Phil:

Here's a chapter from the above link I find compelling in some ways, although the tendency to use logic in the face of mystery and paradox seems to draw itself out almost too far, almost like the foregone conclusion of a logical proof. I'm guessing Arraj would have something to say about such things:

_______________________________________

Chapter 44: The Soul's Immutability After Death

"Why does death make the soul immutable, either in good or in evil? The most explicit answer is found in the Summa contra Gentiles. [995].

Our will for a definite last end depends on our will's disposition; as long as this disposition lasts, the desire of this end cannot change, since it changes only by the desire of something more desirable as last end.

Now the soul's disposition is variable during its union with the body, but not after separation from the body. Why? Because changes in the body bring corresponding changes in the soul's disposition, since the body has been given to the soul as instrument of the soul's operations. But the soul, separated from the body, is no longer in motion toward its end, but rests in the end attained (unless it has departed in a state of failure toward this end).

Hence the will of the separated soul is immutable in the desire of its last end, on which desire depends all the will's goodness, or then all its malice. It is immutable, either in good or in evil, and cannot pass from one to the other, though in this fixed order, immutable as regards the last end, it can still choose between means. [996].

In this line of reasoning we see again the force of the doctrine on the soul as form of the body. Since the body is united to the soul, not accidentally, but naturally, to aid the soul in tending to its goal, it follows that the soul, separated from the body, is no longer in a state of tendency to its good.

Cajetan proposes on this subject an opinion which seems to disregard the distance that separates the angel from the human soul. Having said that the angel's choice of a good or evil end is irrevocable, he adds these words: "As to the soul, I hold that it is rendered obstinate by the first act which it elicits in its state of separation and that its final act of demerit occurs, not when it is in via, but when it is in termino." [997].

Thomists in general reject this view. Thus Sylvester de Ferrara, who says: The soul in the first moment of its separation has indeed immutable apprehension, and in that first moment begins its state of obstinacy. But it does not, as some say, have in that moment a demeritorious act, because human demerit like human merit presupposes man. Now the separated soul is not a man, not even in its first moment of separation. Rather, that moment is the first moment of its non-existence as man. Therefore its obstinacy is caused, inchoatively, by its last mutable apprehension of its last end before death, but irrevocably by that apprehension which becomes immutable in its first moment of separation. [998].

The Salmanticenses [999] pronounce thus on Cajetan's opinion, saying: "This mode of speaking does not agree with Scripture, which states expressly that men can merit or demerit before death, but not after death. 'We must work while it is day: the night cometh when no man can work. ' " [1000].

Cajetan conceived the matter too abstractly. He saw correctly that man's road to God is terminated by the moment when that road closes. [1001] But he did not notice that merit belongs to the man who is on the road, not to the separated soul. The last merit, or demerit, so St. Thomas and nearly all his commentators, is an act of the soul still in union with the body, and this act of the united soul becomes immutable by the soul's separation from the body.

Hence it is wrong to say: The condemned soul, seeing its misery, can still repent. Of such a soul, as of the fallen angel, we must rather say: The pride wherein it is immovably fixed closes the road of humility and obedience whereby alone it could repent. Could a soul repent after final impenitence, it would no longer be condemned.

The contrary immutability, that of those who die in the state of grace, the immutability of their free choice of the Supreme Good, supremely loved, is a wonderful echo of the immutability of God's own freedom of choice. God, knowing beforehand all that he has either willed or permitted to come to pass in time, can have no reason to change. Thus, when the separated soul of one of the elect receives the beatific vision, it loves God seen face to face with a love beyond its freedom, a love that is indeed spontaneous, but necessary and inamissible. [1002].

We have here, then, in the grace of a good death, a new view of the grand mystery, namely, the mystery of the inner harmony between infinite mercy, infinite justice, and sovereign freedom, a harmony realized in the pre-eminence of the deity, but obscure to us as long as we have not been raised to the beatific vision."

Phil:

This classical Thomist notion is difficult to reconcile with Communion of the Saints, at least insofar as I understand that to include petitions meant to gain their support. Would that not also include prayers for the dead, implying their capability of responding with faculties this Thomist views as immutable once no longer embodied?

w.c., I think the last two paragraphs above can affirm the doctrine of the Communion of Saints. Their choice, or fundamental option, is for and with God, and so they see the face of God and live in God's love. Presumably, this union is such that prayers to them are transmitted to God.

Thomists would say that a soul in the afterlife lives in what they call the "intermediate state," meaning that in its separation from the physical body and not-yet endowed with its new, resurrected body, it is somewhat metaphysically deficient. What precisely this might mean in terms of its exercising faculties of intellect and will is a mystery, of course.

Phil:

I just think such orthodox Thomists are almost making an ad hominem argument i.e, the notion of freedom of will/intellect of the soul post death doesn't match the Thomist soul-body paradigm, but does match a particular notion of Divine Sovereignty, and so the latter becomes the default category, a view that in the hands of most clergy is probably pretty heavy-handed.

And yet the Church prays for the dead; this, along with the notion of Purgatory, seems contrary to this idea of immutability post death.

Phil:

The theologian cited above also draws an anology to fallen angels, stating they cannot repent because of a similar immutability to that of the human soul. How were angels, fully in the presence of God, able to "fall" or turn away in the first place? I know there are differentiations to be made between God's creatures, but the notion of immutability of the soul post death, such that it isn't capable of a deepening of response, simply doesn't feel intuitively sound to me.

w.c., the immutability is with regard to one's stance for or against God, and that is what is considered irreversible. If one if "for," then it doesn't follow that growth is impossible, only that one cannot do anything to help effect it while separated from the body. And so that's why one has to depend on the prayers of those who are still in the body to move one forward -- as well as upon God's grace, of course.

