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Right, Phil, there is widespread consensus that a 14 day embryo is a baby Of course, the reality is that the moral status diminishes as one approaches conception and increases as one approaches full term. The convergence I speak of is NOT a convergence of societal views onto your definition (moral reasoning) and/or moral sensibility, but a convergence of views vis a vis the notion that moral significance changes, and is not at all static, thru development. | ||||
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CORRECT! It will take a long time, if ever ... but we must stay engaged and, when engaged, engage properly. | ||||
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As I have noted, before, I don't find either your moral or your legal approach unreasonable. It is eminently defensible. There is some difficulty, however, in urging such a stance in a pluralistic society in a compelling manner when employing such abstractions as entelechy. My argument has not been that your position is not unreasonable, only that it is not the only reasonable take on this vexing problem. Furthermore, contra your position, pro-choice stances, that are both intellectually honest and informed by authentic moral sensibilities, can be grounded in ontological distinctions vis a vis developmental stages by people of goodwill. And this is to suggest that pro-choice advocates can be well intended even when not grounding their arguments in moral vs legal distinctions vis a vis prudential/pragmatic considerations. At least, that is how I have interpreted the substance of our disagreement, which arose in the context of your assesment of Obama's character vis a vis his abortion position. And I remain adamant in my view, too. | ||||
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JB, my point about entelechy is not an abstraction as one can clearly see that embryos do become human persons and so they must possess some innate potential to do so. This is an irrefutable fact, imo. Re. "ontological distinctions viv a vis developmental stages (e.g. progressive ensoulments) by people of good-will," there's nothing factual about that. That's all hypothecial and aribitrary in both its semantics and metaphysics and can easily be countered by pointing out that such could very well be present from the start--unless one believes these "ensoulments" are progressively added to the fetus. As you know, the prevailing explanation of progressive ensoulment is that this is an emergent phenomenon, the biological level being formed by its metaphysical analogue. In the present political environment, the alternatives you are suggesting do little more than obfuscate what we can affirm as fact and tend to create doubt concerning the moral status of an embryo/fetus (in one post, you absurdly mentioned sperm and eggs). I am not doubting the "good-will" of the people whose ideas you are mentioning, only the worthiness of these "alternative explanations." Given the position I (and countless others) take on the moral status of a fetus, you can understand, I'm sure, how ludicrous it is to hear politicians say that "abortions should be legal, but rare." Might as well say that "slavery should be legal, but rare." Remember, slavery wasn't outlawed until a significant number of people (by no means the majority) agreed that it was morally reprehensible in itself, and could not be allowed to stand in a rational, moral society. There were all the predictable objections from the "pluralistic society" of that time: - the Supreme Court had allowed it; - the Constitution didn't forbid it; - it would wreck the economy of the South (it did, for awhile) - it would ruin Southern culture (that culture did pass away) - the slaves couldn't take care of themselves (they had a very hard time adjusting to "freedom") - some even doubted whether Blacks had souls Nevertheless, it was wrong! Abortion is wrong for similar reasons. It is a morally heinous act! I do not have the answers to how our country should deal with the implications of outlawing it, but I am sure that outlawing it is the proper thing to do. The human community will clearly have to rise up to the occasion and there will be a transition period, just as there has been for almost 150 years since slavery was outlawed. I find this discussion very heavy and burdensome on my spirit, for I believe abortion to be one of the great evils of our time, contributing to a deep moral rot in our culture. It has cheapened our regard for life in all its manifestations and exalted human willfulness to a frightening degree. | ||||
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Addenda - I did not say "baby." A 14 day embryo is an embryonic human being - then fetal human being - than newborn human being - then toddler human being - then child human being - then adolescent human being etc. I say human being is the appropriate "moral object," personhood being progressively emergent through a lifetime (we are all still becoming persons). Drawing lines between what stages of emergence a human being may be lawfully killed makes no sense morally or philosophically. I am done with this point (moral status of an embryo). | ||||
