The link below provides interesting poll results concerning American's beliefs about God and related topics:
- http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,99945,00.html

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4. Do you personally believe in the existence of each of the following?
SCALE: 1. Believe 2. Don't believe 3. (Not sure)

Believe Don�t believe Not sure
God 92% 5 3
Heaven 85% 10 5
Miracles 82% 14 4
Angels 78% 15 7
Hell 74% 20 6
The Devil 71% 24 5
Ghosts 34% 60 6
UFOs 34% 55 11
Astrology 29% 64 7
Reincarnation 25% 62 13
Witches 24% 69 7

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OK, so that's mangling a format, but you can still see how it goes. Lots of folks out there believing in God and even the devil. Just how they understand all this in relation to creation is another matter, however. It would be interesting to do a follow-up poll on some of this.

V.V. Raman, physicist, once posted on an IRAS (Institute on Religion in an Age of Science) listserv:

There are two kinds of <truths>:
(a) truths (interpretations of raw facts) about the
external/physical/perceived world;
(b) truths about the human condition and what affects our feelings,
emotions, and cultural framework.

I took the liberty of quoting from there because those are public archives and I encourage anyone interested in reading all that V.V. said at:
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/LDG-NET/message/5019

That distinction seems to at least partially address the dynamics of a)logos and b)mythos that F. David Peat and others have explored at length.

Apart from our exercises in mythos, humankind is engaged in a rather large
undertaking in logos, looking for facts about our world. To be sure, we are
constrained, sometimes, either systematically or methodologically, in our
pursuit of facts and in our interpretations of them. We have also discussed
the constraints of our logically closed systems. The g�delian implication
is that we cannot prove certain axioms within a closed symbol system, that
we cannot prove certain truths (logos). This does not mean, however, that
we cannot "see" the truth in certain axioms. Rather, by going to the next
book on the math shelf, we can attempt a proof of those axioms within a new
symbolic system.

Part of our pursuit of logos is our investigation of the fact of efficient
causality, that chain of cause and effect that runs through our
emergentistic, supervenient and reductionistic explanations. Efficient
causality is a compelling inference, but when our explanations of it begin
to collapse in the earliest moments after the Big Bang, much less pre-Big
Bang, or in the deepest structures of matter, not all of us shrug and throw
up our hands, knowing we'll never prove the fundamental axioms of our
physical systems. Some of us think that these answers may be nonetheless
staring at us, in the face, and that we may be looking back, although we
don't know it. At this point, then, some reach for the next math book on
the shelf, even if it uses imaginary numbers. And, perhaps, thereby, we
gain an increased understanding of efficient causation as it operated near
the Big Bang, singularity or not, and as it operates, quantum mechanically,
in the deepest structures of matter?

What happens to our logical constructs vis a vis the plenum of space-time-
mass-charge? Does efficient causality as a logical construct collapse or
does it rather open itself to a more broadly conceived notion of this space-
time plenum, such as might use imaginary time, for instance? In such an
instance, even if the space-time plenum concept gets, more or less,
rigorously reconceptualized, resulting in a change in natural genus
(metaphysical jargon for a change in type of being, for a change in
ontological status, however continuous or discontinuous), the logical
construct of efficient causation does not ipso facto change its logical
genus. Analogous to Hawking's theoretical physics, which pulls the next
math book off the shelf, is metaphysics, which, descriptively, is the
pulling of the next book of being off the shelf.

And maybe it is more than a strong analogy, because there is the same
underlying dynamism at work when fudging with time, imaginatvely, or with
matter (being, substance), again imaginatively, insofar as they share a
natural genus in the space-time plenum and a logical genus in efficient
causality. The challenge, then, is to imagine both vigorously and
rigorously.

And maybe there is not quite as much epistemological or ontological
discontinuity as some would imagine between our theoretical physics and
metaphysics? And thus their rigor can be measured similarly in terms of
logical consistency, internal coherence, external congruence,
interdisciplinary consilience, hypothetical consonance, cognitive-affective
consonance, intelligibility, interpretability, meaningfulness, explanatory
adequacy, comprehensiveness, insightfulness, relevance, predictability,
testability, confirmability � direct and indirect (eschatological &
temporal), corroboration, verifiability, falsifiability and fecundity ?

