On one hand:

quote:

Newman could never warm to the God of the philosophers. He kept his distance from the traditional cosmological arguments for the existence of God. He did not deny their validity or their legitimate place in the Church, but he said that they �do not warm me and enlighten me; they do not take away the winter of my desolation, or make the buds unfold and the leaves grow within me, and my moral being rejoice.� He was instead at home with the God of religious men and women, the living God, the God who calls you and me by name, who reveals Himself, who acts unpredictably. And the reason is clear: the living God affected Newman�s imagination and touched his heart and in this way elicited from him a profound real assent.

The metaphysical necessities of the natural theologian tend to block the view of the living, personal God, who reveals Himself not just in what He necessarily is but also in what He unpredictably does. In one early sermon Newman exults in the fact that Christianity discloses to us not a divine principle but a Divine Agent. �Here, then, Revelation meets us with simple and distinct facts and actions, not with painful inductions from existing phenomena, not with generalized laws or metaphysical conjectures, but with Jesus and the Resurrection.� These are just the kinds of facts and actions that awaken a real assent and affect the imagination. By eliciting the sight and sound of them in us readers Newman can do what he could never do with rational proofs�namely, take away the winter of our desolation and make our moral being rejoice.

http://www.firstthings.com/fti...articles/crosby.html


OTOH:

quote:

In responding to Hick, Geivett essentially takes up three themes. First, he draws attention to the significant role of natural theology in the Augustinian tradition. He points out that in De libero arbitrio voluntatis, Augustine is intent on proving the existence of God before formulating his theodicy. It follows that if God's existence can be established on other grounds, the theodicy problem is significantly reduced. Unlike Hick, he believes that natural theology can succeed here, and he draws upon a significant range of contemporary arguments. His favorite seems to be the Kalam cosmological argument, much beloved by William Craig: given that cosmologists tend to believe it is likely that the universe had a start, and given that it is difficult to imagine a universe coming into being uncaused, then it is likely that God was the first cause. This argument is then combined with the anthropic principle (the universe must have properties that make inevitable the existence of intelligent life), providence, answered prayer, and morality to form a cumulative case for the existence of God. God, on these grounds, is more likely than not. In this sense, we start discussing the problem of evil with the significant advantage of knowing that God exists.

http://www.firstthings.com/fti...reviews/markham.html

pax,
jb

Those are two marvelous quotes, JB.

I strongly identify with Newman's attraction to God as Agent vs. principle, although it is gratifying to know that God can be understood as the latter as well.

From some of your other recent contributions, I think we can better appreciate the importance of natural theology. As you know, that discipline has come upon hard times during the past 40 years or so. One unfortunate consequence is a disconnect between natural science and revealed theology, at least in some parts of Christendom. Natural theology forms a bridge between the two, enabling a mutual enrichment. It's also very clarifying to explore what human reason can deduce about the cosmos and God apart from revelation.

re: the distinction between divine principle and Divine Agent, it does seem to me that a lot of natural theologians, especially those of the Abrahamic traditions, do infer, from metaphysical speculation, alone, that God is personal. These inferences are drawn in many different ways. For instance, Islam has, of course, the Kalam Cosmological argument that combines the traditional arguments from contingency (vs necessary being), efficient causation and motion with the arguments against infinite regressions and against material actual infinites.

Basically, part of what the kalam argument suggests is that, unless the First Cause (Unmoved Mover) is Personal, the material universe would have to have been eternal and all potentialities would have to already have become actualities (which, in thomistic terms, would mean that all essences would already be existences), unless there was Someone "willing" creation into existence. St. Bonaventure and Aquinas disagreed over whether or not reason could determine if the world was eternal or not. I guess one could say that Bonaventure was thinking along the same lines as the Muslims? It is nothing to get too hung up on although debates do rage on between evangelicals and the Mormons, since Latter Days Saints beliefs vary widely from what we believe from Scripture on many fronts, including an eternal world.

