, James and Dewey. Under the tutelage especially of the pragmatism of C. S. Peirce and his successors, Gelpi came to question the transcendentalism and a priori methodologies of neo-Thomists such as Rahner and Lonergan that he imbibed in his Jesuit training, and moved in the direction of a fallibilistic epistemology and empirical theology. Both moves are to be applauded. My own foundational pneumatology follows Gelpi in eschewing the strong Cartesian foundationalism that bases all beliefs ultimately on self-evident intuitions . It proceeds instead from what Peirce called a contrite fallibilism wherein all knowledge is provisional, relative to the questions posed by the community of inquirers, and subject to the ongoing process of conversation and discovery. The foundational element in Gelpi�s pneumatology, however, is primarily methodological rather than epistemological.

I note, above, your Helminiak quote speaks in terms of a theoretically coherent account. Coherent is a nonfoundationalistic buzzword, a concept developed in response to the postmodern critique. Is Helminiak, himself, a nonfoundationalist? The buzzword for the foundationalist is typically correspondence, not coherence. Further, you speak of not having absolute certainty and this resonates with the contrite fallibilism prescribed by Gelpi a la Peirce. You also speak of experiential knowledge and this, too, jives with Gelpi's empiricist approach, which denies our grasps of properly basic beliefs as being self-evident or a priori, instead originating in our senses through experience.

Bottomline, not all postmodernism leads inevitably to either a metaphysical or moral antirealism, much less a self-contradictory nihilism. The Helminiak quote above rebuts one narrowly conceived view of postmodernism -- mostly nihilism but also the arationality that Wilber and other nondualists seem to subscribe to. It does not rebut the constructive postmodernism of those nonfoundationalists, who have well responded to the postmodern critique. If that is its thrust, however, it is but a strawman fallacy.

In some ways, the constructive postmodernists, as nonfoundationalists, end up believing many of the same things that foundationalists believe. They mostly differ in their accounts of why such beliefs are justified. Turning to Kant, like Rahner and Lonergan did, is untenable. Even then, make no mistake, Gelpi is a thoroughgoing Lonergan devotee.

pax,
jb

. . . I genericized the theotic to the pragmatic and the theological to the metaphysical-meta-normative.

The latter I can understand, but you've lost me with your association between the theotic and what you're calling the pragmatic.

I honestly don't know enough about the foundationalist/non-foundationalist distinctions to place Helminiak in one or the other. He's clearly about objecting to the arationalist mentality in post-modernism, and what he calls "post-rational critique," which doesn't seem particularly interested in "being reasonable." Without attentiveness to that dynamic, one cripples the dynamism of the human spirit, it seems to me, and renders dialogue and discussion meaningless, especially if one also doesn't especially value the meaning of words as some post-modernists do.

quote:

Originally posted by Brad Nelson:
[qb] Now, to understand this thinking process, and to therefore perhaps propose effective remedies for our shortcomings, do you suppose we need to progress our investigation from what people are doing to why they are doing so? Why might one default to a postmodernist view? Is this type of thinking the result of the influence from our educational, cultural, and/or media institutions? Once the cause is diagnosed, is it just a matter of putting back in a component that is missing? If I were an ideologue (he he), or some type of fundamentalist, what exercises would you give me to do? If I were too literal with not enough spiritual, is there a John Fonda workout video I should rent?[/qb]

One of the points I was trying to make in my response to Phil was how tightly integrated I thought these rationalities were. They act as a piece, rarely independently, and are used at the same time tending to complement each other as people develop skills or solve problems. [The last sentence was a paraphrase from Howard Gardner, which brings up my next point.]

So far, I addressed rationality, types of reasonableness. What I was waiting for someone to bring up was that being rational was cool, in all of the ways I inventoried, but that it is only one way of being intelligent. Many, many moons ago, Phil introduced me to Howard Gardner's work on the seven intelligences. To wit, condensed from the webpage link, above:

quote:

Linguistic intelligence involves sensitivity to spoken and written language, the ability to learn languages, and the capacity to use language to accomplish certain goals.

Logical-mathematical intelligence consists of the capacity to analyze problems logically, carry out mathematical operations, and investigate issues scientifically.

Musical intelligence involves skill in the performance, composition, and appreciation of musical patterns.

Bodily-kinesthetic intelligence entails the potential of using one's whole body or parts of the body to solve problems.

Spatial intelligence involves the potential to recognize and use the patterns of wide space and more confined areas.

Interpersonal intelligence is concerned with the capacity to understand the intentions, motivations and desires of other people.