I say all of this about our pursuit of logos, which might be described as a
search for modeling power in our parade of successive attempts to transcend
our g�delian-like symbol systems, pulling one book off of the shelf after
another. This is emergentistic. And to the extent that mythos arises out of
logos, our metaphysics will certainly inform same. I think it would be fair
to say that, emergentistically, with respect to metaphysics as part of
one's logos, metaphysics can be dispositive of mythos even if it is not
exhaustive. It may be sufficient, for some, but not necessary, for others.
It can be part of a project of meaning, which is to say that I think that
metaphysics, emergentistically, can be A journey on one's quest for
meaning, just like physics/naturalism, but is not THE only journey. Which
constructs in our emergentist understanding of logos are but reifications
will be revealed, eventually, through our rigor and vigor, I'm sure,
coherence yielding to correspondence.

OK. Now, I'll move on to the other mysteries

pax,
jb

Phil commented, previously, on Occam's Razor and who should and shouldn't be using it in various contexts. I'll amplify why Phil is correct:

�Home Alone,� was an entertaining and informative
essay by Jeff Dahms from MetaNexus. In his essay, Jeff writes: �The issue then comes down to the ultimate Occam's choice. Is the scheme of things one kind of thing (self-sufficient) or two kinds of things, one contingent and the other its self-sufficient primary cause. Philosophic naturalists think the aesthetic choice is a no brainer, but then the other guys.... Yeah, you've gotta be wild eyed professional philosopher for it to grab you.�

The entertaining aspect, to me, lies in Jeff�s descripition of his aesthetic sensibilities. This is very reminiscent of one of the aspects of Jack Haught�s approach, as he set forth in __The Cosmic Adventure: Science, Religion and the Quest for Purpose__ ( Paulist Press, New York/Ramsey, 1984), now online it its entirety:

http://www.religion-online.org...howbook?item_id=1948

One would not be far off, in considering the whole of Jack�s writings, in characterizing his leitmotif as an Aesthetic Teleology. Beauty being in the eye of the beholder, I suppose that, on aesthetic grounds, we need simply concede one another his and her�s own taste. Of course, neither Jeff nor Jack�s enterprise is strictly entertaining and neither is merely describing their cosmic tastes. Both are informative, also, and are setting forth formal arguments in support of their respective monistic and dualistic inferences. Both make metaphysical appeals, in general, and refer to the problem of consciousness, in particular.

Jeff writes: �It is completely uninformative to say that we cannot picture matter generating/being mind and consciousness. We cannot picture matter doing anything other than by using metaphors of convenience--waves, particles etc.--even though the deep world is none of these things. It is not the case as is commonly assumed that early twentieth century physics replaced particles with waves. What we discovered was that the same material substrate could be construed perfectly (not as approximations even) in wave terms in one circumstance or particle terms in another. That has very deep implications for our understanding of the nature of the material substrate. Something that can be perfectly captured by metaphors that are completely incommensurate is not some mix of these nor some half way blend. It is not picturable in our mental framework at all. The mathematics tells us only about the outcomes of experiments and says nothing about the thing-in-itself. (As there were and still are some famous holdouts against this understanding). Naturalists are as surprised as anyone else at our evolving understanding of the universe but their philosophic bet is that wild as the intellectual ride is the scheme of things is single and coherent rather than dual in nature--that matter is not mere.�

Without arguing either metaphysics or the hard problem and how they impinge on one�s monistic or dualistic inferences, let�s back up and look at Occam�s Razor, in general. In keeping with the thrust of recent threads regarding such as Dree�s �open space,� arguably, Occam�s Razor is not going to be a useful tool for settling ontological disputes, since we are faced with an occulting, in principle, of such primal affairs. It�s not like our ontologies add explanatory adequacy, presently, to the hard problem, for instance, such that we could then choose the simplest explanation. Resultantly, there is always going to be a question begging nature as to which ontology can actually get the job done, while at the same time being the simplest explanation. In the proper application of the law of parsimony, the simplest explanation must truly be explanatory and large tracts of human understanding must not be cut away. This not only applies to the larger question of ontology but applies to the narrower issue of consciousness where, based on our extremely limited understanding at present, Occam�s Razor is far too blunt an instrument.

pax,
jb

So, given our take on Occam's Razor, is there then a stalemate?