At any rate, other arguments, such as the moral and teleological proofs would imply a Personal deity also. So, too, would any inferences that might be drawn from analogies of human consciousness and God's Intelligence.

What Divine Revelation adds to this "causal principle", then, for some, is not so much agency but moreso loving intimacy. This theme does seem to resonate in both public revelation and private revelation, in both creed/doctrine and mystical experience. We then understand this intimacy in its fullest possible sense --- God as Father, as Mother, as Brother, as Sister, as Friend, as Spouse, as Lover, as Bread, as Wine, as Breath, as Fire ad infinitum! That would make for a wonderful exercise -- to reflect upon how we experience intimacy with God in all of those ways and more! such being the heart and soul of spiritual direction and discernment?

To me, that is THE message of the Incarnation and no-thing that natural theology could derive without divine revelation, though some Teilhardian thought might have hinted even at this? Recall how we discussed whether or not the Incarnation was necessiated by the Fall or was going to happen anyway?

quote:

Though a profound theological and philosophical thinker, Scotus was first and foremost a Franciscan. His doctrine of the Incarnation (more fully known as the Doctrine of the Absolute Primacy of Christ in the Universe) is firmly rooted in the Franciscan intellectual and spiritual tradition, at whose core is the Person of the Incarnate Son as this is experienced in the radical evangelical witness of Francis. At the centre of the life of Francis is the Incarnate Crucified Lord of all creation, whom Francis called our �Elder Brother�; at the centre of the life of Scotus is the Incarnate Person of the Son, whom he calls �God�s Masterpiece�. In Scotus, the Incarnation is not a contingency plan when the original creative process of God goes awry because of sin. Scotus rejects this notion as too central an emphasis on Man to the extent that the freedom of God to act in love is determined by an external necessity i.e. the redemption from sin. Scotus understands the Incarnation as always being in the mind of God even before the historical and existential physicality of creation itself and the fact of sin.

The Incarnation is the model for creation: there is a creation only because of the Incarnation. In this schema, the universe is for Christ and not Christ for the universe. By Seamus Mulholland OFM

So, natural theology could not reason its way to the Jesus of the Gospels, and Duns Scotus emphatically maintained, against Aquinas: that the knowledge of God cannot come from reason, but must be accepted on the basis of the authority of the Church, saying: "A thing may at the same time be true in philosophy and false in theology." And, you know, he's got a point there since philosophy and metaphysics and math can produce alternate explanations that are both internally coherent and logically consistent, as well as mathematically possible (as we know from Godel). However, sometimes, certain alternate explanations for this or that aspect of reality are mutually exclusive (distinguished from mutually occlusive such as wave-partical duality, such as apophasis-kataphasis) and cannot both be, ergo, externally congruent.

It would be an interesting exercise to separate out Teilhard's natural theology, which proceeds from reason, from his theology of nature, which proceeds from a faith perspective. How much can process philosophy and metaphysics inform a natural theology that might predict, however dimly, an Incarnation of sorts? Don't the philosophical & theological thoughts of Whitehead and Hartshorne lead, at least, to a panentheism, including that resembling a Teilhardian Omega Point? But that God should become human? That remains positively scandalous to this day! No natural theology would predict that?!

Whatever the case may be -- any intuitions or inferences from natural theology re: Jesus are obviously VERY dim vis a vis our knowledge of how the Gospel truths have NOT been instantiated, essentialistically, in those traditions that have not been Gospel-informed or evangelized. Importantly, however, the efficacy of the Incarnation HAS been instantiated, existentially and ontologically, for all humans and for all of time, because of Jesus! All can live the upright and moral life illuminated by the Holy Spirit within. All can be saved. Still, what an unmerited blessing and a tremendous free gift to have heard the Gospel! What return can we make?

Just musing out loud.

pax,
jb

check this out:
The Incarnation:Why God Wanted to Become Human