Intrapersonal intelligence entails the capacity to understand oneself, to appreciate one's feelings, fears and motivations.

We also addressed on other threads, over the years, the difference between knowledge and wisdom (knowledge plus love, in my book).

Now, let's return to the litany of questions Brad set forth in the Brad Makeover Shalomplace Edition internet reality show.

Here is the st.romainian workout: Be Here Now In Love - in the now and awareness, love and benevolence, honesty and truth.

Here is the Little Flower workout: Do small things with great love.

Here is the Brother Lawrence workout: Practice the Presence of God.

Here is the Franciscan workout: Where there is hatred, sow love. Where there is sadness, joy. Where there is injury, pardon. Where there is doubt, faith. Where there is despair, hope. Where there is darkness, light. Console, understand, love, give and pardon liberally.

Here is the Dominican workout: Lifelong learning.

In short, discern your spirituality based on temperament and giftedness. Practice it in a worshipping community (whether eremitcally, cenobitcally, monastically or apostolically -- in short, belong), where you can nurture, sustain and support others and they, you.

Seek first the Kingdom and all of these rationalities and intelligences and charisms and fruits of the Spirit will be yours in whatever particular combination or measure reflects your most authentic self, which requires ongoing and never-ending conversion -- intellectually, affectively, morally, socially, politically and religiously.

There is one root cause for fundamentalism and radical postmodernism --- both groups have given up, have literally abandoned the ongoing and never-ending journey to conversion, the former believing they have already arrived , the latter thinking there is no destination . Fundamentalists and arationalists have one thing in common -- they are not moving. One sign of any life is irritability --- movement. Another sign of life is growth. They are dead --- no growth. No new ideas coming in. No revisions to belief systems. No changes in emotional patterns of response to the environment. No moral struggles or ambiguities or dilemmas. No unbiased political perspectives. No tolerance (or way too much) of other religions. Dead wood.

Final workout a la Scott Peck: Awaken each day and ask not how can life meet my demands but, rather, how can I meet life's demands, today?

That's my quick answer. I don't want my kids to become good critical thinkers at college. I want them to become decent human beings, which includes critical thinking and multiple rationalities and intelligences plus ... plus love.

pax,
jb

Here's a recycled SPlace post from yesteryear from some dude named Charlie10 called Mystics & Charlatans:

quote:

now, don't get me wrong, there are those who have stepped forth claiming to have wrapped their souls around this existential vacuum & their minds around this ontological ignorance and

i strongly suspect that some of them are truly on to something;

the thing about it is, one must be both vigilant and quiet in order to hear what they have to say, because they (whom i suspect know the most) seldom speak, and, when they do, there is no clamor or shouting in the streets, for they whisper almost inaudibly, or speak, sometimes, only with their eyes; they quench no smouldering wick and break no bruised reed

even at this stage of discernment, there is no fail-safe method to separate the authentic mystic from the charlatan save for this: for the mystic, mystery perdures and for the charlatan, everything has, long ago, all been figured out

quote:

Originally posted by Phil:
[qb] re: association between the theotic and what you're calling the pragmatic.[/qb]

One example would be Gelpi's: Orthopraxis authenticates orthodoxy.

Another perspective might be to compare the theoretical and the practical realms. If theology is theoretical, spirituality is practical, or applied theology, very useful theology, pragmatically speaking.

I may take a look around to see if I can better discern Helminiak's epistemology, especially with respect to whether or not he buys into such as Gelpi's critique of Lonergan's foundationalism. I did locate one Helminiak quote that hints at some sympathy with a constructive postmodernism (as distinguished from a radical postmodernism, which we all find incoherent): Can we not affirm the postmodern lesson that things are more complicated than we think without giving up the ever necessary human effort to understand them aright?

Continuing the journey ... that's what the arationalists and fundamentalists don't do. Giving up the ever-necessary effort ...

Helminiak�s functional analysis of consciousness provides a nontheist understanding of spirituality to show how one might legitimately bracket the theist dimensions of the matter. I have just further bracketed his brackets toward the same end as Helminiak, which is to provide a comprehensive humanistic psychology-philosophy to critique religions, ideologies and cultures against the criterion of human wholesomeness, of human authenticity, a goal articulated by Gelpi as well in his orthopraxis authenticates orthodoxy. Another way of looking at the relationship between metaphysics and religion is to do precisely what Helminiak does, which is to abstract from religion its metaphysical elements, which can be neither proved nor disproved, to arrive at a concern for spirituality.

later,
jb