Godel�s Theorem doesn�t imply that all of our proofs are necessarily wrong, only that they can�t be proven as axioms within their own systems. I believe that the implications of Godel�s Theorem are that we can indeed see possible solutions within a closed system that can not be proven within it.

In the same article, Home Alone (posted at SP in its entirety per MetaNexus rules), Jeff Dahms also wrote: �We cannot picture matter doing anything other than by using metaphors of convenience--waves, particles etc.--even though the deep world is none of these things. It is not the case as is commonly assumed that early twentieth century physics replaced particles with waves. What we discovered was that the same material substrate could be construed perfectly (not as approximations even) in wave terms in one circumstance or particle terms in another. That has very deep implications for our understanding of the nature of the material substrate. Something that can be perfectly captured by metaphors that are completely incommensurate is not some mix of these nor some half way blend. It is not picturable in our mental framework at all.�

Not unlike what others have suggested, perhaps Jeff, too, is, at some level, indeed eschewing a metaphysical proof, and denying as well that there can be a physical proof, for our ontological leanings. Still, I, personally, don�t suggest that these leanings are
grounded, merely, aesthetically, since I view our noetic-aesthetic-ethic axes as algorithmic products of our metaphysics [ontology + cosmology] times our epistemology. In that regard, certainly our aesthetical outlook is then a fractal of our broader hermeneutic, which is to say that it exists in relationship, through a web of coherence, to the other holographic-like elements of our worldview, each of these elements incorporating what all of the others signify.

When Jeff writes that that which can be captured by incommensurate metaphors is not picturable in our mental framework, he has almost captured the implications of the Dionysian triad that I have described at length previously, variously described as kataphatic, apophatic & eminentistic, or as analogical, anagogical & mystagogical, or as metaphorical, anagogical & unitive. Samuel Brainard writes: �The triad is like a fractal, in that each element of a triad, no matter what it is, seems to be itself a triad. It is specifically through this medium of the recursive-triadic structure that Dionysius preserves everywhere the disjunctive-conjunctive distinction with the addition of a mediating principle.� There is nothing spooky about this per se, for it is the same insight that allows us to break through the Sorite Paradox by making the proper distinctions between logical and efficient causations.

So, certainly making an appeal to our aesthetic sensibilities, but also invoking the idea that we just might see some solutions within our system, albeit unprovable, let me set forth an aesthetic alternative to both the monistic and dualistic inferences. It is the hylomorphic inference of an Aristotelan Thomism, which, matching Jeff�s criteria, looks at the incommensurate metaphors for being and neither �mixes them� nor �blends them halfway� but, rather, nurtures these tensions in a way that is characteristically catholic, viewing human beings as composites of soul and body, wherein soul is related to body as form to matter. [St. Thomas's position eludes categorization in terms of the fundamental modern and contemporary alternatives of dualism and materialism. Nor does it help to depict hylomorphism as a compromise or middle position between dualism and materialism. The latter are closer to one another than either is to Aquinas. --- Thomas Hibbs, Boston College.] As such, then, this hylomorphic inference would seem to meet one of Jeff�s aesthetic criteria, while also precisely taking in the �very deep implications for our understanding of the nature of the material substrate� that he so lucidly described.