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Very well. For any who may be further interested: The "baby" vs "human being" distinction was not the fulcrum of my argument. Anyone interested in engaging this further can consult the American Bioethics Advisory Commission, which, btw, does not see any 14 day distinction as making any sense, morally or philosophically, from such an aristotelian-like perspective as you seem to employ. And what is further at issue is not whether or not the embryo has moral status but how much status it has, which is to say that most folks do not concede it ABSOLUTE status but more and more consensus on same emerges as development progresses. What makes sense philosophically will vary based on which root metaphor one chooses to articulate their ontology, substance vs process vs semiotic vs social-relational vs essentialist vs nominalist vs phenomenological or what have you. How compelling one's de-ontology will be in pre- and pro-scribing moral realities, in particular, in public moral discourse is very much related to how much traction one's ontology has in describing reality, in general. | ||||
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Johnboy, I do not deny that there are other positions besides what I've articulated. I wonder why you find it necessary to keep pointing out that there are such? Quite frankly, I find it rather odd that you keep brining this up. Do you think I (and others) don't know that? I'm also familiar with most of these positions, having written and debated on this topic for many years, now. FWIW, my reference to the 14-day period was an acknowledgement that some have written that it isn't feasible to speak of human individuality until this level of biological development is established. My own position is otherwise -- that two individuals can share the same embryonic space for awhile. Usually, on a discussion forum, people share what they believe, and why. That's what I've done, here. You've seemed to take the position of advocating for the legitimacy of a plurality of opinions on this topic, which, as I've mentioned, everyone already knows is out there. What's missing in your extensive posts on this board is much sharing from you concerning your own personal beliefs and convictions. I've shared mine. How about you do the same? Do you think abortion should be legal? Why?/Why not? What about the moral status of an embryo, which seems to be a pivotal question? | ||||
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I prefer words like totipotent, pluripotent and multipotent, which get the job done for our purposes without any aristotelian baggage, because so many eschew any metaphysical notions re: telos and formal causation, except in the most minimalist senses. | ||||
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I did not fully understand what you meant by the following. So, I thought it would be worthwhile teasing out the nuances. I think I better appreciate now that you were not talking at all about the distinction some are drawing re: human life/individuality and personhood. You were just talking about the human life/individuality matter. Most pro-choice positions are premised on whether or not abortion destroys a human person, so I apparently misread that into your statement. So, you were not??? saying, for example: "What I have absolutely no respect for is a pro-choice position premised on some kind of confusion about whether abortion destroys a human person. Such a position is indefensible and, ultimately, dishonest." | ||||
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Do you think anyone would know what those words mean? I can live just as well with "innate potential to develop," which means pretty much the same thing, no? See my post above where I request that you share your own convictions, if you're willing. I'm done with sharing my own, and clarifying/nuancing, etc. Pax | ||||
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It is important to me that you know that I was not purposefully mischaracterizing your position here. (I do not need strawmen. )I was not saying that you said that, only indicating that there are many different people saying many different things, like that, this over against what I thought you were saying about there being a widespread moral consensus about the moral status of the embryo. I truly wasn't sure you weren't just pulling my leg when you seemed to indicate that I had capitulated and conceded your point. I did moreso suspect that you might have accidentally miscontrued it. | ||||
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Dang, Phil, few people on this forum or any other have gone as far out of their way to share their beliefs, and why, than I have, even on this thread. Usually, I am criticized for going into too much detail. This is a novel charge. Please, everyone, with regard to my beliefs, see: Proposed Statement of Consensus on Principles With regard to my political strategies, I urged dialogue:
I think that abortion is unquestionably an issue of public morality. I think it should be addressed by our laws, codifications and regulations, at both state and federal levels, for all of the reasons I have already cited hereinabove. I can abide with laws that make it illegal with exceptions for rape, incest and the life of the mother, and even the health of the mother (if health is precisely defined, more narrowly conceived). Now, exactly what all of these laws would say and how and on whom they would be enforced and by which jurisdictions and authorities, I'm open to dialogue. I think it should enjoy the moral status of a person from fertilzation through natural death, even though I do not feel that I can prove its moral status in a universally compelling manner. So, in essence, what I urge is that we treat the product of human conception as a human person for all practical purposes, even while I acknowledge that my ontological argument lacks the full force of reason, even for me. I am precisely taking the position of advocating for the legitimacy of a plurality of opinions on this topic. It does seem to me, however, that, even if everyone knows this plurality is out there, it is not at all clear to me that all of us agree about the legitimacy of some of these opinions. That's what is at the crux of the current exchange, in fact. I truly hope this helps. | ||||
