If you are interested in Parallel Universes and cosmology, then you may want to read this article by Max Tegmark in Scientific American.

The last century gave us John Searle�s �Chinese Room� and �Hilbert�s
Hotel� by David Hilbert. What are we to make of this millennium�s �Cosmic
Condominiums� by Max Tegmark?

As a cosmology, a proposal that uses parallel universes, like Tegmark�s,
is very appealing to me, both intuitively and aesthetically. It
articulates the intuitions I have always held regarding how a materialist
monism would have to work vis a vis either its implicit or explicit
affirmations of an infinite universe or multiverse: �Space appears to be
infinite in size. If so, then somewhere out there, everything that is
possible becomes real, no matter how improbable it is,� (Tegmark, May
2003, Scientific American). In my view, this cosmology would indeed be an
analogue to the meta-metaphysical God of thomistic metaphysics, at least
insofar as the distinction between existence and essence gets eliminated,
which is to say that act and potency would then coincide.

This brings to mind the old joke: Why did God create time? So, everything
wouldn�t happen all at once. But Tegmark and Hawkings are not joking when
speaking of parallel universes. It appears to me (and understand
that �appears to me�, here, is a BIG qualification) that they are head-on
taking on Kalam�s Cosmological Argument, the axioms of which, to me, seem
to derive their aesthetic appeal from the manifest absurdities that flow
from their rejection, or, in other words, weirdness.

Kalam�s conclusions turn on the distinction that must be drawn between
potential and actual infinite sets and draws out conclusions that don�t
demonstrate the logical contradictions that would inhere, for instance, in
Tegmark�s multiverse, but rather from the metaphysical absurdities that
would result. For example, some such absurdities would derive from what
happens when we perform inverse operations (of subtraction & division)
using transfinite numbers. But, should intuition and counterintuition,
weirdness or a lack thereof, be our sole criterion in theoretical physics
or speculative metaphysics? Just consider the neat things Einstein came up
with by setting aside Euclid�s axiom re: parallel lines never meeting!

Einstein thus brings me to my next point, because he was talking about
Euclid�s axiom about points when he said: "As far as the laws of
mathematics refer to reality, they are not certain; and as far as they are
certain, they do not refer to reality."

In our search for modeling power, we have often been cautioned not to
confuse our mental mappings with either actual or potential physical,
metaphysical or meta-metaphysical terrains. When we, the symbolic species,
employ formal logical arguments, we need to pay attention to the
distinction that the mathematicians draw between axioms and postulates,
axioms being strongly self-evident and postulates being assumptions. We
also need to dutifully and diligently define our subjects and predicates,
which are used in our formal cosmological arguments. Even then, all these
above-caveats thus heeded, above all, when it comes to cosmology and
ontology, we must remember that the symbolic species is only about the
task of drawing valid cosmological and ontological inferences, assuming
its cosmological and ontological premises are true, because we cannot, in
principle, have recourse to proofs of the axioms that we are using with
our metaphysical postulates (with their mathematical models).

Like a Hilbert Hotel or an ever-expanding Tegmark Condo, for the same
godelian reasons that Whitehead and Russell could not derive math from the
canons of logic in their "Principia Mathematica,� neither Kalam nor
Hawkings� cosmological arguments can be indubitably set forth in either
mathematical or rational systems. However, each successive metasystem can
test its axioms meta-mathematically or meta-rationally and the inferences
drawn from our experience of reality can become increasingly compelling as
we approach various truths asymptotically, even seeing the truths in our
axioms while unable, in principle, to prove them all.

Finally, even postulating that one could get by Kurt Godel as he guards
the portals of metamathematics, hence, metaphysics, one would then
encounter Thomas Aquinas, the invincible sentinel of such a meta-
metaphysics as does make predictions and is verifiable/falsifiable, albeit
only eschatologically, perhaps almost analogous to Kalam and Tegmark�s
situation. As William James noted re: the hard problem of consciousness,
for solutions to Kalam and Tegmark's problems of cosmology, in my godelian-
thomistic view, we've got a long wait.

pax!
jb

p.s. Recognize that the implications of what I am saying are that both Kalam and Tegmark could rationally demonstrate that their cosmologies are not unreasonable, even if mutually exclusive. One is then left to fall back on one's other resources (epistemic capacities), such as common sense and intuition, in opting for one inference versus the other, which is to say we aren't examining them for logical contradictions only, or internal coherence only, or external congruence only, but for a broad range of essentialistic and existentialistic epistemological criteria, including the aesthetic.