In closing, I will quote from the Catholic Encyclopedia: �Such is the Catholic doctrine on the nature, unity, substantiality, spirituality, and origin of the soul.� And �[ It ] is by far the most comprehensive, and at the same time discriminating, syntheseis of whatever is best in rival systems. It recognizes the physical conditions of the soul's activity with the Materialist, and its spiritual aspect with the Idealist, while with the Monist it insists on the vital unity of human life. It enshrines the principles of ancient speculation, and is ready to receive and assimilate the fruits of modern research.�

pax,
jb

- not replying to your last post, JB, which I need to think over some more; just wanting to reflect more in the direction of beginnings -

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Here's an intriguing idea that has occurred to me many times, but I've never taken the time to fully flesh it out. Perhaps this is the place to do it.

The Judeo-Christian doctrine is that God created the universe out of nothing--i.e., there was no eternally existing matter to be shaped into a universe. This means that we have to somehow get from God to creation, and the only explanation for doing so that comes to me is that God somehow becomes extended to form creation from God's own Being. In other words, creation from no-thing implies creation from God--literally!

The prologue to John's Gospel puts it thus:

quote:

In the beginning was the Word;
the word was in God's presence,
and the Word was God.
He was present to God in the beginning.
Through him all things came into being,
and apart from him nothing came to be.

God becomes disposed toward creation through the Word, through whom all things came into being. This is the Greek idea of Logos--God's formative power and wisdom--applied to the pre-incarnate 2nd Person of the Trinity, who became incarnate in the human Jesus.

Now it would be a short step from this idea to pantheism--that the universe is naught but God manifesting as all these creatures, and that the creatures have no being in and of themselves. But that's not the Judeo-Christian doctrine, which holds that creatures, while created by God--maybe even from God--nonetheless are gifted with their own being or manner of existence--one that we can even presume is capable of evolving, or of acting contrary to its innate dispositions. What this also means is that at some level, all creatures must be intimately bound to God by the very fact of their existence, for they do not possess any existence whatsoever independently of God's will that they exist. God (the Father) forms creation through the Word (the Son); the creation is therefore a word of the Word.

One could, then, chart a high spiritual pathway which begins with an inquiry into the nature of one's own existence, considering the fact of our existential fragility and contingency (we do not create ourselves), going on to recognize existence as something received, which implies a Giver of the gift: Super-Natural Existence/Pure Being itself. This is all what the intuition of being a la Maritain, Arraj, and the neo-Thomists affirms, only we are noting here that it must be so, for, "in the beginning," God had nothing to create with except, well, God!

A somewhat delayed response to Phil's musing on God creating out of no-thing:

Consider this (albeit out of context) --- Stanley L. Jaki, a Catholic priest of the Benedictine Order, stated:

quote:

"The caution which is in order about taking the [Hebrew] verb bara
in the sense of creation out of nothing is no less needed in
reference to the [English] word creation. Nothing is more natural,
and unadvised, at the same time, than to use the word as if it has
always denoted creation out of nothing. In its basic etymological
origin the word creation meant the purely natural process of growing
or of making something to grow. This should be obvious by a mere
recall of the [Latin] verb crescere. The crescent moon [derived
from crescere] is not creating but merely growing. The expression
ex nihilo or de nihilo had to be fastened, from around 200 A.D. on,
by Christian theologians on the verb creare to convey unmistakably
a process, strict creation, which only God can perform. Only through
the long-standing use of those very Latin expressions, creare ex nihilo
and creatio ex nihilo, could the English words to create and creation
take on the meaning which excludes pre-existing matter."

(Stanley L. Jaki, Genesis 1 Through the Ages (Royal Oak, Mich.: Real View Books, 1998), 5-6.)

pax,
jb

A lot of the discussion is admittedly over my head But what sticks out in my mind is that the fact that God looked at his creation and said it was good. I grew up in a world were philosophy was considered the enemy fundamentalism. One of main tenants is that Human beings are totally depraved in God's eyes and nothing we do can be redeemed because of the fall. Verses like this remind me why I converted to Catholicism through Anglicanism. Again I am more attracted to Theology of the heart and prayer forms than philosophical arguments. To know God loves me for me as radically changed my view of myself.