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I don't know what you are talking about. I wasn't talking about ensoulment. That has no currency in political discourse insofar as it is a religious concept. Rather, what I was talking about is the fact that the further an embryo gets toward full term, the greater the public consensus seems to build regarding its rights. The nearer an embryo is to conception, the greater the divergence of public opinion regarding its rights. I expressed it inartfully, perhaps. Given the clarification above, this point is moot? I mentioned sperm and eggs to cite a distinction we must make is all. (If I engage absurdity, you might take that as a signal of purposeful hyperbole and not rather an inadvertent gaffe. ) They are life. They are human. They are human life. They are not individuals, though. Their process of coming together marks incipient human life. Fertilization may or may not involve an individual. Individuals are not necessarily sentient. The sentient is not necessarily sapient. Individuals are not necessarily persons. The point is that folks do draw such distinctions and that they are not so easily dismissed as irrelevant or erroneous. The best argument I can urge, in the political arena, is a conservative and pragmatic argument and not a forceful metaphysical apologetic. I have primarily been responding to:
Phil, at some level, it seems you still don't get where these people are coming from or how they could conceivably see reality differently from you. IF and ONLY IF a politician believes that the moral status of an embryo is absolute, and IF and ONLY IF they draw no distinctions between incipient, sentient, sapient, i.e. PERSONHOOD, and IF and ONLY IF they impute total moral equivalency between all stages of gestation and any other person, ONLY THEN would they be logically inconsistent in the manner in which they handle competing values. It WOULD be inconsistent for you to take YOUR position (ontological) and then to drive to their conclusion that it should be legal but rare. It is NOT inconsistent for them to take their ontology and drive to a different de-ontology. Y'all are proceeding toward different OUGHTS because you are starting from a different IS. As one goes from the descriptive to the prescriptive, the given to the normative, the prescriptive and normative outcomes will differ if the descriptive and given inputs differ. It is that simple. By analogy, many, maybe even most, Catholic pro-lifers, would consider an abortifacient to be a heinous crime, and embryonic stem cell research, too, but that might differ for one who believes an individual human life comes in with the primitive streak. I've got news for you. Many still doubt whether anybody has a soul. It ain't a topic for political deliberation. The analogies to slavery are weak. It was a LOT easier to demonstrate a slave's personhood than it ever will be a zygote's, for gosh sakes, no matter what metaphysical system one employs or whose moral sensibilities one appeals to. I can see your heaviness of spirit. I hope my ostensible tone and tenor do not contribute to that. This medium is incredibly difficult. We could not fruitfully engage this topic, likely not, if we didn't already know each others' hearts and wills as well as we do. My special burden, or gift, is the heaviness of heart with respect to the marginalization of religion in the marketplace, because I feel our great traditions have singular value in informing our culture with great truth, beauty, goodness and community. I am especially burdened by the hijacking of authentic religion, especially by the radical fundamentalists, and the fact that it will contribute to this marginalization; further, it is a scandal and causes many young people to throw their authentic formative upbringing out with the bathwater of inauthentic religion, religiosity. I address this dysfunction elsewhere in either the POTUS or Candidates 2008 thread. | ||||
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More medical bioethicists know those than entelechy. As far as a 14 day embryo being a "baby", as it is, for all practical purposes, it is, from the Church's perspective; and a zygote is, too? There ain't no ontological nuance in play there. | ||||
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I am not just responding to things you have said, but other voices, too. And y'all seem to be recognizing that there are other prudential positions while denying that there are other ontological positions. In lay terms, y'all seem to be recognizing that some are pro-choice because they feel that criminalization would be ineffective or counterproductive. But you seem to be denying that some are pro-choice because they do not recognize the embryo to be a person, at least in some stages of gestation. And that they cannot take this latter position in an intellectually honest way, but are governed by expedience or some other cynical motive that reflects negatively on their entire value system, character, goodwill. That's why I have felt it necessary to flesh out the nuance of these alternate views. I have taken the impression that y'all feel like certain of these views don't really exist (personhood distinctions) or, that if they do, they are necessarily the products of an intellectually dishonest or unprincipled person. And I am trying to dispel those notions. Maybe I've had some success that I have not picked up on? To wit:
You seem to say that once we ascribe moral status to the embryo that the conversation's over (and it is for those of us coreligionists, who share hermeneutics). It is as if you give it absolute status and treat it, for all practical purposes, as a person (and, again, we do, those who share a hermeneutic). Others, however, see it as human life worthy of dignity but not necessarily, especially given this or that stage of gestation, the same amount of respect due any other person with whom it is placed in a value-realization competition. Most people agree that the amount of respect due a third trimester fetus IS ON PAR with any other person. Few people agree that the amount of respect due a zygote is morally equivalent to any other person. Between fertilization and full term, more and more people seem to impute more and more respect to the embryo-fetus as it progresses toward full-term. Even this dynamic (how people variously view the embryo) seems to have been called into question. And I don't mean that what has been questioned is only whether or not the way different people see the embryo is coherent or reasonable. I mean that what has been questioned is the very fact, itself, that this is how many (most) people indeed see things (approach the moral status of the embryo). This is revealed in polling data; the older the embryo, the more people, apparently, there are who will want to protect it. So, good. Therefore be it resolved: We agree that these disparate views exist. We agree that these views do not necessarily reflect on anyone's goodwill or character and that they are not unreasonable. We disagree with their views on the grounds that they are treading on gravely significant territory where moral mistakes can have profound negative consequences for human dignity. We formulate metaphysical arguments that coherently articulate our interpretation of the facts of reality but, because of our own invincible ignorance, much less that of our dialogue partners, thus far, we cannot urge a universally compelling moral argument using the natural law, alone. We continue to work toward more compelling arguments and to effectively reduce the number of abortions through all practical means at our disposal, emphasizing, at any given point in time, those that will be most effective, deemphasizing those that would ignore the counsel of that prudential judgment to which we subscribe and which we call political realism. Thanks for your patience and forebearance while we cleared this up. I'm glad we have arrived at a new consensus to supplement the original consensus statement that I confected a few years ago on this same thread. | ||||
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I do know that, but I just strongly disagree with them. What remarkable insight on their part! It looks and acts more like we do, therefore it must be more of a human, individual, person -- something! None of these distinctions, nuances, and reminders of a plurality of public opinion are new to me. If I have conveyed a judgment against the good-will of those who hold them, then I apologize for that. What I mean to reject is bad ideas, not people. ----- As I expected, your responses to the questions I asked about the legality of abortion, the moral status of an embryo, etc. are much in line with my own. Thank you for stating them so clearly. Your summary of agreements and disagreements above is well-done. ------ Could we possibly move on to something else? How about let's look at the social consequences of abortion? If we're really dealing with a serious moral issue, we should expect to see evidence of this, and we do: Here's a good start Studies on post-abortion syndrome Other consequences of abortion One wonders why these kinds of consequences aren't as widely reported as those suffered by soldiers who've been to Iraq or Viet Nam? Or from the consequences of smoking? Or some drug? Or asbestos? Or global warming? (Actually, one doesn't wonder too much about this, given the mainstream media's political bias) | ||||
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I'm with you totally on this one, Phil. I was composing this response late last night, but didn't get to post it until just now. In the meantime, I see you've already brought up the psychological problems that result from this kind of tragedy. I just returned from a conference on inner healing (at Christian Healing Ministries) and heard a presenter, Susan Stanford-Rue, Ph.D., who wrote, Will I Cry Tomorrow? Healing Post-Abortion Trauma. She and so many other therapists who actually work with the long-term devastating effects of abortion agree with you too. Abortion produces terrible suffering. Women suffer immensely and for many years unless there is deep inner healing that only Christ can bring. Dr. Stanford-Rue says that in her experiences, an abortion means "baby goes from the womb to the brain" and the mother is never released from the guilt, emptiness, and grief until deep inner healing happens. She points out that post abortion suffering of so many women is minimized and disguised by the political climate. There appears to be a deceptive confound of "women's rights" and the legalizing of abortion, the �it's a woman's body-and-she-can-do-what-she-wants-with-it� mentality. On the medical-ethical level, it's an abomination that women are not given thorough *informed consent* about the procedure and the long-term consequences to one's psyche. Every single woman I've talked to who has had an abortion has suffered with everything from a nagging, obsessive doubt and regret to tormenting grief. I've never had an abortion, but have worked with women in therapy and talked to many friends who opened up about the sorts of post-traumatic stress that is suffered. One of my patients shared with me that she was screaming in emotional pain while she was on the abortion table because she knew it was wrong even while it was happening. Unbelievable to me that we don't prepare women for this tragedy. There's no way a woman can allow a doctor to stick an object or solution in her body in order to kill her baby and NOT suffer terrible pain. I have had women crying in my office years and years after an abortion with remorse and guilt. Just this morning, a close friend and colleague of mine said her 67 year-old patient is still agonizing about an abortion she had 1/2 century ago or so. My friend says that she sees how her patient's guilt/pain has affected her own daughter's mental health. One woman I worked with years ago was sure that her 3-year-old son was tragically killed because she had had an abortion years earlier. She said, �I decided to take my unborn baby�s life and in return, God took my son's life.