I think some of my remarks on Wilber were a little harsh. To be fair, he does mention some of the critics he draws from. I suppose that I wished he would have introduced his theory gradually, and with more care (less footnotes!) so that it really could be incorporated into social discourse. As it stands, not many people in the humanities (at least) ever refer to him. I think that his work would have been accepted more, if it was introduced with more care; and perhaps this really means such a trite issue as finishing a PhD. Most people buy that stuff; they won't buy genuis, unfortunately, unless it is packaged properly.

Anyway, I wanted to post some quotes from some of these critics that I mentioned, none of which I can entirely agree with (except, perhaps Bakhtin), but people who, I think, are on the right track, without alientating themselves from a community of critics:

From Deleuze & Guattari:

"The schizoanalytic argument is simple: desire is a machine, a synthesis of machines, a machinic arrangement--desiring machines. The order of desire is the order of production; all production is at once a desiring-production and social production. We therefore reproach psychoanalysis for having stifled this order of production, for having shunted it into representation. Far from showing the boldness of psychoanalysis, this idea of unconscious representation marks from the outset its bankruptcy or its abnegation: an unconsious that no longer produces, but is contented to believe. The unconscious believes in Oedipus, it believes in castration, in the law. It is dobtless true that the psychoanalyst who believes--the psychoanalyst in each of us? Would belief then be an effect on the conscious material that the unconscious representation exerts at a distance? But inversely, who and what reduced the unconscious to this state of representationm if not first of all a system of beliefs put in the place of productions? In reality, social productions becomes alienated in allegedly autonomous beliefs at the same time that desiring-production becomes enticed into allegedly unconscious representations....


From Bakhtin

But no living word relates to its object in a singualar way, between the word and the speaking subject, there exists an elastic enviornment of other, alien words about the same object, the same theme, and this is an enviornment that is often difficult to penetrate. It is precisely in the process of living interaction with this specific enviornment that the word may be individualized and given stylistic shape.

The living utterance, having taken meaning and shape at a particular historical moment in socially specific enviornment, cannot fail to brush up against thousands of living dialogic threads, woven by socio-ideological consciousness around the given object of an utterance; it cannot fail to become an active participant in social dialogue."

"Discourse in The Novel"

From Said's "Orientalism" (a brief statement of purpose)

"For the general reader, this study deals with matters that always compel attention, all of them connected not only with Western conceptions and treatments of the Other but also with the singuarly important role played by Western culture in what Vico called the world of nations. Lastly, for readers in the so-called Third World, this study proposes itself as a step towards an understanding not so much of Western politics and of non-Western world in those politics as of the strength of Western cultural discourse, a strength too often mistaken as merely decorative or 'superstructual.' "

For a brief definition of Said's use of the word, Orientalism, see:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Orientalism

Best,

Asher

Without denying all the trees in the forest . . .

I guess I'm more attuned to what seems to be inviolable structures in human consciousness rather than the linguistic concerns raised by these gents. As our consciousness is immediately available to us to both use and as an object of reflection, I find Lonergan's descriptions to be spot on. As I have gone into this at length in other threads, I won't repeat myself, here, but will note that in terms of Lonergan's approach, the pm critique is a good example of Being Intelligent -- of proposing hypotheses to explain aspects of human experience. Note that these hypothesisizers are in accord in some matters, but differ in others, which ought to tell us that we are dealing with a fairly complex phenomenon that doesn't lend itself to easy answers.

When it comes to "being reasonable," however, pm wants to change the rules through a pre-emptive strike against the very notion that some hypotheses can be better than others in terms of accounting for the facts of experience, congruence, and so forth. It's almost as though they don't want to move from hypotheses to critical reflection because that would entail the use of language, which they feel they've already established as a slippery and untrustworthy means for arriving at understanding. As they have to use language to make that very point, however, one wonders how and why we should take that hypothesis to be the last word on the subject. What if language -- clumsy as it can often be -- is actually the means for activating dynamics of understanding which don't completely equivocate to linguistic formulations (but which do make use of them to communicate)? We all know this experience -- understanding something, but struggling to put it into words. The understanding is real and can actually influence our behavior long before we have been able to clearly articulate it to ourselves.

So Lonergan's observation about Being Reasonable stands, I believe, as even the pm philosophers cannot avoid moving from hypothesis to wondering what might be the best explanation, or if some are better than others -- all of which signifies a movement toward a deeper grasp of truth.

Is this making sense, or have I totally misunderstood the pm venture?

Is this making sense, or have I totally misunderstood the pm venture?

Misunderstood�at least in terms of motive, not logic. The pm venture is to wipe the slate clean so they can fill it back up with their supposedly uncorrupted thoughts because, gosh, just look at the world before they came along. It�s a mess! And indeed, great swaths of it are a mess -- no thanks, of course, to a score of misguided efforts such as pm that attempt to bulldoze over the truth or try to create some new reality with a foundation of patent nonsense. But throwing the baby out with the bath water is still not a sound approach to anything. PM, in my opinion, is just arrogance in yet another flavor. But don�t take that to mean that I dismiss your discourse, Phil. Not at all. I think your logic is quite impeccable�although you screwed up a bit by using words.

quote:

Originally posted by Phil:
[qb] Without denying all the trees in the forest . . .

I guess I'm more attuned to what seems to be inviolable structures in human consciousness rather than the linguistic concerns raised by these gents. As our consciousness is immediately available to us to both use and as an object of reflection, I find Lonergan's descriptions to be spot on. As I have gone into this at length in other threads, I won't repeat myself, here, but will note that in terms of Lonergan's approach, the pm critique is a good example of Being Intelligent -- of proposing hypotheses to explain aspects of human experience. Note that these hypothesists are in accord in some matters, but differ in others, which ought to tell us that we are dealing with a fairly complex phenomenon that doesn't lend itself to easy answers.