JB, what is the logical or intuitive evidence for parallel universes? I know there's no scientific evidence for it one way or another.

What do you see as the theological significance of such if it exists? That every possible person we could have become actually exists in a real universe?

JB, what is the logical or intuitive evidence for parallel universes? I know there's no scientific evidence for it one way or another.

Logically, it seems to be driven by the observation that space may be infinite. In math, we do deal with infinite sets and would consider them potential . When we defend Kalam's Cosmological Argument, we aren't arguing against the logical possibility of a potentially infinite universe or against the mathematical accuracy of such a description. Rather, we accept the infinite universe/multiverse premise and then demonstrate, not that it leads to logical contradictions or mathematical error, that it is patently absurd. As Tegmark proceeds from level to level in his multiverse, there are certain premises that would have to play out vis a vis such evidence as cosmic background radiation, for instance. It has always seemed to me that a materialist monism must algorithmically buy into an infinite universe argument. As you are aware, the evidence is stacked against this, heavily. Once adopting a materialist monistic premise, an infinite multiverse that is self-caused or acausal and that has always been seems to flow intuitively therefrom, right? But, if the universe/multiverse were infinite, then everything we see taking place right now would have already taken place, right? then everything we see taking place right now would have already taken place, right? then everything we see taking place right now would have already taken place, right?


What do you see as the theological significance of such if it exists? That every possible person we could have become actually exists in a real universe?

Theologically, regarding God's transcendent nature, HOW things are cannot, in principle, address THAT things are. Meta-metaphysically, what we learn in the realms of metaphysics and physics can only yield up analogical knowledge of God, right? So, if there is a multiverse, we might develop a few more weak transcendental analogues that wouldn't likely add much to the Divine Attributes we've already explicated from both natural and revealed theology. And I know that is not the overall thrust of your question but I thought it would be worth putting out there.

I think that, yes, metaphysically, every possible person we could have become would exist in the universe, like wave function cascading upon wave function. I think we would be right, nonetheless, to infer that those other jokers named Phil and johnboy that married those other girls, are ontologically distinct from you and me. So, power to them and good luck Seriously, theologically, it just seems that God would be providentially guiding a LOT more of creation than meets the eye and it doesn't seem much different a situation from might exist if their were other intelligent creatures in the universe, which seems unlikely unless their planet has both a sun and a moon just like our own. Our moon is one of those anthropic events that would have to have happenned, precisely like it did, for us to have evolved.

Bottomline, Tegmark's proposal offends common sense. OTOH, so did curved space and general and special relativity, until we learned the math. Max Tegmark knows his math but he also mixes philosophy with some of his science, which is okay, because I think he winks at us re: some of his publications. He's zany like that.

My grasp of all of this is inchoate but I don't think one needs to know formal logic, physics and high math to understand the implications and apply a little common sense.

I hope I helped clarify and didn't muddle this further.

pax,
jb

Why would cosmology matter, anyway -- theologically or vis a vis moral philosophy, for instance?

My type of pragmatism is not of the variety that thinks that reason is wholly unreliable in metaphysics and moral philosophy, that we should thus resolve to concentrate only on more pressing matters to which our methodologies and systems are more proportioned. I believe that is only on the surface that our worldviews may appear arational, that upon closer examination our implicit existentialistic intuitions will inevitably correspond to one or another otherwise explicit essentialistic articulations, which philosophically and metaphysically are going to be, ipso facto, metarational enterprises. All of this is to say that I think that my hermeneutical formula holds, descriptively: metaphysics [cosmology + ontology] x epistemology [as variously defined epistemic capacities & enterprises] = worldview = noetic + aesthetic +ethic = creed + cult(ivation) + code.

I think there is a general consensus that our ontologies matter for our metaethical and ethical enterprises, even as some might glory in that notion, while others bemoan this situation. There seems to be less consensus that our cosmological speculations could and/or should matter insofar as our metaphysics and moral philosophies are concerned.

Whatever our worldview, it seems to me that, on one hand, our speculative theoretical physics will not matter, for instance, insofar as the extrapolations of circum-Big Bang physics would not be of practical significance to our metaethical exercises and, for instance, our quantum mechanical models are going to totally lack explanatory adequacy insofar as issues of free will are concerned.