� Nothing could have convinced her that she didn�t deserve her loss. Decades after an abortion, many women have a hard time enjoying their children out of guilt and pain over the one's they destroyed. It's as if they are like ghost siblings that haunt the mother. I don't fall into the deceptive dichotomy of having to choose pro-choice or pro-life. I tell my students that I am both Pro-Choice AND Pro-Life. That is, I will do everything in my power to share with you the facts of what abortion is and the clinical research findings on what it will likely mean to your souls. I will encourage them to make the best CHOICE to choose LIFE over death of your baby. To that end, I really appriate those links you've provided Phil. I'm going to teach on this tomorrow night as a matter of fact! Thank you!! | ||||
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here's a tragic story of a woman who hung herself months after aborting twins. she says, "Living is hell for me. I should never have had an abortion...I told everyone I didn't want to do it, even at the hospital..." http://www.telegraph.co.uk/new...02/22/nartist122.xml | ||||
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The notion of emergence is pivotal for it stands astride our conceptualizations of continuity and discontinuity (wherever they may arise vis a vis epistemology, ontology, logic, historicity and so on, and however they may be framed, interpretively, vis a vis this or that metaphysical root metaphor). To the extent that discontinuities involve real dichotomies while continuities involve what are mere distinctions, our task, then, is not to underappreciate these dichotomies and not to overwork these distinctions. I have not come across a robustly metaphysical system that can easily navigate us between these shoals of underappreciating and overworking, and it's not like I haven't searched in earnest; such systems, by their very nature, tend to be overinvested in one or the other of these hermeneutics. In trying to best bridge this divide, what has seemed to work best for humankind, from a practical perspective, is more of a phenomenological approach, which is grounded in good old common sense. [Technically, this ends up being a semiotic realism that mines meaning and realizes values from a perspective that is more vague --- epistemically, semantically and ontologically --- than any strictly philosophical system and from a perspective that seriously heeds our innate epistemic, aesthetical and ethical sensibilities.] Translation? and application? The masses possess a certain wisdom that often seems to elude professional philosophers, many who are enamored by an Enlightenment fundamentalism. Let's listen to Bill Buckley. Have I continued this conversation? Yes, but only to reframe it for future consideration. Have I argued any new points or challenged any old? No, I mean to take a break myself in that regard. I am satisifed to leave things where they are for now and gratified in thinking it has been all worthwhile. Thanks, Phil. pax all, jb | ||||
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Thank you for your deep and probing insights and nuances, JB. Don't go away, however. As you can see, Shasha and I have begun to explore the consequences, which I believe tell us something about the kind of issue we're dealing with. For many, it is these consequences that has led them to recognize the evil we are dealing with more so than the kind of intellectual reflection we have been engaging in. That, too, is a valid way of arguing for a "position," and many times it is more effective. What say? | ||||
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This is a good conversation to have. I do want to offer a point of information. The Church does not argue against the intrinsic evil of an act based on consequentialistic criteria; it argues based on the type of deontological criteria we have been discussing. (And I know you already know this, Phil. The POI is for others.) Why, then, consider the consequences? Well, we can draw an analogy to what Janet Smith says regarding contraception: If you visit here , you will see listed a number of logical fallacies --- slippery slope fallacy, post hoc fallacy, causal fallacy, etc --- that are cited with respect to a consequentialist evaluation, such as Smith's. This would not mean that the inference was necessarily wrong (although as a deductive inference it would clearly be invalid), it only means that the inference, as an abductive inference, is weak. Do you see any parallel here, which is to ask if the same caveats might not apply? At any rate, for a more dispassionate look on matters involving religious controversy, I often find Religious Tolerance Dot Org to be a reliable resource. Using this type of inference is useful, especially when deductive and inductive inferences are not otherwise available. It can appropriately raise our "sneaking suspicions." However, it is weak and inconclusive and our resulting positions should be held most tentatively. | ||||