When it comes to "being reasonable," however, pm wants to change the rules through a pre-emptive strike against the very notion that some hypotheses can be better than others in terms of accounting for the facts of experience, congruence, and so forth. It's almost as though they don't want to move from hypotheses to critical reflection because that would entail the use of language, which they feel they've already established as a slippery and untrustworthy means for arriving at understanding. As they have to use language to make that very point, however, one wonders how and why we should take that hypothesis to be the last word on the subject. What if language -- clumsy as it can often be -- is actually the means for activating dynamics of understanding which don't completely equivocate to linguistic formulations (but which do make use of them to communicate)? We all know this experience -- understanding something, but struggling to put it into words. The understanding is real and can actually influence our behavior long before we have been able to clearly articulate it to ourselves.

So Lonergan's observation about Being Reasonable stands, I believe, as even the pm philosophers cannot avoid moving from hypothesis to wondering what might be the best explanation, or if some are better than others -- all of which signifies a movement toward a deeper grasp of truth.

Is this making sense, or have I totally misunderstood the pm venture? [/qb]

You raise some interesting remarks, but I'm afraid you haven't quite grasped some points:

"Note that these hypothesists are in accord in some matters, but differ in others, which ought to tell us that we are dealing with a fairly complex phenomenon that doesn't lend itself to easy answers."

True. I would argue that the ability of a critical framework to hold contradictions and not fall apart reflects the nature of the ordinary unconscious. The ability of a critical system to hold contradictions reflects the state of the unconscious in our world at this time. True, pm doesn't posit a way out of this paradox, quite yet. It posits, quite correctly, that many of these forces are socially and culturally constructed and seeks to nuance the "in between" place between binaries, opening up a vast mid-region. This is really the place where the creative process begins. I think that this in-between place represents the conditions of our globalized world. Individuals in diasporic communities, for example, have no clear sense of cultural identity; people that must learn to walk on "floating borders" where the cultural self is obscured and they are forced to creatively engage this in between place, not only in regards to culture, but in regards to life. This is the first step out of mythic membership consciousness and is something positive indeed.

"It's almost as though they don't want to move from hypotheses to critical reflection because that would entail the use of language, which they feel they've already established as a slippery and untrustworthy means for arriving at understanding."

This is incorrect. Consider postmodern critics like Frank Davey and you'll see some of the best critical reflection of our time. Criticism that works with peoples consciousness as it exists here and now, in a globalized world. There much excellent, excellent reflection. In contrast to what you suggest, I think pm posits language as the only tool by which to effect change, having established that all language is discourse. Bakhtin makes this point clear. In fact, pms consider language as ALL we have, or leave behind (rather extreme!). See a pm text such as Micheal Ondajee's "Running in the Family." You wrote:

"What if language -- clumsy as it can often be -- is actually the means for activating dynamics of understanding which don't completely equivocate to linguistic formulations (but which do make use of them to communicate)?"

--very interesting point. This is where pm's are stuck, imo. Davey wanted very much to propose a theory of poetry as phrenomenology, which would open up many more avenues of approach. But what you write above is not phrenomenology, as it is sacramental, if I'm reading correctly.

Best,

Asher

PS.

Could you kindly direct me to the Lonergan thread?

I think that Brad's response epitomizes the frustration of many people with pm, especially amoung right wing thinkers, who find it left wing agendas implicit within pm. There are many ideological underpinning in a system that proports to see from all persepective. But to suggest that this is a reason to throw pm out, would be naive, I think.

As an example of these ideological underpinnings, I kept finding Marxist echos (even in syntax structure) in Deleuze and also in Bakhtin. Part of struggle with Bakhtin (who has given so much to cultural studies) is what he proposes as "self" as almost ONLY socially constructed:

The binaries that Bakhtin sets up create many problems when probed, particularly the process of individuation. Graham Perchey elucidates this point:
It is worth following up this issue of �individuation�, for if dialogism is the substratum of all monologism�if from within a sense of the ubiquity of the dialogical we are enabled to �see� and �hear� monologism for what it is and does, if we are freed from the mystification of its naturalness�then it is also true that a dialogised heteroglossia as it were needs the moment of individuation (68).

Bakhtin�s reading of Plato suggests that in Plato �conversation with one�s own self turns directly into conversation with someone else, without any hint of boundaries.� This notion also underpins Bakhtin�s simple notion of self. Clearly, there must be the building of boundaries, before any such a fluid notion of heteroglossia could arise. However, Bakhtin does not grant any authenticity to a self that is apart from social discourse and inadvertently shaping discourse : �[t]here is no mute or invisible core to the individual himself: he is entirely visible and audible, all on the surface.� Perscy writes:

Bakhtin�s revolutionary postulate of the primacy of dialogue (in his strong sense) must be sustained, but it must be qualified by a consideration we would call its obverse: without individuation, that primal state of discourse would not only not be known, it would be immobile and would mobilize nothing and nobody (68).

Continually, Bakhtin obfuscates the author as �having no language of his own.� He even goes as far as suggesting that for the classical Greek, �every aspect of existence could be seen and heard�he did not know an invisible and mute reality (134). Surely, it is a stretch to suggest that Plato was not interested in an esoteric reality.

I hope this makes some sense, especially the problems of Bakhtin's individuation.

However, I think that if one doesn't know about pm and its effect on our culture and present thinking, or try to suggest that it is not effecting us presently, they would be going backwards. It is already in place. We have to work with it!

Here was another contradiction I kept finding in Bakhtin:

For Bakhtin, dialogism does not attempt to interpenetrate the word, as it does in poetry; but it dances around the word in �ever new� contexts. Poetry represents a vertical ascent to a purer language (which presumes hierarchy), rather than a horizontal embracing of an "ever-changing" heteroglossia posited on the notion of a homogeneous plane. This is achieved by a "double voicedness:�
There--on the rich soil of novelistic prose--double-voicedness draws its energy, its dialogized ambiguity, not from individual dissonances...in the novel, this double-
voicedness sinks its roots deep into a fundamental, sociolinguistic speech diversity and multi-languaged-ness.