On the other hand, our cosmologies are integral to our ontologies, (meta)physically and, even if our cosmologies play no significant proximate role in the metaethical manufacturing departments of our various worldviews, descriptively, it seems to me that, ultimately, they are going to very much matter to the sales and marketing departments of our respective worldviews, which is to say that, if our cosmologies inform our ontologies, then our various cosmologies need to be assessed for their respective modeling powers. Rather, I should have said are �going� to be assessed.

These assessments get accomplished with such human epistemic capacities as are variously, more narrowly versus more broadly, conceived. Some stay in metaphysical apophasis, while others dwell in kataphasis and, still others attempt to nurture a tension between these two dynamisms. Our cosmological cases need to be made to all of these epistemological approaches and, if they don�t appeal to common sense and intuition, then they need to get rearticulated/re-explicated if anyone is going to buy into our metaethic by way of our ontologies. A more compelling cosmology can thus translate into a more compelling morality, like this fact or not.

What seems to happen next is that these different hermeneutical models (worldviews) do then get philosophically evaluated, either existentially, implicitly and intuitively or essentialistically, explicitly and articulately. Why the disparity in evaluations? Because different people emphasize or deemphasize, validate or invalidate, our manifold and diverse epistemic capacities and epistemological enterprises. These evaluations belong in public discourse and critique of these evaluations should follow critique in our collective pursuit of modeling power for reality. In short, philosophy matters. All of it. And I haven�t even begun to get prescriptive where this is concerned.

Prescriptively, I would recommend following that Middle Path that avoids, encratism, fideism, quietism, rationalism and pietism, by affirming a more pluralistic and more broadly conceived epistemology than that which gets apophatically dismissed (and properly so). And I say this, essentially, pragmatically.

From Chesterton�s __Orthodoxy__ : [Some seem to think that] because one incomprehensible thing constantly follows another incomprehensible thing the two together somehow make up a comprehensible thing" (pp. 56-57).

Well, Chesterton, yes and no. Regularities are indeed comprehensible, as regularities, when two things are taken together. But, indeed, cosmology and ontology, in and of themselves, are incomprehensible. HOWEVER, in MY view, we might properly infer, from their effects, the different types of causes that would exist, physically, metaphysically and meta-metaphysically and, even though unable to discern the specific nature of reality at these various levels, we can determine, with a meaningful level of confidence, that certain effects are so proper to this or that cause at this or that level of reality that they are impossible to any other. And our hermeneutical systems need to thus delineate these causes in such a way that we cannot mistake or confuse them with any other. (We need to define subjects and predicates, for example.)

This cross-posting is coming to you, instantaneously, from another version of me that is just a hubble-bubble away and interacting on a listserv for solipsists.

pax,
jb

Since you are very smart and I am but a grasshopper, I may only reveal my ignorance, but let
my try this one:
Since there are 11 dimensions or "strings" holding everything together, would it be possible to
have angels or spirit beings existing in other dimensions. Jacob saw a ladder with angels ascending
and descending. The disciples saw the transfiguration and Jesus is speaking with Moses and Elijah. Can these beings choose to reveal their dimension(s) to us at certain times. Perhaps I saw one too many Star Trek episodes michael <*))))><

re: Since there are 11 dimensions or "strings" holding everything together, would it be possible to have angels or spirit beings existing in other dimensions.

Michael - Those strings would still be part of the physical multiverse so I wouldn't equate these finite spiritual beings with anything physical.

I think another important thing at issue is whether or not miracles are possible, which, from God's side, clearly they are. Also, from the side of nature, they could be if God has thus ordained so. Some would claim that certain principles involving the uniformity of nature and its laws could be violated if such as miracles or angels were, allowed in , so to speak. But a violation implies that someone or something has exceeded the limits of their authority. Thus, for God, there are no limits. For angels, both good and bad, there are limits. What those limits are, I don't really know but insofar as the good angels are finite, personal spiritual beings and are naturally invisible, I'd suspect their visible manifestation in a physical realm might only come when they are acting as God's messengers, from his volition and not merely their own, and this would hold for any appearance in any string theory dimension or multiverse level, such appearances seeming beyond the limits of their authority.

Now, with respect to both good and bad angels, they do seem to have some power over the forces of nature and the ability to influence individuals even if they don't (can't), by nature, visibly manifest themselves. God can and does USE even demonic assaults (maybe even allowing a visible manifestation) to accomplish His purposes, so battle or not, the war is already over. Bottomline, although there are some things we might know from natural theology and metaphysics about other spiritual beings, there is a LOT to be gained regarding same from revealed theology and from their appearance in human history in almost all religious traditions, as well as Aristotle's metaphysics.

pax,
jb

Charles Hartshorne had a version of Anslem's ontological argument that he developed from modal logic. Peter Kreeft summarizes it like this:

quote:

The expression that being than which a greater cannot be thought (GCB, for short) expresses a consistent concept.