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Phil, drawing from the contraception parallel, some theologians draw a distinction between the essentialistic and existential aspects of our tradition. The first is more dry and philosophical, more deductive. The second is more grounded in the actual experience of the faithful and is more inductive. I see a parallel here in your affirmation of those aspects of human experience that are not so distinctly intellectual. Quite often, in Church history, the teaching office has paid heed to the gap between its essentialistic articulations of values and the faithful's existential realizations of same. In other words, due to our finitude and original sin, humans face, sometimes, incredible obstacles in putting certain teachings into practice, or even in being able to, in the first place, fully grasp the truth of those teachings. The Church, for its part, has often done a poor job of articulating such teachings in a manner that is universally compelling vis a vis the natural law and in a way that is transparent to human reason. Whatever the case may be, for one reason or another, on either the part of the faithful or on the part of the magisterium or likely a combination of both, an invincible ignorance is at play. And this ignorance looms large in determining, for example, moral ex/culpability. It also looms large in the church, sometimes, taking a compassionate approach in enforcing its moral doctrines and church disciplines. All this considered, how do you see the church responding, pastorally, to this issue? Specifically, how does it interact with these mostly young women? (Rachel's Vineyard and such) How do these pastoral responses square, then, with the church's apparent stance re: the criminalization of abortion? Specifically, how does it want the criminal justice system to react to these same women? My impression is that the church (different church Catholic conferences) generally doesn't want women to be legally culpable? only providers and other accessories? What about the the crackpots who want to make abortion a capital offense (i.e. death penalty)? How do we carry on the conversation in a manner that does not lend credence to such thinking? When we speak in unequivocal terms about treating an embryo, at all stages, for all practical persons, like any other person, then the average Joe or Joette plugs this definition into their deductive logic and, in so doing, can go off the deep end in what are ostensibly very valid logical arguments. IF this, then THAT. Isn't some nuance needed, however otherwise obfuscatory (my specialty)? Here's a good article by John Allen of the National Catholic Reporter. Not speaking directly to this consideration; just came across it and found it interesting. | ||||
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Right, JB: a "consequentialist approach" is inadequate for making a case for the morality of an action. Given the thread topic, which pertains to the legality of abortion, what we sometimes find is that acts or substances are outlawed not so much because they are immoral per se, but because of actual or possible harmful consequences. Not all that is illegal is immoral, and vice versa. So just as a drug is sometimes banned because it causes harm to a significant percentage of people who use it, abortion could be banned for the same reason -- the harmful consequences it brings to women who've had abortions. Consideration of consequences can also shed light, to some extent, on the moral nature of an act. If an act truly is immoral, then we should see harmful consequences coming from it -- damage to the personality, self-esteem, relationships, etc. Indeed, one should wonder about the moral gravity of an act if there seem to be few consequences that can be directly linked to the act or its aftermath (a weakness in Janet Smith's approach, imo). What we find with abortion is not only terrible consequences to the fetus -- it's death (which would be bad enough) -- but to a high percentage of women who've had abortions as well. This fact alone ought to motivate a compassionate culture to take appropriate actions to reduce the number of abortions that take place. You might say it's in the interest of the common good to do so. | ||||
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The legal/moral distinction is an excellent point, one I've raised throughout this consideration, although not in that direction. I think the weakness in this approach is in providing a legislature with unambiguous empirical evidence for such a syndrome, which is to say that such facts as these generally lend themselves to alternate interpretations. Also, although I think we can justifiably distinguish between existential and neurotic guilt, both which have been gifted (in the first case) or instilled (in the second) by the church, such as re: abortion, in the first case being existential, such as masturbation, in the second, being neurotic, I'm not too sure we can convince others that the guilt is not religion-induced, which is to say that a church can, sometimes, both instill certain guilt and hold itself out as a remedy for same in a rather nonvirtuous cycle. I'm not saying that I cannot tell the difference but that I'm not sure I could successfully demonstrate the difference. It is not enough to say that most women in this or that study of PAS were unchurched, for, as you know, this does not at all speak to the profound impact of early de/formative influences on one's psychological-emotional milieu throughout the rest of one's life. | ||||
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