The word "fundamental" is at odds with the multiple tensions that dialogism presumably builds up. How can there be any fundamental ground of language and narrative, if such a ground is constantly being uprooted, questioned, and juxtaposed with other dialects? It seems odd that Bakhtin employs the trope of a root, when "there is no single plane on which all these 'languages' might be juxtaposed with one another." Clearly, Bakhtin's use of the word "fundamental" to describe an ever shifting "ground" of narrative is contradictory to the premise he sets up in other essays. What this ground presumes, is a socio-linguistic unity--not dissimilar to the essential/metaphysical ground of being, he is contesting. This is why many of Bakhtin�s critics see the primacy of dialogue rather than dialogism underpinning the pragmatic outcome of Bakhtin�s thought. Gibson writes:
Bakhtin argues the need to look beneath the superficial hustle and bustle of literary process to �homogeneous features that, if only relatively static and constant, can be treated as such for the purposes of analysis.� In that respect, Bakhtin�s theoretical reflexes do not seem so very remote from Lukac�s or even Aristotle�s. (154).

Asher: I would argue that the ability of a critical framework to hold contradictions and not fall apart reflects the nature of the ordinary unconscious. The ability of a critical system to hold contradictions reflects the state of the unconscious in our world at this time. True, pm doesn't posit a way out of this paradox, quite yet. It posits, quite correctly, that many of these forces are socially and culturally constructed and seeks to nuance the "in between" place between binaries, opening up a vast mid-region. This is really the place where the creative process begins. . .

I have no argument with that, Asher, and I agree that it's good. What I would add, however, is that there is also a natural movement in consciousness to understand the truth in these new questions and possibilities, or to comprehend what meanings they convey. I don't think it matters whether this is done through art or philosophy, although one surely needs to consider whether what is being expressed is a perception or an opinion. If the latter, then there are various kinds, some of which are entirely subjective, but some not.

. . . Davey wanted very much to propose a theory of poetry as phrenomenology, which would open up many more avenues of approach. But what you write above is not phrenomenology, as it is sacramental, if I'm reading correctly.

Yes, and Aristotle/Aquinas, who viewed concepts as the means by which we grasp reality and re-present it to ourselves symbolically. They would find pm's obsession with words and language per se to be missing the essential connection between words and reality. Think of the Zen story of fingers pointing to the moon and you've grasped the key insight, here. Of course, you need to believe there really is a moon, and that the finger really can point to it because the one who points really has seen it.

Longergan:
- http://shalomplace.com/ubb/ult...t_topic;f=2;t=000192

Also recommended:
- http://www.iep.utm.edu/l/lonergan.htm
- http://www.lonergan.on.ca/glossary/glossary_a-b.htm

- - -

- from the link above:

absolute

What is reached by reflection and judgment; what is independent of us and our thinking , what is really so (M 35). That to which the subject as critically reflective stands in conscious relation, and which makes the subject regard the positive content of the sciences as probable, not true or certain (M 16). Objectivity is absolute when it is the result of combining experiential objectivity (the givenness of the data of sense or of the data of consciousness) with normative objectivity (the fulfillment of the needs of intelligent and reasonable operation). Through experiential objectivity conditions are fulfilled. Through normative objectivity conditions are linked to what they condition. Combined they yield a conditioned with its conditions fulfilled. In knowledge, this is a fact. In reality, this is a contingent being or event (M 263).

Just a little nugget to drive a pm-er nuts.

Thanks, I'll give your links a week or so and then get back to this.

Best Wishes to all,

Asher

quote:

Originally posted by Phil:
[qb]
[i They would find pm's obsession with words and language per se to be missing the essential connection between words and reality. [/qb]

Phil,

You are right, I think. Pm (in its worst strain) is "obsess[ed] with words and language." Take this critic Linda Hutcheon, who writes (on the back of a book, here...excuse):

"As Davey deconstructs the ideologies of Canadian critical discourses--including his own--readers can understand how criticism can and must be a political act."

Now that's taking some of the fun out of things

By fun, I mean...in the case of Davey, production is emphasized. Ie. Writer's are predisposed to write is a voice that sells; and once this voice is well established, a lot of creativity is lost...the possibility of multiple voices...

This is a great point, to be sure. But to go on an on about it to the exclusion of every other point seemed slightly reductive, to me at least.

Once you go two or three removes from the relationship between words/concepts and the reality they express, and begin analyzing words and language per se -- words about words! -- things can get pretty confusing and seemingly ungrounded, and philosophy can degenerate into a matter of what seems to be "word games." PM at its worst, as you say.

I think that Brad's response epitomizes the frustration of many people with pm, especially amoung right wing thinkers, who find it left wing agendas implicit within pm.,

Yes, Asher, I do believe I can stand in for one of those, a right wing thinker.

But to suggest that this is a reason to throw pm out, would be naive, I think.

Although I might make the mistake of throwing out some of the baby with the bathwater when dismissing postmodernism, and that is a mistake we shouldn�t carelessly make, it just seems to me that postmodernism is so tainted with being anti this and anti that that it can no longer be relied on for serious critiquing or for uncovering past delusional or prejudicial thinking. I see PM as going down a facile blind alley of its own � one that some post-postmodern visage will someday have to clean up. And that PM has clear leftist underpinnings is not just icing on the Marxist cake � it is the cake!

quote:

Postmodernism is highly debated even among postmodernists themselves. For an initial characterization of its basic premises, consider anthropological critic Melford Spiro's excellent synopsis of the basic tenets of postmodernism:

"The postmodernist critique of science consists of two interrelated arguments, epistemological and ideological. Both are based on subjectivity. First, because of the subjectivity of the human object, anthropology, according to the epistemological argument cannot be a science; and in any event the subjectivity of the human subject precludes the possibility of science discovering objective truth. Second, since objectivity is an illusion, science according to the ideological argument, subverts oppressed groups, females, ethnics, third-world peoples (Spiro 1996).

