Hi Phil:

I am reading Longergan's Method in Theology. I'd like to hear your comment on this statement on page 8:

"...there is the word, introspection, which is misleading inasmuch as it suggests an inward inspection. Inward inspection is just a myth. Its origin lies in the mistaken analogy that all cognitional events are to be conceived on the analogy of ocular vision; consciousness is some sort of cognitional event; therefore, consciousness is to be conceived on the analogy of ocular vision; and since it does not inspect outwardly, it must be an inward inspection."

I see you as a man who has done a lot of "inward inspection." Would you agree with that? If yes/if no, how do you interpret what Lonergan is saying?

Thanks,

Ryan

Hi Ryan. Good to see you out here again.

I looked up the quote from Google books:
- see http://books.google.com/books?...#v=onepage&q&f=false

It seems that by "inward inspection" Lonergan is referring to some kind of split between the attention and intention that motivates reflection and the contents of reflection. Iow, our very reflection is not something we observe as though someone else were doing it; the contents of our consciousness are, in fact, the consequences of acts taking place in consciousness -- what he will go on to describe as being intelligent, reasonable and responsible.

Is that how you understand it? It's not an easy read.

Thanks for your comment Phil.

I think you are talking about what Lonergan is in favor of. But what I am asking about is what he opposes here.

On one hand we have the kind of "introspection" Lonergan advocates, which is "...the process of objectifying the contents of consciousness...through inquiry, understanding reflection, judgment, to statements about conscious subjects and their operations." I think that is what you are talking about, Phil. And on the other hand we have the kind "introspection" that he calls "just a myth" and "misleading" -- "Looking inwardly" (p.9) or "inward inspection;" where "cognitional events are to be conceived on the analogy of ocular vision."

I am particularly interested in the latter: the sort of "looking inwardly" that is in his opinion "just a myth." From what he has said, I think, for example, a claim to have experienced "seeing light within" would be beyond the horizon of Lonergen's method in theology, (Especially if that "seeing light within" is taken to be a foundational event in cognitive progress -- a cognative enlightenment).

Would you agree with that?

I just don't know what he means, Ryan, especially when he refers to "ocular vision" -- as in seeing with one's eyes?

To my understanding, the perception of inner light would belong to Lonergan's first-level, pre-reflective consciousness: being attentive. What is seen is an inner phenomenon, and it seems to me that it's seen with the same visual apparatus that we see outer phenomena, only the light isn't coming through the eyes. Some of the mystics talked about inner senses, or mystical senses; it may also be that the pineal gland (third eye) plays some role, here. To my knowledge, Lonergan has never addressed the phenomenon of seeing inner light, though I'm not sure why that would be more of a "myth" than simply observing outer light.

Your thoughts?

I think what he's saying is this.

When we see a cat, for example, there is a perceiving subject (ourselves), an object (the cat), and an act of perception.

Lonergan is against the idea that this model also applies to so-called introspection.

For example, if I'm feeling sleepy on a Saturday morning, and I become aware of feeling sleepy, we might model this by saying that the sleepy feeling is an object, and I am the perceiver of this object -- on the analogy with perceiving the external cat.

But Lonergan is saying that the sleepy feeling is not really an "object" at all.

quote:

Originally posted by Phil:
it's seen with the same visual apparatus that we see outer phenomena, only the light isn't coming through the eyes. Some of the mystics talked about inner senses, or mystical senses; it may also be that the pineal gland (third eye) plays some role, here.

My analysis of the phenomenon in terms of its neuro-physical basis is that the sense of "inner light" that is "pre-reflective" results from a kind of combination of neural pathways such that we have an immediate perception of "seeing" an inner feeling. For me different inner lights correlate with different inner feelings.

Not everyone experiences inner light as an immediate perception. I do not know that stats, but my guess is that most people do not. For those people who do not experience it directly, they might still use the language of "seeing light" interiorly although for them it is an analogy. Some of those who use that language analogically may be of the opinion that the analogical usage of the ocular metaphor is really the only usage. These people are simply unaware or unwilling to believe that for some other people it is first and foremost a direct inner perception. I think Lonergan is one of those people.

I know this may be a hard pill to take for you, as it is for me also (although less so because I am not an Lonergan fan yet), but when I see what he says, that seems to be the most natural reading.

Ryan

quote:

Originally posted by Derek:
When we see a cat, for example, there is a perceiving subject (ourselves), an object (the cat), and an act of perception.

Lonergan is against the idea that this model also applies to so-called introspection.

Hi Derek:

Thanks for your comment.


I think you are mistaken. I think his definition of introspection that he approves of is "objectifying the contents of consciousness" -- in other words treating an operation of consciousness like an external object. That is what he says on the bottom of page 8 and the top of page 9.

Your thoughts?

quote:

I know this may be a hard pill to take for you, as it is for me also (although less so because I am not an Lonergan fan yet), but when I see what he says, that seems to be the most natural reading.

Well, I just don't know what Lonergan would say about the actual perception of inner light as I'm not aware of him addressing this anywhere. It would seem that "inner light" is to be taken as a perception on the order of outer perceptions. To assume that his comments on "inward inspection" invalidates this somehow has not been conclusively established, imo. Truth be told, I'm not sure what that all means. An example or two would have been helpful.

quote:

According to Lonergan, the human subject attends to the data of experience, seeks to understand that data, passes judgment as to the veracity of that understanding, and then makes decisions based on that judgment. Regardless of the nature of the experience, the human person performs these operations and spiritual matters are no longer relegated to a distinct realm of human life away from everyday concerns.