GCB cannot be thought of as:
necessarily nonexistent;
contingently existing; but only as
necessarily existing.

So, GCB can only be thought of as the kind of being that cannot not exist.

But what must be so is so.

Therefore, GCB (i.e. God) exists.

This quote is from Kreeft's Handbook of Christian Apologetics , written with Ronald Tacelli, S.J. -

The ontological arguments, for many people, aren't conclusive. They do seem, to me, to establish the existence of necessary being. We can set up a disjunctive outline such that:

1) The necessary being has to exist but could exist as either within or outside of a multiverse.

2) If within a multiverse, the multiverse, as necessary being, would have to be infinite and uncaused (unreceived existence). If outside a multiverse, the necessary being would be infinite and uncaused but the multiverse could be finite and caused.

3) If the multiverse is infinite and uncaused, then its mathematical models predict a certain symmetry that would correspond both to addition and multiplication and their inverse operations, subtraction and division. Such inverse operations on transfinite sets have profound implications for changes that occur through time such that, for instance, all of the potential past (including the future) will have already taken place, or, for instance, perhaps all events are taking place instantaneously, such as in Hawking and Tegmark's parallel universes. Also, in this truly materialist monist existence, there would indeed be no essences, no qualia, no quiddity (and this is precisely what monists maintain) inasmuch as essence and existence would be indistinguishable, thus act and potency being indistinguishable, thus all potentialities being realized.

4) If the multiverse is finite and caused, then all of the metaphysical absurdities (not to be confused with logical contradictions and mathematical errors) mentioned in item #3 go away and time is truly assymetrical, flowing one way, just like common sense suggests.

So, if we look at the Tegmark multiverse as an alternative to the Kalam cosmos, we cannot really a priori rule out either scenario and, because our physical models and their explanations rely on mathematical and rational symbol systems, we cannot, in principle, ever hope to demonstrate the proofs of their axioms, which, at this stage of our understanding are really postulates. Such postulates, through time and the advancement of our knowledge, could become very compelling inferences that eventually take on the self-evident nature of axioms. If so, then we will be able to SEE their truth even as we cannot prove those axioms in a formal system of logic or a formal mathematical model.

From a practical standpoint, maybe we ARE already able to SEE the truth in our ontological and cosmological presuppositions? Taken as a whole, the cosmological implications of either materialist or idealist monist ontologies are patently absurd, unless one totally changes one's predications of time, change and being. The only way an impersonal, infinite multiverse could temporally squeeze eternity out of its eyedropper one drop of potentiality into reality at a time, rather than have everything already having taken place or everything (all potentialities) instantaneously taking place, is to introduce intentionality, which is to say, personhood. That metaphysical maneuver would turn the necessary being of an infinite multiverse into G*d.

pax,
jb

I think that, yes, metaphysically, every possible person we could have become would exist in the universe, like wave function cascading upon wave function. I think we would be right, nonetheless, to infer that those other jokers named Phil and johnboy that married those other girls, are ontologically distinct from you and me. So, power to them and good luck

I follow, but the only problem (and it's a big one) is that I actually do exist in this universe and am actually doing this-and-not-that, so to postulate other universes based on choices-not-made doesn't seem very intuitively appealing to me. I don't see why we need all these infinite, ever-branching universes to account for choices-not-made; they simply never come to the level of reality that produced consequences necessitating a grounding in another universe. Granted, I don't know the math on any of this, but . . .

Moving toward a theological response, we can say that infinite possibilities reside in God, who is always able to providentially interact with the creation-that-is to present possibilities for realizing the destiny for which we were created.

I haven't finished reading all the rest, but thought I'd reply to this part, which seems rather pivotal.

Phil, I'll address some of the math, generically, below, Kalam vs Tegmark. I'll say this, not all physics has been intuitive or unweird -- STILL, stay with your intuitions on this one, I say!

I want to say something about cosmology and its implications for morality (or not).