Which means that postmodernism is just another leftist flavor of Cultural Marxism, leftism, and/or Critical Theory.

quote:

The preferred analytical tool of thinkers associated with the Frankfurt School was known formally as "Critical Theory of Society." The stated aim of Critical Theory was to identify and describe obstacles that blocked the way to the ideal non-repressive (read "Marxist") society. It is important to note that criticism was � and is to this day among many leftist Democrats, including Teddy Kennedy, Nancy Pelosi, and Harry Reid, to name a few � implicitly seen as the only legitimate method of societal analysis, thus the theory's name. To posit a constructive alternative to the status quo would be, according to this way of thinking, to "prescribe" what should be, and such prescription was (and remains today among those on the left) to be avoided at all costs.

Here�s Brian McLaren�s response to a critique of postmodernism by Chuck Colson:

quote:

They looked at powerful belief systems of the twentieth century � world views (extreme Marxism is one such world view), grand stories (anti-Semitism is one such story, White Supremacy is another, American manifest destiny is another), ideologies (such as the industrialist ideology that the earth and its resources are not God�s creation deserving care through reverential stewardship, but rather, are simply natural resources there for the taking by secular industrialists), and they were horrified. These dominating belief systems were responsible for so many millions of deaths, so much torture, so much loss of freedom and dignity, so much damage to the planet, that they sought to undermine their dominance. They advocated incredulity or skepticism toward such stories or belief systems.

Extreme Marxism? Why not soft anti-Semitism or something like that? I think this goes to show the bias of even reasonable-sounding postmodernists (and I just ordered a book from this guy on a different subject so it�s not like I�m dead set against his other ideas.)

quote:

Anyway, Chuck, you�re legitimately worried that "postmoderns" will use their relativism as an excuse to do anything they want. But they�re worried that you and other "moderns" will use your absolutism as an excuse to do anything you want. (If you can�t see any validity to their concern, then I�m truly speechless, and it�s hardly worth your reading the rest of my letter.) From where I stand, I�m afraid both of you are seeing a valid danger in one another. Postmodern people like me � you can call us post-postmoderns if you want to continue asserting postmodernity is dead, but please don�t call us truth-denying relativists, because we�re not, even though we don�t like your unreflective use of words like "absolute truth" � people like me want neither the self-indulgent narcissism of the one nor the unreflective absolutism of the other. You�re against their supposed denial of truth in the interest of self-indulgence, and they�re against your apparent monopolization of truth in the interest of political domination, and you�ve convinced some of the rest of us that you�re both at least partly right about each other.

The problem is that the skepticism of postmodernism can not hold a framework of constructive and life-enriching truths. They see the act of coming together onto "hard" truths as inherently harmful. But the opposite is to do what postmodernists do and that is to assert their ideology of "no hard truths", or engaging in radical skepticism. And I have to agree with Colson on this one that PMers are engaging in hard truths of their own � then denying that they have done so which is just another way to screw up the thinking of humanity so that more atrocities can be committed.

Postmodernists might do better if they simply insisted that certain ideologies (like fascism) were bad. But when they try to dig down deeper and say that rather it is tightly-held truths, or some other secondary cause that is the real problem, then their ideology is the answer to nothing. And they are committing the major sin of socialism, Marxism and Communism in that they are denying human nature. They are denying the reality that people are searching for hard and fast truths and always will be. The answer is to feed people with better truths, not a wishy-washy philosophy that is afraid of truth itself.

Well, Brad, you've nicely pointed out extreme versions of postmodernism, sounding (in your condemnation) extremist yourself! But that's how it always will seem to be: right vs. left--until there is a genuine enquiry on both sides. I appreciate these quotes, but be sure to read up on less extreme versions of pm, and consider all that it has given us. Saying this, I also appreciate this comment, although I don't think you've got it right (ie that pm are all Marxist or even more extreme. This is like saying all conservatives are fascist. Simply not the case.):

"Postmodernists might do better if they simply insisted that certain ideologies (like fascism) were bad."

I agree. At the same time, why shouldn't a powerful model be used by liberals and conservatives alike? It's simply a model, a lens, a way of enquiring, a way of reading. Everyone could use a bit of it to destablilze their presumptions in a rapidly shifting global climate.

In extreme strains of pm, I'll agree with this:

"And they are committing the major sin of socialism, Marxism and Communism in that they are denying human nature." They are denying the reality that people are searching for hard and fast truths and always will be. The answer is to feed people with better truths, not a wishy-washy philosophy that is afraid of truth itself."

And what would that truth be in the current conditions of the world?

You seem to think that only Marxists or anti-semitists (!) use pm critical approaches like deconstruction. That's simply not the case. Walk outside and turn the corner and look at the Neoclassical ornamenation on the building that you're living in. The building wasn't designed by a Marxist. Those representational images of pm replace other representations that dominated Western consciousness (Oedipus as one example); this is progressive. Metatheatricality, metafiction, metajournalism, metaarchitecture, invites speculation, invites participation of the audience, invites critical enquiry, is not an aethetic artifact to be observed. We live in a pm climate and anyone who refuses to see it, or to pigeon hole it (yes, there are arguments even amoungst pm's. How wonderful a system that is fluid that is open to multiple intepretations, that is bendable without subscription! Conservatives could learn from it!) does diservice to the world as it now exits. Theatre, dance, reading is all imbued with pm theory. Streets and cities are being built on these concepts.