- from http://epublications.marquette...rtations/AAI3188541/

Maybe that's more to the point? Inner light is experienced by a human subject as data of experience, about which one can inquire as to its meaning. Unless Lonergan explicitly states that such perceptions are somehow inherently erroneous, I think we have to consider them as we would any others. I'm not sure why he would say such a thing, however. On what basis?

quote:

Originally posted by Phil:
Well, I just don't know what Lonergan would say about the actual perception of inner light

I think Lonergan clearly leaves room for your interpretation. I see at least two openings. First, he says that the mistake comes from regarding "all" congnitional events on the analogy ocular vision -- not "any" cognitional events. This leaves open the option of using the ocular analogy legitimately sometimes. Second, this "myth" of "inward inspection" is his invention. I do not know of anybody out there arguing for the true value something they call "inward inspection." I Googled the phrase and found almost nothing. The peculiar wording makes it seem like a straw man in his argument.

Still I think there is a stronger case to be made that Lonergan doesn't regard seeing inner light as theologically significant. Not only does he not talk about seeing inner light in a positive sense(as does his friend Johnston, Arise my love, p. 200 where he is probably talking about direct experience of fire and light, but where the same so quickly becomes an analogy for love and wisdom it is not clear), in his treatment of religious experience, Lonergan is far more interested in the fruits of spiritual experience as in "love, joy... self-control."

Last night it occurred to me that the "myth" of "inward inspection" might be about the futility of the Self trying to apprehend itself through inner observation. The Self, as "see-er," cannot observe itself as an object of its own perception, as it is the observer, not the observed. Could that be it? Again, it would have been helpful had he given examples.

quote:

Originally posted by Phil:
...it would have been helpful had he given examples.

Given his lack of examples, my line of question must lead to tentative answers at best. The example you gave of the Self (the non-reflective self) trying to reflect on itself would be misleading. I doubt that is what Lonergan is talking about though as a model of a misleading notion of introspection.

Tonight I was reading A still small voice: A prectical guide on reported revelations by Fr. Groeschel (1993). Groechel distinguishes "private revelations" from "religious experience." As I was reading about the two, it struck me that Lonergan is totally on the side of "religious experience" and not at all addressing "private revelation." I'm curious, Phil, if that matches your reading of Lonegan.

I think Lonergan calling inner inspection a myth has to do with wanting to differentiate his version of introspection from seeking private revelation. Groeschel has a section of "visions" where he give this example of what he calls an exterior, corporeal or "ocular" vision:

"Bernadette never questioned that she saw the Lady with her eyes although, in fact, there was apparently not an exterior (meaning objective in the perspective of a non-believing third party observer?) vision."

The "ocular" label struck me in this example. Lonergan might consider Bernadette's vision mythmaking, in the sense of being a misleading model for what he considers "introspection." It is a bit of an awkward match, but the use of the word "ocular" is striking for me.

quote:

Originally posted by Derek:
But Lonergan is saying that the sleepy feeling is not really an "object" at all.

I'm inclined to say that maybe Lonergan is saying that when there is a purported ocular vision of a cat where the seer is convinced that it is an external, corporeal cat, but where other people cannot see the cat, then that "cat" is mythic, or rather that sort of seeing is mythic.

quote:

The "ocular" label struck me in this example. Lonergan might consider Bernadette's vision mythmaking, in the sense of being a misleading model for what he considers "introspection." It is a bit of an awkward match, but the use of the word "ocular" is striking for me.

Hard to say. I'm no Lonergan expert, however. I'm much more familiar with the writings of people like Daniel Helminiak, who studied under Lonergan and has helped to explicate his work. Helminiak never treats this "inward inspection" angle in the books I've read, and my sense is that he'd consider even visions like that of Bernadette to be in the framework of the first level of consciousness: being attentive (non-reflective consciousness). Bernadette "sees" Mary, and whether it's with her physical eyes, inner vision or via some miracle of grace, it doesn't matter in terms of how consciousness operates. The vision communicates information that Bernadette perceives, then she moves on to second, third and fourth-level operations, which, in her case, seemed to unfold in a fairly normal manner.

I don't know where else to go with this, so if you come across any clarifying information in your reading, let us know.

quote:

Originally posted by Phil:
I'm much more familiar with the writings of people like Daniel Helminiak

Thanks for your comments on your sense of what Lonergan is saying.

I am re-reading Meditation without Myth after having read it over a year ago. I must admit, Helminiak is a very clear thinker and writer. Brilliant.

I wonder if Lonergan is not trying to distinguish between cognition and feeling. When I'm aware of the fact that I'm thinking about it, I may have a feeling that my attention and consciousness is turned "inwardly", as if casting a light on the thought that is "inside" my mind. But, in fact, thoughts are not "inside" anything, so it's only a metaphor. Plotinus, as well as others mystical writers, uses that a lot, saying: "the soul must leave everything outside it, and turn inwards...". But it is a metaphor, and a certain experience, feeling, common to people who meditate. But philosophically it makes little sense, since everything is "in consciousness", and of course it's not a spatial "in". So perhaps Lonergan is just "demythologizing" philosophical/theological language.
I wonder how he'd make sense of Roberts' and Phil's experience of "losing the internal" or "not being able to look inwardly". But these are subtleties of mystical experiences which have hardly been dealt with but Christian theologians in a conceptual manner. However, Thomas Aquinas uses metaphorical language, saying, along with Aristotle, that "intelligibles are in the intellect". Can we equate intellect of mediaeval philosophy with Lonergan's consciousness/spirit? Helminiak does. Perhaps we can.

So I suppose it's more about a precision of language, not about discounting the fact of inner perception. Lonergan must be very aware of the Neoplatonic tradition of "turning the eye of the spirit inwardly" - it's in the Confessions of Augustine, for goodness' sake