1) I think there is a general consensus that our ontologies matter for our metaethical and ethical enterprises, even as some might glory in that notion, while others bemoan this situation?
2) There seems to be less consensus that our cosmological speculations could and/or should matter insofar as our metaphysics and moral philosophies are concerned?
3) Whatever our worldview, it seems to me that, on one hand, our speculative theoretical physics will not matter, for instance, insofar as the extrapolations of circum-Big Bang physics would not be of much direct and practical significance to our metaethical exercises and, for instance, our quantum mechanical models are going to totally lack explanatory adequacy insofar as issues of free will are concerned.
4) On the other hand, our cosmologies are integral to our ontologies, (meta)physically and, even if our cosmologies play no significant proximate role in the metaethical manufacturing departments of our various worldviews, descriptively speaking, it seems to me that, ultimately, they are going to very much matter to the sales and marketing departments of our respective worldviews, which is to say that, since our cosmologies inform our ontologies, our various cosmologies are going to get evaluated and modeled, however unconsciously or consciously, implicitly or explicitly, existentially or essentialistically, vis a vis their respective perceived modeling powers.
5) A more compelling cosmology might thus translate into a more compelling morality, whether we welcome this situation or not.

The American Association for the Advancement of Science has a program called �The AAAS Program of Dialogue on Science, Ethics, and Religion� and it is divided into sections: Bioethics, Evolution, Human Nature, Bioresponsibility, Cosmos and And Beyond.

In the section on Cosmos, Joel R. Primack shares his perspective in an essay, �Cosmology and Culture,� at url:
http://www.aaas.org/spp/dser/c...pectives/cosmo.shtml

Below, are three quotes from Primack�s essay that especially struck me:

1) Anthropologists tell us that in virtually all traditional cultures, a cosmology is what gives its members their fundamental sense of where they come from, who they are, and what their personal role in life's larger picture might be.

2) In the next few decades, powerful ideas of modern cosmology could inspire a spiritual renaissance, but they could also be totally ignored by almost everyone as irrelevant and elitist.

3) How well our cosmology is interpreted in language meaningful to ordinary people will determine how well its elemental stories are understood, which may in turn affect how positive the consequences for society turn out to be.

In that same section on Cosmos, IRAS� Christopher J. Corbally, S.J. shares his perspective in an essay, �Religious Implications from the Possibility of Ancient Martian Life,� at url:

http://www.aaas.org/spp/dser/c...tives/corbally.shtml

I would like to share a quote from him that seems to me to very much echo some of the sentiments expressed here regarding the Max Tegmark thread: �This brief historical review shows that philosophy and religion, working from their premises, cannot prove the existence of extraterrestrial life. However, history also shows that, where science fails to give enough evidence, premises such as plurality or uniqueness will fill any vacuum that is left. This is what happens when we work "at the limits" of science (Dick 1996, 7). There is nothing wrong in this; it is only dangerous when this happens unawares to us or to others. A powerful guard against this danger is to keep a proper relationship between science and other disciplines, particularly philosophy and theology in this case.�

One can substitute for �cannot prove the existence of extraterrestrial life� other such metaphysical matters as I have suggested are constrained by the godelian dynamism as it impacts our closed formal systems of mathematics or logic, or can substitute other meta-metaphysical matters as are occulted in principle, except for certain transcendental analogues and other than what can be observed and inferred vis a vis certain effects of what are otherwise veiled causes.

Corbally shared, in that essay, two rather ancient quotes. I will lift them out of the context that he provided in his essay and set them forth below for those who may wish to draw parallels to the Hilbert Hotel and Tegmark Condo thread:

1) First the Tegmarkian view from Epicurus: �There are infinite worlds both like and unlike this world of ours. For the atoms being infinite in number, as was already proved, are borne on far out into space. For those atoms which are of such nature that a world could be created by them or made by them, have not been used up either on one world or a limited number of worlds .... So that there nowhere exists an obstacle to the infinite number of worlds.�
(Epicurus, in Bailey 1926, 25)

2) Next, the Hilbertesque critique from Aristotle: �Either, therefore, the initial assumptions must be rejected, or there must be one center and one circumference; and given this latter fact, it follows from the same evidence and by the same compulsion, that the world must be unique. There cannot be several worlds.�
(Aristotle, in Guthrie 1953)

I can only reiterate to Epicurus and Aristotle the same thing I have counseled Tegmark and Hilbert: For this particular resolution, gentlemen, I�m afraid you�ve got a long wait.