Granted, objectity may be needed. There are critics who will fix things momentarily, but systems are never fixed into laws; these laws are changing and require a flexible model that is not hung up on creating fixations. Depending on what we're speaking of, there ARE certain laws, scientific and, I would argue, ethical. Pm will tend to bring these laws out in ways that are new and creative and unique to an individual IN relation to the world around him/her.

There is structure in pm.

We should exchange reading lists for a month.

Asher

I'm beginning to feel like a sufi in a postmodern body.

Anyway, I really don't have more to say. I have much more to read and can concur with many of the points that have been raised here. I'm glad that I could bring in some positive effects that this system of thinking has had on my life etc. In the least, I think everyone can dabble in it, conservative or liberal. To be fair, there are certain "subscriptions" to it. But as FD told me: this is how we are taught to read now and I must be familar with it at least, before I can build on it, or put it in question. I appreciate everyone's insight here.

Chuck Colson�s response.

quote:

I don�t have time or space here to delineate for you why I think each of those movements were pernicious, although I think you�ve probably read enough about deconstructionism and existentialism to agree with me if you think it through. To put it in the most shorthand way, relativism and deconstruction and existentialism have to lead to the loss of any transcendent authority. Whenever a society lacks transcendent authority, it is going to be governed by whoever can obtain power � and there will be no restraints upon that person or party. The process is almost inevitable. Even democracies � and remember Franklin said democracy is a good thing if you can keep it � must have some overarching objective standards to support a rule of law; without that it will fall into chaos just like any other governing structure. If postmodernism succeeds in destroying transcendent authority, the inevitable consequences are anarchy and nihilism. But nihilism is a vacuum and all vacuums must be filled; so without the restraint of a higher law a tyrant can always be depended upon to step in to fill the power vacuum; and people always choose order over liberty.

Some postmodernists are quite honest about this. Look at the writings of Stanley Fish � Fish was for a while at least the leading deconstructionist in America. He quite frankly acknowledged that in the absence of truth, all intellectual discourse eventually degenerates into a power struggle. Remember his book, There�s No Such Thing as Free Speech and It�s a Good Thing Too, and his stirring defense of the politically correct movement, which in my view stifles academic debate on the campuses. If you stop looking for truth and you stop debating primary questions, that is, the fundamental issues people deal with in life, then whoever occupies the seat of power makes those decisions for us. The utopians may think this is a good thing. They believe the victors (their choice) will be more enlightened and benign than the white oppressors who wrote history and of course were only expressing their view of life, which they imposed upon culture. The utopian myth, which for generations has been the principal enemy of liberty, is based on false premises as Christians who are aware of the Fall know.

quote:

I for one have a lot of sympathy for post moderns. They�re drifting. They don�t even know the questions they�re supposed to be asking let alone the answers. They�ve been anesthetized by a culture which emphasizes pleasure and personal autonomy. A generation raised on channel-surfing has lost the capacity for linear thinking and analytical reasoning.

Let me confess at this point that I have had little experience in trying to win over post-moderns (by that I mean the people who live in this generation and have never known anything other than postmodern thought.) I�ve had experience, however, dealing with and battling postmodernists. I�ve also studied their writings, which I do not think, as you put in your letter, qualify for the phrase "density of postmodern philosophical writing." It isn�t philosophical at all in the sense of the love of knowledge. It is, in my opinion, stridently ideological, which falls closer to the propaganda side of the fence than the side of reason. Okay, I�ll admit, Christians do the same thing, often unthinkingly, and hurt our cause when they do.

quote:

Of course, the postmoderns are right in saying that looking over European history, those who have "a passionate commitment to a system of belief will be most willing not only to die for it but to kill for it." But is it wrong to die for a noble cause�or to kill in a just war, restraining evil? The Greeks recognized courage as one of the four cardinal virtues � courage to defend justice. Where would we be if people did not have a wholehearted commitment to a system of belief like democracy, freedom, and liberty? We�d still be living under monarchs. The issue isn�t whether you�re willing to die for a particular system of belief � or in some way to kill for it. The problem is whether that system of belief is truth or a lie. In the case of fascism and communism, it was a utopian lie, predicated upon a number of ideas common to postmodernism. So I really think you�ve got that one backwards.

I know what you�re thinking and that is that Christians have used their passionate commitment to their belief system to not only die for it but to kill for it (wrongly, as in the Crusades). That�s true, because we�re fallen as well. But it is far less true than those who have abused their system of belief in non-Christian systems of thought (witness Islamists versus democratic liberals today). A dispassionate look at history bears this out. In the inquisitions, over several centuries, three thousand people were killed. (Moderns think it�s in the millions). That is absolutely horrible, indefensible; an abuse of Christian religious beliefs. But you see, it was an abuse of it, whereas often when people act in pursuit of a lie, that is, fascism or communism, they are acting consistent with their beliefs - a big difference. Remember, too, that in the Crusades, where thousands died and were slaughtered, the aim of the Crusaders was every bit as much political as religious. I am not a student of the Crusades, but I would dare say the political outweighed the religious.

On the other hand, Christianity has advanced the cause of humankind in ways that no other system in history has ever done�not Islam, certainly not communism, fascism, not Freudianism, not pragmatism, not socialism, not utilitarianism or any other "ism." Just look at the glories of Western civilization�the great art treasures, music, learning, accomplishment, universal reading, education. It�s quite remarkable.

And as for being willing to not only die but kill for our belief system, if Lincoln, who was deeply motivated by his strong faith (informed admittedly by a confused theology) did not pursue the abolition of slavery and the emancipation of the slaves, we might still live under slavery today. Yes, hundreds of thousands died, but it was tragically necessary to end evil.