Obviously, thomism was compatible with the doctrines of the Communion of Saints and Purgatory, as it has been the crown jewel of Catholic theology since the 13th C. and has obviously co-existed with these doctrines. Its theses aren't necessarily synonymous with the doctrines, however, and so one is free to use non-thomistic approaches to explaining these teachings, as many theologians are, in fact, doing. Even the new Catechism steers away from thomistic language as much as possible while staing in straightforward manner the teaching of the Church.

How were angels, fully in the presence of God, able to "fall" or turn away in the first place?

That's a mystery, of course, but it may well be that they were plunged into a Dark Night of sorts where God withdrew from their range of perception the manifestation of His glory, enabling them to experience themselves and their freedom without undue influence of His majesty. That's a thought that's come to me again and again through the years.

http://www.nd.edu/Departments/Maritain/etext/gc.htm

http://www.nd.edu/Departments/...ain/etext/gc4_92.htm

http://www.nd.edu/Departments/...ain/etext/gc4_93.htm

http://www.nd.edu/Departments/...ain/etext/gc4_94.htm

http://www.nd.edu/Departments/...ain/etext/gc4_95.htm

http://www.nd.edu/Departments/...ain/etext/gc4_96.htm

Quotes from Aquinas:


"Whoever has enough in what he has, seeks nothing else beyond. But whoever is finally blessed has enough in the object of true happiness, and therefore seeks nothing that is not in keeping with that object. Now the only way in which the will can be perverse is by willing something inconsistent with the object of true happiness."


"Sometimes it is an impulse of passion that prompts us to desire a thing as our last end: but the impulse of passion quickly passes away, and with it is removed the desire of that end. In other cases the frame of mind, provocative of such desire, amounts to a habit; and that frame of mind is not so easily got rid of, and the desire of an end thence ensuing is consequently stronger and more lasting: yet even a habit is removable in this life. We have seen then that so long as the frame of mind lasts, which prompts us to desire a thing as our last end, the desire of that particular end is irremovable, because the last end, or whatever be taken for such, is desired above all things else; and no other object of greater desire can ever call us away from the desire of that which we take for our last end. Now the soul is in a changeable state so long as it is united with the body, but not after it is parted from the body.* Separated therefore from the body, the soul will be no longer apt to advance to any new end, but must rest for ever in the end already attained. The will then will be immovable in its desire of what it has taken for its last end. But on the last end depends all the goodness or wickedness of the will. Whatever good things one wills in view of a good end, he does well to will them,* as he does ill to will anything in view of an evil end. Thus the will of the departed soul is not changeable from good to evil, although it is changeable from one object of volition to another, its attitude to the last end remaining constant."

________________________________________

Phil:

That last sentence is like what you are saying in your last post, no?

Aquinas seems to be suggesting that mutability of the soul depends upon time and space, and that being directly in the presence of God outside of the body arrests the will in whatever its disposition happens to be, open or closed to God. One's basic openness to, or withdrawal from, God, then, is immutable, but mutable re: degree of volition within those two dispositions. Is that, in your view, what he is saying?

Man . . . this has quickend my sense of conscience, and will to conscience, so to speak. Most of it isn't fear of God per se, but fear of how lax I can be in making choices that either cultivate or denegrate virtue. I can see a number of areas, or issues, where closing off to others has become a habit, although it isn't comfortable, and generates an underlying sadness to which I'd like to respond, ultimately.

I was praying in Mass several months ago, and a deceased patient appeared in a kind of vision; he was in Purgatory and asking for my prayers. Not that my prayers are particularly potent, but there was the sense that he needed this from anyone willing to do so. I've remembered him during most Masses, and have thought of lighting a candle for him as a way of keeping prayers alive for his sake. My sense is that when I'm praying and opening to Christ, and feel the Holy Spirit, to simply remember him, although my faculties aren't always able to manage that particular memory. But this experience had an urgency similar to your description of those without a body in Purgatory needing our prayers.

So what of the dreams where my grandmother appears to me? She's very loving, and seems to have grown in Christ. I guess this generally falls into that category of immutability where her basic disposition is fixed in Christ, but her degree of growth is still underway.

An excellent topic, w.c., and I'll need a little help from the Angelic Doctor now that I'm about to be devoured by the great evolutionary, integral Sri Aurobindo. Perhaps this will pull my bacon from the fire. JP II (he loves U) has urged modern philosophers not to give up on Aquinas, and the Holy
Father was quite a philosopher in his own right, I understand.

http://www.innerexplorations.com/philtext/the1.htm

"philtext" (chuckle) TY 4 the Maritain links!

More ambling thoughts re: The Communion of Saints:


Obviously God doesn't need intermediaries to know His creatures in any way; therefore, one would expect "communion" to imply an actual, active relationship between incarnate and dis-incarnate souls, with saints such as Mary occupying a role of service that our own deceased family members do to the extent they are "for" God (suggesting degrees of potency/nearness to God with regard to growth after death, as cheribim and seraphim are traditionally viewed as nearest the unimpeded Splendor of the Trinity) which Phil mentioned in light of Thomistic thought. But to say that departed souls cannot do anything about their growth needs some further explanation, given, of course, that this is an indissolvable mystery.

I understand how those in Purgatory would be in a mode of purification, learning to open to love via surrender of will, assuming the soul still has this faculty post-death. But for those purified enough not to be considered in this more restricted state, there would seem to be a more active role for them in the exercise of their intentionality post-death, always in the context of "for" God. Being "for" God could involve doing His work in this "Communion of Saints," which seems to characterize what I experience of my grandmother when she visits me, and how those I've watched die speak of having departed family members and friends helping them make the transition.

And then, of course, there is much ado about guardian angels, although I'm not sure how the Catholic Church has treated that notion theologically.