pax,
jb

Before one feels compelled to choose between Tegmark and Kalam,
one might recall that the issue of rigorous predication of terms used in
physics, metaphysics and meta-metaphysics remains important. For instance,
insofar as the Tegmark Cosmos and Kalam Cosmos explications are seemingly
set out as over-against each other, once one predicates these
explanations� usages of the term �infinite� as either a) potential b)
actual c) transfinite or d) absolute [distinction drawn from a devout
Catholic mathematician, Georg Cantor] , one might rightly conclude that
Tegmark and Kalam are talking about two different putative realities, this
notwithstanding how weird or aesthetic one might find them. So, some may
maintain that they could be in conflict as cosmological models, maybe
others would think not. I like to look at them both ways: as in conflict
if predicated physically/metaphysically, as not even able to be in
conflict when Kalam is predicated meta-metaphysically. Tegmark�s model
seems to me to address the realms of physics and metaphysics (both
creatures to a thomist, for instance). As far as Kalam�s argument, it
seems to me that it could possibly address physical, metaphysical and/or
meta-metaphysical domains, depending on how one predicates the
term �infinite� (when speaking of creatures and/or Creator [Absolute
Infinite], for instance).

Tielhard de Chardin seems to think that we "are it". The Phenomenon of Man discovering his universe is the closest thing to God that we will ever see. Gene Roddenberry's God seems similar to me. Elron Hubbard at leasts envisions a Prime Mover
which placed us here. Alan Watts tips his hat to
Vedic Cosmology. Yogis meditating postulated something resembling the "Big Bang." The Tibetan Book of the dead and it's Egyptian predecessor envision a cosmos beyong our present reality. Mayans were looking into space along with Babalonian astrologers.Kabbalists work to understand "creation", and Christians have heaven
and perhaps hell and purgatory.
Perhaps someone will "Contact" Jodie Foster
and let her know.
A sense of awe and wonder I will thank you for. A good way to begin the day. michael <*))))><

Michael, there is truly nothing new under the sun, one on hand, and, otoh, there is God's recreation of this new day.

Chesterton once remarked at how silly it was that some folks take two incomprehensibles and note some regularities between them and then conclude that, thus taken together, they are now comprehensible!

Thanks for your on the mark thoughts and feelings. Our nonrational responses to the Mystery of it all (not to be confused with irrational) can be quite telling, too! I share your awe and wonder and appreciate your reinforcement of same in me, too.

pax,
jb

"Here is the peculiar perfection of tone and truth in the nursery tales. The man of science says, 'Cut the stalk and the apple will fall'; but he says it calmly, as if the one idea really led up to the other. The witch in the fairytale says, `Blow the horn and the ogre's castle will fall'; but she does not say it as if it were something in which the effect obviously arose out of the cause. Doubtless she has given the advice to many champions, and has seen many castles fall, but she does not lose either her wonder or her reason. She does not muddle her head until it imagines a necessary mental connection between a horn and a falling tower.... [The scientific men, on the other hand,] feel that because one incomprehensible thing constantly follows another incomprehensible thing the two together somehow make up a comprehensible thing" (pp. 56-57).

"This elementary wonder, however, is not a mere fancy derived from the fairy tales; on the contrary, all the fire of the fairy tales is derived from this. Just as we all like love tales because there is an instinct of sex, we all like astonishing tales because they touch the nerve of the ancient instinct of astonishment" (pp. 58-59).

From Chesterton's _Orthodoxy_

"Even if there is only one possible unified theory, it is just a set of rules and equations. What is it that breathes fire into the equations and makes a universe for them to describe? The usual approach of science of constructing a mathematical model cannot answer the question of why there should be a universe for the model to describe." Stephen Hawking

Alan Watts wrote about the Wisdom of Insecurity. Perhaps it is wise, but it has been very disorienting for me in recent months. My cosmology is challenged by those who say that Mysticism = no longer Christian any more. All roads lead to God.
The Bible is unreliable. The disciples forged the account based on what they gleaned from old testament prophesies, etc. It was Midrash writing and never meant to be taken literally. There is no Virgin Birth, no Incarnation, no Atonement or Trinity. The early Church Councils suppressed reincarnation and were mainly interested in political control,etc. It goes on and on.
I read Paul Tillich and wonder if there is any other cosmology than "God as the ground of our being". What ever happened to Orthodoxy? Has it all been a mistake? Should I follow Bishop Spong and Marcus Borg and the Jesus Seminar? Should I become a Gnostic like Elaine Pagels and embrace the Gospel of Thomas and the Nag Hammadi scrolls.
It is all quite disorienting. I would like to let go of my overattachment to my version of the truth, but must I let go of the truth also?

baffled.com <*))))><

re: I would like to let go of my overattachment to my version of the truth, but must I let go of the truth also?