So my only point is that the view that people have of Christians as being oppressors who have done these horrible things through the ages is a result of propaganda and misinformation and a lack of an objective study of history. We ought to be correcting them, not pandering to them. If you really look at the history you cannot support their conclusion. More people died in the name of atheism in the 20th century than had died in all centuries prior to that in any cause. You as a Christian and I as a Christian have to put down this terrible distortion, often promoted by America�s strongly secular cultural elite.

quote:

I believe we can also make a very compelling argument to the postmodern generation, which is what I am desperately anxious to see us do. I want to see us lovingly approach them (that�s technique or strategy), but then bring them to the point where they have to deal with the question of truth (substance). Schaeffer used to say that this was the issue of our age, and he was absolutely right, talking about "true truth" or "flaming truth." He talked about the concept of the law of non-contradiction, which postmodernists have seemed to suspend. I shouldn�t say seemed to suspend, they have suspended it. They�ve dispensed with logic, reason and critical thinking.

quote:

Your point five is whether moral truths change over the years. No they do not. It has always been true that murder is considered evil. We may gain a more advanced understanding of the truth as we seek to discover it and our moral consensus or moral understanding may change, we may become better informed about what is moral with respect to particular issues as the slavery example you use demonstrates. But that doesn�t mean that the underlying truth about human dignity, for example, is changed. On this point, note that in the NIV, in 1 Timothy, Paul describes slave traders in the category with murderers and adulterers and perverts. He also set slaves free. Christians were in the vanguard of that movement. What we were doing was conforming society in a fallen world more closely to what are enduring, unchanging truths.

Well, Brad, you've nicely pointed out extreme versions of postmodernism, sounding (in your condemnation) extremist yourself!

Thank you. But actually, sometimes the extremism is exposed simply by stating the truth, by opening the wound and exposing the sore. One can sort of gently try to piddle-paddle around the harsh reality, but I say if the reality is harsh then just expose it. When we recoil at this truth, or this hopeful presentation of truth, we'll often dump our shock onto the presenter and call them an extremist. I'm not particularly extreme about anything other than my desire that people deal with their personal crap personally and be mindful that they don't do their psychotherapy out in the public domain via their ideologies, politics, etc. My extremism is a public service. And a nice way for myself to work out my psychological hang-ups. But at least I'm doing this on a voluntary internet forum and not as a Senator or something.

�but be sure to read up on less extreme versions of pm, and consider all that it has given us.

Asher, do you have a favorite links you'd like to offer?

I agree. At the same time, why shouldn't a powerful model be used by liberals and conservatives alike? It's simply a model, a lens, a way of enquiring, a way of reading. Everyone could use a bit of it to destablilze their presumptions in a rapidly shifting global climate.

Fair enough. And fair enough that it's certainly possible that there are a few people, such as yourself, who will use the tool of postmodernism skillfully and will not, say, be analogous to a doctor performing heart surgery and sticking to his hacksaw for all the cutting because that's his favorite tool. What I would like to see is some example where PM thinking has correctly identified a problem and offered a realistic and workable solution via that ideology or method.

And what would that truth be in the current conditions of the world?

Too much socialism will kill the capitalistic goose that laid the golden egg. Racism, sexism and a number of other isms exist not because our current systems (democracy/capitalism) are fatally flawed but because humans are fatally flawed. There are other truths.

We live in a pm climate

No, I think there are many people who want to live in a PM climate, and that's based, among other things, on the primarily leftist education and orientation they've been given via college and university. Change is normal. Overthrowing the old for the new is as old as time. PMers, it seems to me, want to feel special about all this. Well, certainly some of the changes in art and architecture are welcome. Great stuff. I like people challenging the status quo. That's good. But it seems to me that PMers are trying to read WAY too much into what is a fad. I think that what they are really searching for is something deeper�something like the things that religion provides. But, of course, hasn't religion been deconstructed by PM as some simple metanarrative of superstition or something?

How wonderful a system that is fluid that is open to multiple intepretations, that is bendable without subscription! Conservatives could learn from it!)

Well, first off, conservatism is not another word for inflexible or calcification. It's an approach to the historic realities of institutions vs. people and the tendencies of human nature to screw things up in our zeal for utopia or "equality" over freedom and opportunity, or any of other numbskull things we tend to do as people to overreach in our institutions. Flexible and fluid is good�except when you're dealing with speed limits on a residential street where kids are playing ball and hopscotch. Then we need to turn to the truth that slower is better�say, about 25 mph. And these kind of principles also scale up to larger concepts. Of course, we must be flexible but the only point of flexibility is so we don't get stuck in some inconvenient and incomplete truth!

We should exchange reading lists for a month.

Well, I'd be pleased if you'd post of few suggested links or book. I could do the same. Thanks, Asher.

We live in a pm climate . .

Well, not in Kansas. OK, maybe the political science department in our universities, and in some of the private colleges, but all in all, the widespread influence of Christianity mitigates against the kind of relativistic pm we've been discussing. PMers love to castigate Kansans and other midwestern/southern Americans for this -- as though it's somehow regressive -- but most people here would consider that a compliment. Meanwhile, we build airplanes for the country, study engineering, explore new possibilities in computer technology, marry and have children, live more happily and longer in marriage, and generally experience life as meaningful. We tend to vote Republican, but we do have a Democratic governor who's doing a decent job and will probably get re-elected. We'd happily vote for a Democratic President if ever a good candidate came along. The fundamentalist Christians have an axe to grind about evolution, making us the laughing stock of the world, but that's OK with us. If the theory really does have the level of credibility that scientists profess, it ought to be able to prove itself in the arena of public discussion, and that's a good thing, too. Etc. etc.

Good quotes from Colson, Brad.

Well, not in Kansas.

LOL. Well, do you have room for one more? Actually, deep down, I don�t have a problem with a critique of reason. Yes, let�s all get out our pointy instruments and chip away at some of the stuff we have taken on as "reason" at some point and then forgotten having ever done so. But, sorry, in my heart of hearts I just don�t see PM as anything but an unintentionally useful foil.

This thread has covered a lot of ground. It's made me think of many things along the way; too many to address in a single post. But I would like to make one key observation.

"Postmodern" is not a particularly precise term. It refers to wide range of things - styles of architecture, approaches to literary criticism, psychological perspectives on the socially constructed sense of self, and currents in philosophy. The key observation I'd like to make here, though, is that much of postmodernism is primarily an activity, not a hypothesis.

It is the activity of appreciating presumed givens and absolutes as interpretations. Deconstruction is the activity of looking at how our mind constructs its notions - which, it really needs to be pointed out, is a very different thing from an intent to destroy such notions. There are lots of approaches and outlooks that are called postmodern, but postmodern deconstruction, at its healthy heart, is the attempt to be honestly appreciative of our own ineluctable penchant to be "idolatrous" and to forget that our creaturely understandings are precisely that.

A quick analogy: Freud's awareness of the fact that unconscious forces influence our conscious egos deconstructs the ego. It widens the scope. It reinscribes our conscious experience into a broader context. The ego is, in effect, now better appreciated as a tip of the iceberg. The ego is no longer assumed to be the whole story. It is, in a word, deconstructed. It is not , however, destroyed.

Another analogy. Do you know the story of Theseus' ship? In brief: What if you had Theseus' wooden ship and you replaced one of its planks. Is it still Theseus' ship? Most folks would say it was. What if you replace 50% of the ship? What if, piece by piece, you replace 100% of the ship? And what if, meanwhile, you take all those pieces you've replaced of the first ship and build another ship out of them? You now have two ships. Which one is Theseus' ship? Both? Neither?

A deconstructionist, I think, would suggest that there never was a "Theseus ship" in the first place. She would point out that that is a constructed idea, an interpretation, a mere designation. In point of fact there is no Theseus' ship "presence". That critical observation, though, does nothing to destroy the ship. To my way of thinking, it actually enhances our experience of it; it makes it all the more fascinating and all the more a wonder to interact with. Knowing that my name for the thing is provisional gives me a bit more humility, as it were, to interact with the event all the more directly, freshly, naively.

Deconstruction is also, I feel strongly, a key element in much of contemplative spirituality, especially so-called apophatic or "negative" contemplation.

For fun, here's a set of quotations taken from one of the fathers of Christian mystical theology, juxtaposed with a few "contemplative" quotations from the deconstuctionist philosopher, Jacques Derrida:

quote:

The divine nature ... transcends all cognitive thought and representation and cannot be likened to anything which is known. [Moses] was commanded to heed none of those things comprehended by the notions with regard to the divine nature nor to liken the transcendent nature to any of the things known by comprehension. (St. Gregory of Nyssa, 4th c., The Life of Moses 1.47, in Malherbe & Ferguson, 1978, p. 43)

To grasp the operation of creative imagination at the greatest possible proximity to it, one must turn oneself toward the invisible interior of poetic freedom. One must be separated from oneself in order to be reunited with the blind origin of the work in its darkness. This experience of conversion ... is such that the very words 'separation' and 'exile,' which always designate the interiority of a breaking-off with the world and a making of one's way within it, cannot directly manifest the experience; they can only indicate it through a metaphor.... For in question here is a departure from the world toward a place which ... articulates only that which is in excess of everything, the essential nothing on whose basis everything can appear and be produced within language.... Only pure absence --not the absence of this or that, but the absence of everything in which all presence is announced--can inspire .... (Jacques Derrida, Writing and Difference, 1978 [1967], p. 8)


How could anyone express even in outline that which is inexpressible and incomprehensible to the human mind?
Once a man has purified his heart, so that he might perchance see the Lord's beatitude fulfilled [viz., "Blessed are the pure in heart, for they shall see God"], he will then despise all human utterance as absolutely incapable of expressing what he has experienced. (St. Gregory of Nyssa, On virginity 10, in Dani�lou, From Glory to Glory , p. 104)

The language of [mystical] ab-negation or of renunciation is not negative: ... it denounces, enjoining; it prescribes overflowing this [referential] insufficiency; it orders: it is necessary to do the impossible, it is necessary to go ... there where one cannot go.... The sole decision possible passes through the madness of the undecidable and the impossible: to go where ( wo, Ort, Wort ["where," "place," "word"]) it is impossible to go .... (Jacques Derrida, 1992, "Post-scriptum: Aporias, Ways and Voices," in Coward & Foshay, Derrida and Negative Theology, p. 302)


In this way the mighty David became intoxicated and went out of himself: he saw, while in ecstasy, that divine beauty which no mortal can behold, and cried out in those famous words: Every man is a liar (cf. Psalms 116.11), thus giving us some hint of that ineffable treasure. (St. Gregory of Nyssa, Commentary on the Canticle 10, in Dani�lou, From Glory to Glory, p. 239)


To become Nothing is to become God
Nothing becomes what is before: if you do not
become nothing,
Never will you be born of eternal light. [Angelus Silesius]

[Commenting on the preceding poem:] How is this becoming to be thought ... This coming to be starting as nothing and as nothing, as God and as Nothing, as the Nothing itself, this birth that carries itself without premise, this becoming-self as becoming-God--or Nothing--that is what appears ... more impossible than the impossible if the impossible is the simple negative modality of the possible.
This thought seems strangely familiar to the experience of what is called deconstruction. (Jacques Derrida, 1992, op. cit., pp. 289-290)

Derrida felt there were significant differences between what he was doing as a philosopher and what the contemplatives are doing. But there are also important commonalities.

Derrida once said, "I trust no text that is not is some way contaminated with negative theology." I feel the same way.

This is only my third post at this site. It's already long, so I'll look to provide something more about my own background in another post at some point.

~ Dave

In addition to the link Asher provided to an essay on Eckhart and postmodernism ...

http://www.eckhartsociety.org/Essay.html

... which I thought was rather good - thanks for the lead, Asher - here are several essays by Joel Hunter, a Christian who finds a lot that is spiritually positive in postmodernist approaches. (I only came across the sites today; I don't know anything much about Joel or the forum they appear in.)