One thing that all of the different perspectives or hermeneutics or worldviews, or whatever one wants to call them, have in common, seems to be FAITH in human reason. All seem to make this particular leap , even those nihilists and relativists who assert nothing else other than our inability to find meaning or who claim that there is no indubitable datum of any type. The truth seems to be inescapable even to those who believe that the only truth is that there is no truth? Hans Kung thus talks about our fundamental trust in uncertain reality.

Kung notes that some folks simply take reality's trustworthiness as a given, while others attempt to justify why it is that they trust reality. Kung suggests that an unjustified trust in uncertain reality is nowhere anchored and paradoxical. Contrastingly, people of faith, of the great traditions, take another leap as they attempt to justify their first leap, which was trust in human reason. People of faith turn to revelation, to revealed truth, which is perhaps just to suggest that all peoples of faith believe that, if there is truth to be found in reality, however uncertain reality itself is, then that truth didn't place itself there of its own accord.

Some faiths then go on to affirm both natural and divine revelation, others divine revelation, alone. Divine revelation is typically articulated as both a spoken and written word in both oral and written traditions. Natural revelation requires the use of human reason to discover the God of the philosophers and of metaphysics and can only say so much about God prior to being augmented by divine revelation.

Now, undeniably, it is all quite disorienting and befuddling because, for instance, on what basis do people who affirm only divine revelation then choose between the manifold and diverse divine revelations that have been claimed down through the millenia? Clearly, there must be a role for human reason, never really unaided by grace even if sometimes failing to cooperate with same?

And how would the role of reason play itself out? I think that faith and reason, fides et ratio, play themselves out as metaphysics, as a philosophy of nature (affirming science and philosophy) and as natural theology AND also as lives well-lived in conformity to the Gospel. Without philosophy, metaphysics and natural theology, there can be no reasoned appeals made to one revealed theology versus another. At the same time, we mustn't forget, however, that some reasoning is played out implicitly in people's lives, that while many people may not essentialistically articulate their faith, still, all must attempt to existentially live out its truths. For instance, those who follow the imperative to Love one another as I have loved you may give others all the reason they need in order to embrace the truth of the Gospel. Still, we don't forget that we are also challenged to be able to give a ready answer for our lively faith (just not as noisy gongs or clanging cymbals).

Specifically, when it comes to Bishop Spong and the Jesus Seminar and such, when we begin our discussion of Christology on the Christian Mysteries forum, their inadequacies will be exposed. Regarding Paul Tillich's ground of being , I truly believe we must retain its lessons when considering, for instance, Teilhard's omega point . As for Elaine Pagels' work, I'd appreciate a good book review re: how she treats the Gospel of Thomas or a concise summary here inasmuch as I am unfamiliar with Pagel's book.

pax!
jb

Michael, I think you got a good reply from JB.

I will add that no matter how we slice or dice it, at some point reason alone cannot provide the ultimate answers. That's where faith comes in, and part of your question as I hear it is where to place one's faith? We don't want a faith that goes against what reason can point to as truth, but even with that acknowledged, it seems there are many posible pathways.

For me, the non-negotiables are first and foremost the life and teachings of Jesus, and the Church's doctrinal elaborations on the meanings which flow from them. Dogma, in particular, is important. People today associate that with being "dogmatic," but what dogma really points to is that which is indispensable for coming to an orthodox (i.e., straight-thinking) understanding of the meaning of Christ. This is not to say that all dogmas are incapable of being reformulated for better understanding by a culture, only that they are intended to be foundational for developing the kind of faith that Christ invites for purposes of his communicating the divine fullness.

It is against the cornerstone of Church dogma that I evaluate the kinds of questions and concerns you're raising. Sometimes, there are exciting possibilities for developing a deeper understanding and appreciation; sometimes, they lead away from orthodoxy.

(Aside: perhaps JB would say something at some point on how his dialogues with scientists and philosophers led him to an appreciation of orthodox teaching.)

Of course, the point I'm making raises the question of "what dogma" and why should one believe the affirmations of one tradition instead of another.

My trust, here, is in the promise of Christ that his Spirit would lead us to the fulness of truth and that the gates of hell would not prevail against our understanding of such truth. Unto this end, it is helpful to note that the essential dogmas of Christianity concerning God and the meaning of Christ were developed and cherished long before the various splits began to rock Christendom. It is precisely assent to these basic dogmas which links the Catholic, Orthodox and Protestant traditions and continues to present the world with a message that can rightly be called "Christian."