Whoa, pomo? Oh, no!

Mohler v. Postmodernism

Inerrancy, Postmodernism, and Cheese


~ Dave

Dave, welcome, and thanks for your thoughtful post. I think you do point out some of the positive contributions of postmodernism, and have noted as much in some of my exchanges with Asher as well.

You note: It is the activity of appreciating presumed givens and absolutes as interpretations. Deconstruction is the activity of looking at how our mind constructs its notions - which, it really needs to be pointed out, is a very different thing from an intent to destroy such notions. There are lots of approaches and outlooks that are called postmodern, but postmodern deconstruction, at its healthy heart, is the attempt to be honestly appreciative of our own ineluctable penchant to be "idolatrous" and to forget that our creaturely understandings are precisely that.

I think that's very well put, and, as you note, does help in fostering apophatic spirituality.

Pushed too far, however, a deconstructive analysis of words and concepts seems to violate the via affirmativa, or kataphatic aspect of spirituality. Christian spirituality drinks from that stream as well, recognizing that the God who is beyond all concepts is also the God who has revealed Himself in space and time in a Person. Reflecting on the meaning of such revelation, we have come to make doctrinal and theological affirmations about God, human nature, human destiny, etc. The postmodern critique can help us to avoid absolutizing these formulations, but it would be a mistake to view them as arbitrary and meaningless. They point to something very imporant and valuable, which we continually grope to express using the limitations of language.

BTW, that ship analogy is really intriguing, only I think it doesn't take into account time and process. The ship that had the material replaced is the one that belongs to Theseus, as with every step it still belongs to him, only with the new material. Same goes for my body: its matter being constantly replenished, yet the body I had two years ago and the one I have now is still "mine." The analogy does serve as a good example of how deconstructionism can lose its grasp of the essence and substance of an issue by focusing on more superficial concerns.

It is the activity of appreciating presumed givens and absolutes as interpretations. Deconstruction is the activity of looking at how our mind constructs its notions - which, it really needs to be pointed out, is a very different thing from an intent to destroy such notions. There are lots of approaches and outlooks that are called postmodern, but postmodern deconstruction, at its healthy heart, is the attempt to be honestly appreciative of our own ineluctable penchant to be "idolatrous" and to forget that our creaturely understandings are precisely that.

Okay, Dave. That sounds great in theory. But let�s see how it�s applied in practice to some social, political and economic problem. Has this been done? What have been some of the more popular or wide-spread solutions? Do they adhere to these principles that you enunciated? Frankly, I�ve yet to see much more than a sort of cynical deconstruction of things in order to then substitute some already preconceived notion of how things should be, particularly far-left notions of how things should be.

If this is not so then can anyone provide any examples of postmodernism pointing to solutions for social, political and economic problems that are conservative-oriented?

Another analogy. Do you know the story of Theseus' ship? In brief: What if you had Theseus' wooden ship and you replaced one of its planks. Is it still Theseus' ship? Most folks would say it was. What if you replace 50% of the ship? What if, piece by piece, you replace 100% of the ship? And what if, meanwhile, you take all those pieces you've replaced of the first ship and build another ship out of them? You now have two ships. Which one is Theseus' ship? Both? Neither?

A deconstructionist, I think, would suggest that there never was a "Theseus ship" in the first place. She would point out that that is a constructed idea, an interpretation, a mere designation. In point of fact there is no Theseus' ship "presence". That critical observation, though, does nothing to destroy the ship. To my way of thinking, it actually enhances our experience of it; it makes it all the more fascinating and all the more a wonder to interact with. Knowing that my name for the thing is provisional gives me a bit more humility, as it were, to interact with the event all the more directly, freshly, naively.

I disagree. It is Theseus� ship with a lot of replaced boards, or perhaps Theseus� practically new ship. There are other ways to interpret such ambiguity other than to just say that such ideas as a ship in the first place are arbitrary. It will not seem so arbitrary when one is out to sea in the teeth of a storm trying to stay afloat. Of course, if Theseus didn�t pay for all the boards then the ship, by rights, now belongs to whoever did.

She would point out that that is a constructed idea, an interpretation, a mere designation.

That seems to be the central point of postmodernism. It surely seems to be an attempt to inhabit or take the more primordial ground by labeling things that come out of it as dependent on postmodern thought. Actually, I find, and have always found, such thinking, present company accepted, to be more than a bit condescending. My boat is not a "concept" or mere designation. It�s a boat. YOUR postmodern concepts seem to me to be more of the class of things that are mere designations and "concepts", if you see what I mean. Why on earth should the PM version of things take precedence when they have such difficulty with such simple concepts as a boat repaired or made totally new?

I disagree. It is Theseus� ship with a lot of replaced boards, or perhaps Theseus� practically new ship. There are other ways to interpret such ambiguity other than to just say that such ideas as a ship in the first place are arbitrary.

Come on, Brad, you read my post above, right?

. . . can anyone provide any examples of postmodernism pointing to solutions for social, political and economic problems that are conservative-oriented?

I can't think of a single one.

Come on, Brad, you read my post above, right?

I�m sorry. As is so often the case, I get a full head of steam and do my own posting before reading yours. And I must tell you that, again and again, and with all humility, I will read yours and it will seem to say the same thing only with fewer words and with a better sense of constructed reason. But then, shooting from the hip is so much more fun!

But I will say that I thank Dave and Asher for both giving a quite affirmative, genuine and honest treatment to what they see as the positive sides of postmodernism. One has the feeling that if other PMers shared their attitude that much more positive would come from such an activity.

I was teasing . . . Well-said!

Agreed re. Dave's and Asher's posts. Very helpful to point out the positive contributions of PM, and interesting to see the limitations that emerge from this approach as well.