I hope this makes sense. I'm not sure how it all relates to the issue of parallel universes, except at some point even hypotheses like that need to be evaluated in the light of dogmas, or whatever lesser doctrines might have relevance.

I can say that from my dialogue with other viewpoints I have come to a deeper understanding of my own. Especially revealing has been how many of the philosophical and metaphysical debates that rage in modernity are exactly the same issues that were raised by the ancient Greeks, by the early Church fathers in the Patristic period and by Aquinas and the scholastics of medieval times. Their philosophy and metaphysics, although autonomous from the faith, was clearly illuminated by their Christian faith. That philosophical work has been timeless and resilient.

Although the work of philosophy & metaphysics versus natural theology can be distinguished, taken together they can accomplish much for different people. For some people, they present sound arguments that compel faith. For others, they present sound arguments that demonstrate that faith is not unreasonable, even if not conclusively rationally demonstrable. For people within the faith, these arguments can bolster their faith.

Also, for people in the faith, what can be known about God from natural theology, however meager, can be indispensable for exploring the Divine Attributes and gaining a knowledge of the First Cause, although not of Its precise nature, at least by Its effects, which, minimally, can be delineated as effects as could be proper to no other Cause.

Natural theology and a good philosophy of nature also can aid us in matching our various epistemic capacities with those objects to which they most properly correspond in proportion, in genus and in species, both logical and natural, discriminating between the physical, the metaphysical and the meta-metaphysical.

Natural theology and philosophy can illuminate our scientific efforts, our metaphysical speculations and such, always mindfully aware of when we may or may not be conflating our ologies with our isms , which is not necessarily perilous as long as we are both aware of and up-front about what we are doing (truth in labeling).

Natural theology and philosophy can be useful, even when not completely and explicitly demonstrating (iow, proving ) the truths inherent in their propositions, if only by helping one reduce the rejection of those propositions to absurdity. This is because, sometimes, such as with competing cosmologies, alternate worldviews can be free of logical fallacy and free of mathematical error and even logically consistent and internally coherent while otherwise mutually exclusive. In such cases, natural theology and philosophy can then help us in a reductio ad absurdum analysis as we extrapolate certain metaphysics and philosophies to their logical conclusions, sometimes revealing patently absurd putative physical realities such as parallel universes, not, so to speak, very externally congruent in the end (to tie in more directly to the thread). [Caveat: Still, we must recall that it is not really HOW things are but THAT things are, which is the mystical - per Wittgenstein, even as we might assert that reality is not only stranger than we imagine, it is stranger than we CAN imagine - per Haldane.]

As Phil alluded to earlier, I told him before that, often when stumped by the panel of those who practice scientism, for example, when I turned more toward the orthodox teachings of old, such as of Aristotle or Aquinas or even the early neo-platonists, I often regained my competitive polemical edge.

Finally, natural theology and its praeambulae fidei can help support the reasonableness of our assent to the mysteria fidei , though in no way does it turn that assent into a movement of pure reason rather than a leap of faith .

That's just what comes off the top of my head!

pax,
jb

Perhaps we could segue from this thread and the God of the Greeks, now, to this thread in The Christian Mysteries Forum , where we can more fully explore Jesus, who transformed our understanding of the Unknown God of Philosophy. We can discuss and critique the work of the Jesus Seminar, the views of Bishop Spong, and other such matters as Michael brought up as any of you are so led, moving from natural revelation to divine revelation.

pax,
jb

The Editors of US Catholic Interview Elaine Pagels

Book Reviews in America: Beyond Belief: The Secret Gospel of Thomas by By Elaine Pagels

Eric Corbman from Randolph, NJ - Book Review at Amazon makes some good points about Pagel's work:

quote:

1) It seems to buy into the modern trend of thinking of Gnosticism as the "good" Christianity that should have won out, all the while ignoring its less desirable aspects.

2) I also disagree with her saying that Gnosticism is in any way more true to general mystic principles than Catholic mystics like St. Teresa and St. John of the Cross.

3) Pagel's version of "gnosis" is no more revolutionary than the Catholic/Orthodox dogma of divinization/theosis.

4) If anything, orthodox Christianity on this point [theosis] is more empowering because it affirms material existence, saying that Jesus was man, was flesh. Gnosticism separates Christ thoroughly from us, making us totally depraved by nature, as in modern Protestantism.

5) Pagels seems to forward the idea that Gnosticism is unique in saying that God's Light is in all of us. That's untrue ...